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ABSTRACT 
In most developing countries, the provision and supply of public infrastructures 
and services were, until recently, under the total control of the public authorities. 
However, because of inefficiencies, corruption, lack of skills and technical know-
how that had plagued, and in fact still continue to plague, the provision and supply 
of public infrastructure through the traditional public procurement model, as well 
as the need to harness private capital and expertise, the governments of these 
countries began to divest themselves of their monopoly in the provision and supply 
of infrastructures. This paradigm shift from ‘government providing’ to 
‘government enabling’ approach necessitates the smart synergy of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). Far more importantly, PPPs also serve as a catalyst for social-
economic development for the country. In recognition of the vital role that PPPs 
could play in nation’s infrastructure development, governments, especially of the 
more progressive developing countries have put in place policies and have 
embarked on enacting legislations with the aim of regulating PPPs in their 
respective jurisdictions. These laws seek to ensure transparency, accountability and 
a level playing field between the government and the private sector partners. This 
thesis, therefore, examines the existing legislative framework in Ghana, Nigeria 
and South Africa as well as the core international frameworks with the aim of 
making specific recommendations for each of the jurisdictions examined as well as 
recommending a model regulatory framework for developing countries intending 
to adopt PPPs to mend their infrastructure deficits. This study adopted a qualitative 
method of legal research which involved both empirical and library-based study. 
The study demonstrates that generally speaking the current legislative framework 
of South Africa is by far more comprehensive than that of either Ghana or Nigeria 
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and, hence, can well serve as a national PPP framework for other developing 
countries subject to some changes and adjustments to suit the local conditions and 
circumstances. The study also concludes that there is an urgent need to review and 
revise the UNCITRAL Law on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects so as to 
better serve as an international legislative model or instrument on PPPs. 
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ABSTRAK 
Dalam kebanyakan negara-negara membangun, penyediaan dan pembekalan 
infrastruktur dan perkhidmatan-perkhidmatan adalah, sehingga baru-baru ini, di 
bawah kawalan pihak-pihak berkuasa awam sepenuhnya. Walau bagaimanapun, 
kerana ketidakcekapan, rasuah, kekurangan kemahiran dan pengetahuan teknikal 
yang melanda, dan sebenarnya masih terus melanda, penyediaan dan pembekalan 
infrastruktur awam melalui model perolehan awam tradisional, serta keperluan 
untuk menikmati penanaman modal dan kepakaran pihak swasta, kerajaan-kerajaan 
negara-negara ini mulai melepaskan monopoli mereka dalam penyediaan dan 
pembekalan infrastruktur. Peralihan paradigma daripada pendekatan 'kerajaan 
menyediakan' kepada ‘kerajaan membolehkan' memerlukan sinergi pintar 
Perkongsian Awam-Swasta (PAS). Jauh lebih penting lagi, PAS juga bertindak 
sebagai pemangkin kepada pembangunan sosio-ekonomi negara. Bagi 
mengiktirafkan peranan penting yang PAS boleh mainkan dalam pembangunan 
infrastruktur negara, kerajaan negara-negara membangun yang lebih progresif telah 
memulakan penggubalan undang-undang dengan tujuan untuk mengawal selia PAS 
dalam bidangkuasa mereka masing-masing setelah menyiapkan dasar-dasar 
sokongan yang berkenaan. Undang-undang ini bertujuan untuk memastikan 
ketelusan, kebertanggungjawaban dan tahap sama rataan antara kerajaan dengan 
rakan-rakan kongsi sektor swasta. Tesis ini, oleh itu, bertujuan mengkaji semula 
rangka perundangan yang sedia ada di Ghana, Nigeria dan Afrika Selatan serta 
rangka-rangka antarabangsa teras yang berkaitan dengan tujuan membuat 
cadangan-cadangan khusus bagi setiap bidang kuasa yang dikaji serta 
mengesyorkan suatu rangka kawal seliaan sebagai model bagi negara-negara 
membangun yang bercadang untuk menerima pakai PAS untuk memperbaiki dan 
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mengatasi defisit infrastruktur mereka. Kajian ini mengguna pakai suatu kaedah 
penyelidikan undang-undang secara kualitatif yang melibatkan kedua-dua kajian 
empirikal dan kajian perpustakaan. Kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa secara amnya 
rangka perundangan semasa di Afrika Selatan adalah jauh lebih menyeluruh 
daripada apa yang sedia ada di Ghana atau Nigeria. Justru itu, ia juga boleh 
berfungsi sebagai rangka PAS kebangsaan bagi negara-negara membangun lain 
tertakluk kepada beberapa perubahan dan penyelarasan untuk disesuaikan dengan 
syarat-syarat dan keadaan-keadaan tempatan. Kajian ini juga menyimpulkan 
bahawa terdapat keperluan untuk menyemak semula Undang-undang UNCITRAL 
untuk Projek Infrastruktur Biayaan Swasta bagi tujuan penambahbaikan sebagai 
suatu model perundangan antarabangsa atau instrumen untuk PAS. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Investment in infrastructure is the key to economic growth, quality of life, poverty 
reduction and, access to education and healthcare, and helps in achieving many of 
the goals of a robust economy.1 The recent trend from public to private provision 
of infrastructure has been underpinned by a marked change in thinking and 
practice, reinforced by technological changes and institutional innovations.2 In 
recent time, a worldwide movement has taken place towards Public Private 
Partnerships3 and deregulation,4 signaling an intellectual revival in free markets. 
 
Governments all over the world have sought for the participation of private sector 
in the delivery of public services which were traditionally within the domain of 
public authorities. The levels of involvements vary and have taken different forms 
ranging from Privatization of erstwhile public enterprises to contracting out of 
services and of recent, the use of Public-Private Partnerships in the provision of 
social and economic infrastructures necessary for the development of a nation.5 
Privatisation is the most common of these initiatives and it has been adopted by 
several countries especially in Europe, Asia and Latin America.6 Contracting out of 
government services has also been widespread. Recently, Public Private 
Partnerships in infrastructure development have increasingly been of special 
interest to most developing countries as an alternative to traditional public 
procurement system. 
                                                          
1 Jefferey Delmon, Public Private Partnership Projects in Infrastructure: An Essential Guide for Policy Makers, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2011). 1 
2Darrin Grimsey and M. K. Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and 
Project Finance (Edward Elger Publishing Limited,2007) Page 30. 
3PPP is used here in its most inclusive form, to mean any contractual or legal relationship between any public and private 
bodies  aimed at improving  and/ or expanding infrastructural services, but excluding public works contract. 
4 This means the reduction or elimination of government power in a particular industry, usually enacted to create more 
competition within the industry. 
5 Bing Li and Akintola Akingboye, “ An Overview of Public Private Partnership”, In Akintola Akintoye, Mathias Beck, and 
Cliff Hardcastle (eds)  Public Private Partnerships: Managing Risks and Opportunities (Blackwell Publishing Company: 
Oxford, 2008) Page 29.  
6 There are several Countries that have adopted this politico-economic policy. Prominent among them are China, Brazil, 
India, Russia, Poland, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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The idea of Government in Nigeria divesting itself of its interest in commercial 
enterprises started in the early 80s.7 Because of the government monopoly in 
businesses, the experience of Government in Nigeria had been very similar to that 
of the United Kingdom. Almost all the businesses in the country became virtually 
unsuccessful. The magnitude of the failure of these businesses became very 
apparent when the government realized that it had failed even though it had no 
competitors. 
 
By the late 1980s, the Nigerian government began to open up to a more private 
sector-led economy. The government started to engage the private sector in 
dialogue on economic policy making.8 However, due to the long military rule in 
the country which gave no active role to the private sector in development, the 
private sector had become weakened and lacked the capacity to constructively 
prioritize and implement reforms.  The resumption of military rule in the early 
1990s forestalled the limited economic progress made, but with the return to 
democracy in 1999, economic policy again shifted in favor of a more open, private 
sector-led economy.  At this time, effective representation by the private sector 
became critical to national economic policy deliberations. 
  
In the same vein, Ghana’s experience is similar to that of Nigeria. The long 
military rule which the country went through had weakened the private sector. 
However, since the return of democracy in 1992, the country has equally laid a 
solid foundation for the private sector participation in development. The 1992 
constitution expressly gives the private sector the right to participate in economic 
activities in order to increase its investment in infrastructure and other economic 
                                                          
7This was the Privatisation and Commercialization Decree No. 25 of 1988; later redesigned “Act”. 
8 M. I. Agboli and J. J. Emery, “Encouraging Effective Dialogue and Advocacy in Nigeria: The Public-Private Dialogue”. 
Retrieved from www.publicprivatedialogue.org/.../The%20Better%20Business%20lni. Accessed on 04.03.12. 
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activities.9 Investment in Public-service delivery has not matched the population 
growth. The World Bank estimates that Ghana needs over US$1 Billion annually to 
address its infrastructure challenges.10 
 
South Africa has the greatest cumulative experience in the practice of Public-
Private cooperation. The Public-Private Partnership programme has over 50 
projects executed at both the National and Provincial levels and over 300 projects 
executed at the municipal level since 1994.11The South African National Treasury 
which is the ministry that is responsible for the approvals of these deals, has built 
on almost a decade of PPPs, and has developed a PPP Manual and Standardized 
PPP Provisions to guide all projects of this nature.12 
 
South African Public-Private Partnerships programme has been a success story. 
The rate of the development of infrastructure is rather unimaginable; electricity, 
rail, roads, airports, ports and water are all expanding rapidly.13 Clear Public-
Private Partnership laws, processes and standard terms; independent judiciary; 
strong political commitment; strong financial market and competitive private sector 
and sound monitoring measures are part of the success factors in the Public-Private 
Partnerships programme.14  
 
It is on the above premise that this research will examine the existing legal and 
regulatory framework for Public Private Partnerships in Ghana and Nigeria and to 
draw lessons from South Africa and other regional and international legislative 
                                                          
9 See S.36 (2) of the Ghanaian 1992 Constitution. 
10See Threading a Public Private Partnership Path that Works”, Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/july-2011-policy/364-treading-a-public-private-partnership-path-that-
works.html. Accessed on 17.05.12. 
11Peter Farlam ‘Putting Partnerships Together’. <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/4/34867724.pdf>. Accessed on01.05.12. 
12Ibid. 
13 Sikhumbuzo Gqoli, Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa.Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/10/35624345.pdf. Accessed on 19.04.12. 
14 Ibid. 
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frameworks. Hence, the research will look at the practical application of the legal 
and regulatory framework  especially in the selected countries such that where the 
application of these  legal and regulatory  frameworks are inadequate, proposal  
will be made to the appropriate authorities to legislate laws that will complement 
the already existing ones. 
 
1.1  Statement of Problem 
Nigeria and Ghana suffer from a huge deficit in terms of key infrastructures.15 The 
available infrastructures are not also being operated or maintained satisfactorily. In 
Nigeria, the existing network of highways in the country is not only inadequate but 
also largely in a deplorable state. A vast section of the country remains 
unconnected to the national grid and the areas connected suffer from epileptic 
power supply most of the time.16 The same unsatisfactory state of affairs applies to 
other infrastructures with the possible exception of telecommunication which has 
enjoyed very significant private sector investments in recent times.17 
 
The state of infrastructure in Ghana and Nigeria currently does not meet the 
requirement for economic development. Recent reports suggest that Nigeria 
requires USD100 Billion (about 15 Trillion Naira) for the next Ten Years in order 
to meet her infrastructural requirements.18The World Bank recommends that 7-9 % 
                                                          
15 Section 36 of the Infrastructural Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, e.t.c) Act 2005 defines 
“Infrastructure” to  include development projects which, before the commencement of the Act, were financed, constructed, 
operated or maintained  by the government and which, after the commencement of the Act  may be wholly or partly 
implemented by the private sector under an agreement pursuant to the Act including but not limited to power plants, 
highways, seaport, airports, canals, dams, hydroelectric power projects, water supply, irrigation, telecommunications, 
railways, interstate transport systems, land reclamation projects, environmental remediation and clean-up projects, industrial 
estates or township development, housing, government buildings, tourism development projects, trade fair complexes, 
warehouses, solid wastes management, satellite and ground receiving stations, information technology networks and 
database infrastructure, education and health facilities, sewerage, drainage, dredging, and other infrastructure and 
development projects as may be approved, from time to time, by the Federal Executive Council. 
16B. O. Babalakin, Public Private Partnership: Infrastructure Development as a vehicle for Economic Development. Being a 
Paper Presented at the 2nd Mustapha Akanbi Public Lecture Organised by the faculty of Law University of Ilorin, July, 2009.  
 
17 The Federal Government of Nigeria granted the first license to Mobile Telecommunications Network (MTN) in August 
2001. 
18See the statement made by the Central Bank Governor of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/cbn-advocates-creation-of-nigeria-infrastructure-fund/87067/ accessed on 04.03.12. 
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of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP]19 of the developing countries like Ghana, 
Nigeria and other developing countries should be invested in infrastructure.20 
 
Today, Ghana's infrastructure development is relatively poor, both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms, in spite of its growing economic wealth.21 Investment in 
public infrastructure in recent times has not matched the increasing need of the 
population. The nation's railway network had suffered serious neglect before it is 
currently being given government attention. Underinvestment in road 
transportation, electricity, housing, water and sanitation has posed a serious 
challenge to the government in its quest for rapid development. The World Bank 
has estimated that for Ghana to fill its infrastructure gaps, the country needs over 
US$1.5 billion annually for the next ten years in various sectors of the economy.22 
The investment required exceeds government total revenues available in the short 
term. These infrastructures and related investments are critical in helping these 
countries to achieve 13% Annual Growth government target and to be in one of the 
world’s 20 largest economies by the year 2020.23 
 
It is therefore apparent from these facts that the government alone, at the best of 
times lacks the capacity to provide the infrastructure requirements of the nation. 
This clearly underscores the need for the active participation of the private sector 
through the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) schemes to supplement the efforts of 
government in the provision of critical infrastructures. 
                                                          
19This is the total monetary value of all goods and services produced domestically by a country. 
20 See:  Can Infrastructure Investment Generate Growth? Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTINFRA/0,,contentMDK:23154473~pagePK:64168445~piPK
:64168309~theSitePK:8430730,00.html, accessed on 15.06.12. It has also been said that improved infrastructure quality 
accounted for about 30% of growth attributed to infrastructure in developing countries. 
21 Treading a public private partnership path that works. Available at  <http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/july-
2011-policy/364-treading-a-public-private-partnership-path-that-works.html>. Accessed on 09.11.13. 
22 See Ghana-PPP Projects. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P125595/ghana-ppp-project?lang=en>. 
Accessed on 13.11.13. 
23See the statement made by Chief Earnest Shoneka, Chairman Nigerian  Infrastructural Concession and Regulatory 
Commission.  http://allafrica.com/stories/201004200328.html Accessed on 04.03.12. 
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The government of Ghana and Nigeria are moving from the role of infrastructure 
developers and operators to facilitators. The governments believe that PPPs will 
optimize achievement of their goal of adequate infrastructure services that support 
the full mobilization and realisation of all economic growth and will help resolve 
problems related to traditional procurement such as inefficiency, unreliability and 
poor fiscal management.24 
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a formal collaboration between a public body 
such as the Federal Government or a sub-national authority, and one or more 
private companies generally, with the objective of procuring private capital, 
management, technology and other resources as a means of enhancing 
infrastructure service delivery. PPPs, through which private companies work with 
public sector to manage complex infrastructure programmes and develop public 
services, are increasingly being used throughout the world as a solution to major 
public projects. 
 
It is as a result of these and other reasons that the National Assembly of Nigeria 
enacted the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, 
etc.) Act of 2005 (hereinafter called ICRC Act) to allow the Federal Government 
Ministry, agency, corporation or body involved in the financing, construction, 
operation, or maintenance of infrastructure to enter into contract with or grant 
concession to any pre-qualified project proponent in the private sector for the 
financing, construction, operation or maintenance of any infrastructure in 
Nigeria.25 
 
                                                          
24 See the Project Appraisal Report of the African Development Fund accessed from 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/NIGERIA%20-%20PAR%20%20-
%20CB4PPPi%20(2).pdf on 06.03.12. 
25 See Section 1 of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Establishment Act 2005. 
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However, despite the enactment of this Act, the PPP scheme has not made any 
appreciable impact at closing the infrastructure gap for which the Act was 
established due to lack of comprehensive legal and regulatory framework and lack 
of access to long-term financing. These have constituted serious impediments to 
the successful delivery of infrastructures through the Public-Private Partnerships 
arrangement in Nigeria. 
 
Before the enactment of the ICRC Act in Nigeria, traditional procurement 
legislations and regulations have been adopted which usually include stipulations 
that the government can unilaterally terminate the agreement and forfeit the 
performance bond. The position of government has been that they can unilaterally 
terminate contracts as long as the termination is bona-fide and for the purposes of 
public interest. This concept clashes with the fundamental principle of party 
autonomy not only in infrastructure agreements but also in various international 
business transactions where states are involved.26 
 
It is as a result of the above stated problems that the researcher has raised some 
questions which this research will address in order to suggest solutions and 
recommend reforms.  
 
1.2  Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are: 
1. To examine and evaluate the legal and regulatory framework for Public-Private 
Partnerships in infrastructure development in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa 
and other core international legislative framework;   
                                                          
26 Mohamed A.M.Ismail, International Infrastructure Agreements and PPP in Developing Countries: Substantive Principles, 
(2011) EPPPL Journal, Vol. 3. 
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2. To analyse the roles and responsibilities of the regulatory agencies under the 
relevant regulations, laws and conventions;  
3. To identify the issues and challenges facing the implementation of PPP in 
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa after their adoption; and 
4. To propose reforms and recommendations in order to close the gaps in the 
existing legislative framework for PPPs in these countries as well as the 
international agencies. 
 
1.3  Research Questions 
The researcher therefore raises some questions which the study seeks to address. 
These are: 
1. What are the relevant laws governing the private sector participation in the 
provision and development of infrastructure through PPP in Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa? 
2. Whether the present legal and regulatory framework for Public-Private 
Partnerships in the three selected countries is adequate? 
3. What are the challenges facing the Ghanaian, Nigerian and South African 
Authorities in the implementation of PPP laws in their respective jurisdictions?  
4. Whether the UNCITRAL Model Law on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects and Other International Legislative Framework on PPPs could 
effectively assist in the making of an ideal national PPP Model law? 
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1.4  Research Methodology 
The researcher adopts a qualitative method of legal research. The qualitative legal 
research encompasses both doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches. The 
methodology involves both empirical and library-based study involving the 
analysis of primary and secondary literature. In order to complete the first objective 
of this research work, namely; to examine and evaluate the legal and regulatory 
framework for Public Private Partnerships in infrastructure development in Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa as well as other international legislative frameworks, this 
research work looked at the primary sources which are the PPP legislations and 
other internal rules made by the regulatory bodies of the selected countries. These 
include:  
1. The 1992 Ghanaian Constitution, National Policy on Public Private 
Partnerships, Public Procurement Act 2003, Financial Administration Act 2003 
and Financial Administration Regulations 2004 and other relevant laws on 
PPPs in Ghana; 
2. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory 
Commission (Establishment) Act of 2005, Public Procurement Act of 2007, 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and other relevant laws in Nigeria; 
3. The South African Constitution of 1996, Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA), Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) 2003 Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act, The Black Economic Empowerment Act 
2003, Treasury Regulation 16 and other relevant laws; and 
4. Other regional and international legislative frameworks such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs), 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO’s) Guidelines 
for Infrastructure Development through Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT), 
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The OECD “BASIC Elements of Law on Concession Agreements” 2000; 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD’s) “Core 
Principles on Modern Concession Law” (2006) and the European 
Commission’s Directives on the Award of Concessions. 
 
The secondary sources that were used in this research work are: text books, journal 
articles, internet, newspaper reports, international documents, reports and other 
relevant materials. The use and analysis of the secondary materials at this point 
was considered quite interesting. This is because, it has helped the researcher to 
understand the practical constraints facing the legal and regulatory framework that 
could not be easily identified by the analysis of only the primary materials.  
 
The non-doctrinal method adopted in this research includes the interviews of 
relevant stakeholders in the field of PPPs in the three selected countries. Semi-
formal interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders in the field of PPPs in 
the three selected countries (Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa), such as academics, 
Concessioners, attorneys, Staff of the relevant PPP regulatory agencies, educated 
persons and other members of the public. The names of the interviewees and the 
questionnaire are contained in Appendix A of this thesis.  
 
Specifically, interviews were conducted in Nigeria at the following offices; Legal 
Department of the Infrastructure Concession Commission in Abuja which is the 
main regulator of Public-Private Partnership Projects in the Nigeria; a PPP 
Practitioner of Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited was also interviewed in Lagos. The 
office is one of the major players and advisors on infrastructure development in 
Nigeria; two academic from the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Abuja and 
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University of Ilorin (both in Nigeria) respectively were also interviewed. In Ghana, 
interviews were conducted at the Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) in Accra. The PID is the main 
regulator of PPPs in Ghana. The dean, faculty of law University of Cape-Coast was 
also interviewed. To further understand the prospects and challenges facing PPPs 
in South Africa, the researcher beamed his searchlight to the PPP Unit of the 
National Treasury in Pretoria where he interviewed an official in the Unit.  The 
Head of Chambers of Ledwaba Mazwai Attorneys, a leading firm in the provision 
of legal services relating to procurement, drafting, and implementation of delivery 
of infrastructure project in South Africa was also interviewed. The Head of the 
Department of International Law and Development of the University of Pretoria 
was also interviewed among others.   
  
A less structured interview technique was adopted. In the process, interviewees 
were encouraged to talk freely about the adequacy and practical constraints 
experienced in the application and enforcement of the rules governing PPPs in their 
respective jurisdictions. Those interactions have greatly contributed to a better 
understanding of the practical context in which the laws and regulations are 
applied. Moreover, the discussions have also greatly contributed to the other 
objectives of this thesis by helping to identify and understand the prospects and 
challenges facing the implementation of the laws and regulations of PPPs in these 
countries. 
 
Documentary research for the review of the current legislations was mainly carried 
out through library research at both the Tan Sri Professor Ahmad Ibrahim Law 
Library and the University of Malaya Main Library. Internet Materials, using the 
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University of Malaya Database and other search engines have really been very 
useful for this research.  
 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
There is little comprehensive research on the regulatory framework for Public-
Private Partnerships in infrastructure development, and generally no empirical 
research on the use of PPPs to procure public infrastructure especially in Nigeria 
and Ghana. The study therefore hopes to contribute to both theoretical and 
empirical literature by examining the regulatory framework of the three selected 
countries together with international best practices with the aim of recommending a 
model legal and regulatory framework for Public-Private Partnerships which can 
guide all developing countries with common law origin in particular that have 
adopted or may want to adopt PPPs as a solution to their infrastructure deficits.  
 
Secondly, a close observation of the Public Private Partnership programme 
especially in Nigeria and Ghana will reveal that it has been a mixed grill. There 
have been remarkable progress, but there are also challenges. The challenges 
facing private participation in operation and maintenance of public infrastructures 
in Ghana and Nigeria are beyond cultural, funding, political and even economic 
factors. The lack of a clear cut policy on it and an inchoate nature of the legal 
framework are largely responsible for these challenges. This therefore necessitates 
a thorough examination of the Public-Private Partnership programme by looking at 
its legal and the regulatory framework. The study will therefore make appropriate 
recommendations to close the gap in the existing regulatory regime. 
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Thirdly, as at the time of writing this research, the African Union (AU) does not 
have any legislative framework to govern Public-Private Partnerships in 
Infrastructure Development and thus, may be interested to draw lessons from this 
research while drafting the regulations on PPP for the Union.27 This will greatly 
help the nations of the union and other developing countries to consolidate and 
harmonise the laws for the development of the continent. 
 
An effective, credible and sustainable legal and regulatory framework is crucial 
and essential for the promotion and fostering of successful PPP projects. It is the 
sincere hope of the researcher that this study will increase understanding of how 
best to use PPPs in developing countries and it will thus interest all stakeholders in 
PPP contract awards such as private firms, governmental agencies and lawyers. It 
is further hoped that the study will be of great interest to policy makers in PPPs and 
Public Procurement. 
 
During all stages of PPPs, there must be a clear and transparent legal and 
regulatory framework that both parties can trust. Clarity in the regulatory 
framework will also help to minimise the risk of corruption and prevent unethical 
behaviour. No country can grow without the right guiding principles and laws 
regulating economic development. In essence, the right kind of legal and regulatory 
framework must be well established so as to achieve the desirable goals. A 
formidable legal system is therefore indispensable to the realization of a 
developing economy. 
 
                                                          
27 Also the ASEAN Region could also draw from the recommendations to develop a legal and regulatory framework for 
PPPs and Public Procurement. 
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It is hoped that the ultimate outcomes of this research project will be of great 
relevance and significance to other developing countries whose legal and 
regulatory framework on the same are still struggling to come to grips with the 
actual operating mechanics governing the same.28 
 
1.6 Choice of Jurisdictions 
There are three countries selected for this study. These countries are all developing 
countries in Africa and they are the most developed in terms of common law and 
regulations within the African continent. 
 
South Africa has developed a very comprehensive PPP Procurement regulation 
which makes it an ideal candidate for this study. The country has adopted a highly 
regulated and formal approach to public procurement and Public-Private 
Partnerships by entrenching Constitutional provisions as well as binding legislation 
and regulations to achieve the procurement objectives. The Administrative Law in 
South Africa has developed at an unprecedented manner making the country to be 
one of the best in the world in terms of administrative laws and regulations.29  
 
In addition, there is available research that South Africa has incorporated various 
anti-corruption measures into its procurement regulations generally, and the effects 
of such mechanisms on the machinery of government will be great.30 The study 
will therefore examine the manner in which the PPPs in South Africa are structured 
and applied, and lessons gathered from this jurisdiction will be recommended to 
other developing countries particularly those with common law background.  
                                                          
28 There are many countries that have PPPs but with no clear legal framework. Examples are Malaysia, Thailand among 
others. 
29 The South African Constitution provides for Just Administrative Actions and the parliament has enacted the 
Administrative Justice Act to ensure that official conducts of all officials are just, fair and reasonable. 
30 Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement:  A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures. Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December, 2011. 
  
15 
 
Nigeria is a developing nation with huge human and material resources. The 
country has an estimated population of about 170 million people, it is the 13th 
largest producer of oil and gas and the 10th largest in oil reserves.31 Like many 
developing countries, the country has a huge infrastructure deficit. It also has a 
very high potential for high returns on infrastructure investment. There exists huge 
opportunities within its infrastructure landscape which should make it a preferable 
choice for private investment in infrastructure.32 The country has since 2005 
adopted the PPP initiative as a solution to its huge infrastructure gap. Despite this, 
there have been serious challenges facing the operation of the PPP initiative. This 
study will therefore examine the existing legal and regulatory regime with a view 
to making recommendations from lessons learnt from other jurisdictions. 
 
Ghana’s wealth of resources, dynamic economy as well as stable political system 
makes it one of Africa’s leading lights. Peaceful political transition and firm 
commitments to democracy and the rule of law are really helping the country to 
gain the world confidence in recent times. The country is attracting well-known 
international businesses that are currently investing in various sectors of the 
economy. The country is therefore committed to improving her infrastructure 
through the Public-Private Partnership initiative. The parliament in Ghana is in the 
gradual process of coming up with a legislative framework for PPPs for the 
country. This research work will therefore speculate on the possible outcome of the 
Ghanaian PPP legislation. The writer’s guess is that Ghana will come up with a 
practical legislation considering its commitments to good governance. 
 
                                                          
31 See: Nigeria’s facts and figures. Available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm. Last accessed 
19.01.14. 
32 Ahmed M, PPP for Infrastructure Development: The Nigerian Experience (2011). Infrastructure Concession Commission 
Publication, Page 1. 
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1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Research 
Generally, in a research like this, where a discourse on infrastructure is involved, it is 
mainly expected to be interdisciplinary in the sense that most of the texts are written by 
non-lawyers and were viewed not from the legal perspective. However, this research 
work is inherently limited to the legal aspects of Public-Private Partnerships in 
infrastructure development. The study focuses on developing countries with a case 
study of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
1.8  Definition of Terms 
In this study, the term “public sector”, “government” and “public authority” are 
interchangeably used.  Also, the term “Public-Private Partnership” and “concession” are 
also used interchangeably because in most PPPs, what the government does is to grant 
concession to the private sector to develop the infrastructure project. In addition, most 
of the international legislative framework refers to it as concession. 
 
1.9 Structure of the Study 
The thesis broadly discusses the legal and regulatory framework for Public-Private 
Partnerships in Infrastructure Development with specific focus on Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa. The thesis is broadly divided into Seven Chapters to ease the discussion 
and appreciation of the issues therein. 
 
Chapter One (1) is the general introduction to the study which includes the background 
of the research, methodology, Objective of the Study, Significance of the study, Choice 
of Jurisdiction and the Literature Review. Chapter Two (2) discusses the meaning and 
concept of Public-Private Partnerships, its typology and other necessary agreements 
which are ancillary to the main PPP agreement. Chapter Three (3) examined the legal, 
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regulations and agencies responsible for the implementation of PPP laws and policies in 
Ghana and further identified the challenges facing PPPs in that country. Chapter Four 
(4) examined and analysed legal regime of PPPs in Nigeria and identified the 
challenges. Chapter Five (5) focused on the legal regime of PPPs in South Africa. 
Chapter Six (6) examined the regional and international legislative frameworks like 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs), United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO’s) Guidelines for Infrastructure 
Development through Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT), The OECD “BASIC 
Elements of Law on Concession Agreements” 2000; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD’s) “Core Principles on Modern Concession Law” (2006) and 
the European Commission’s Directives on the Award of Concessions while Chapter 
Seven is a concluding chapter which deals with conclusion, findings and 
recommendations. 
 
1.10  Literature Review 
Reputable legal literature on Public-Private Partnerships were reviewed and relied 
upon to assess the merit of the previous studies carried out in this area of study and 
to assess the international best practices on the practice of Public-Private 
Partnerships in the selected countries. As highlighted in this chapter, the dearth of 
research specifically on the legal and regulatory framework for Public Private 
Partnerships in Infrastructure Development in the selected countries justifies the 
selection of this research. Among the literature were: 
 
N. Avery33 posited that governments of all political colours, at least in the capitalist 
world have considered the opportunities provided by the private sector in the 
modernisation and improvement of their ageing infrastructure. The writer gave a 
                                                          
33Nicholas Avery, Public-Private Partnerships: A Practical Analysis,( London: Globe Publishing Ltd, 2006). 
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vivid description of the nature and kinds of PPP transactions. The book analysed 
PPP in relation to socio-economic infrastructures like Roads, Railways, Prisons, 
Health, Education and defence. However, the writer did not consider the legal and 
regulatory framework for PPPs in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
E.R Yescombe34 defines infrastructure and the various types to include economic 
and social infrastructure. The book further examined policy issues which normally 
arise for the public sector in considering whether to adopt the PPPs procurement 
route, and the specific application of this policy approach in PPP contracts. The 
writer also focused on the systematic and integrated approach to financing PPPs 
within this public-policy framework. The writer however did not make any 
mention of the legal and regulatory frameworks of PPPs in the three selected 
countries. 
 
D. Grimsey and M. K. Lewis35 examined the nature and types of Infrastructures to 
be covered by PPPs and the advantages and disadvantages of adopting PPPs as an 
alternative to infrastructure provision. The book further examined the typologies of 
PPP which can be adopted depending on the type of project. Finally, the structures 
of PPPs partnership agreements and also the concept of Risk Sharing and Value for 
Money were also examined. The writer also did not focus on the legal and 
regulatory framework for PPPs in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
 
                                                          
34E.R.Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships Principles of Policy and Finance, (Oxford: Elsevier Publishing Ltd, 2007). 
35 D. Grimsey and M. K. Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and 
Project Finance.(United Kingdom, Edward Elger Publishing Limited, 2007). 
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Jefferey Delmon36 focuses on specific infrastructure sector, with a focus on the 
strategic and policy issues essential for successful development of infrastructure 
through PPPs. He explained the practical guide to PPPs for policy makers and 
strategists, showing how governments can enable and encourage PPPs, providing a 
step by step analysis of the development of PPP projects. He explained what 
contractual structures look like and how PPP risk allocation works in practice. 
Though, the writer gave a brief account of the regulatory framework of PPPs, the 
writer did not examine it with specific reference to the legislations applicable to the 
selected countries being examined in this work. 
 
S. Arrowsmith,37 defines Public Procurement especially under the EU framework 
and explains the terminologies adopted by other systems such as the World Trade 
Centre and the United States. The work further distinguished between Public 
Procurement and other in-house provisions such as contracting-out or outsourcing. 
The study posited that for almost two decades now, governments have started 
moving towards contracting out of their services to an outside entity. The study 
further highlights the basic objectives of Public Procurement systems as including 
Value for Money, accountability, integrity, equal opportunities and treatments of 
all bidders, opening of public market to international trade and efficiency in the 
procurement process. The writer further examines the key principles that are 
important in ensuring the proper implementation of procurement objectives. These 
principles, according to the writer are transparency, equal treatment and 
competition. 
 
                                                          
36 J. Delmon, Public Private Partnership Project in Infrastructure: An Essential Guide for Policy Makers . (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
37 S. Arrowsmith, Public Procurement: Basic Concepts and the Coverage of Procurement Rules in Public Procurement 
Regulations: An Introduction, Sue Arrowsmith (ed), (2010). Available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementregulationintroduction.pdf. 
Accessed on 28.05.12. 
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P. Urio,38 examines how the government and the private sectors can deliver 
efficient, sustainable, peaceful and equitable development through adequate 
collaboration and cooperation. The writer further examines the usefulness of the 
theory and practice of Public-Private Partnerships experience in Western countries 
to the transition and developing countries. He stated that the greatest obstacles to 
the ability of the government to create jobs are mainly due to a lack of effective 
basic infrastructure and services, poverty and insecurity. He further stressed that 
such situations will definitely limit the development of small and medium scale 
enterprises or investments by the multinational corporation. However, the writer 
did not address the legal and regulatory frameworks for Public-Private 
Partnerships. 
 
J.L. Guash,39 discusses the concession procedure, the regulatory framework and 
their outcomes in order to determine the continued usefulness of the process for the 
governments, investors and other end users. The book further examines the high 
incidence of contract renegotiation and its implication for infrastructure 
performance in the long run. However, the writer did not examine the legal and 
regulatory frameworks of Public-Private Partnerships in the three selected 
countries.  
 
S. Karangizi,40 analysed the extent to which some countries in the African Union 
have introduced and implemented the framework arrangement in public 
procurement processes. In doing this, the writer examined the existing procurement 
legislations of some of these African countries which were based on the 
                                                          
38Paulo Urio, Public-Private Partnerships: Success and Failure Factors for In Transition Countries, (Washington, University 
Press of America, 2010). 
39J.L. Guash, Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Avoiding the Pitfalls, (Washington D.C, The World 
Bank, 2004). 
40 S. Karangizi, Framework Agreements in Public Procurement: A Perspective from Africa, in Reform of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Procurement: Procurement Regulation for the 21st Century Sue Arrowsmith (ed), ( Danvers, USA, Thompson 
Reuters, 2009). Pages 243-263. 
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UNCITRAL Model Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction and services. 
The writer specifically examined the conditions for using the framework 
agreements; procurement planning and budgeting; publication of awards; financial 
thresholds and right of administrative review. The writer concluded that for 
African countries to enhance their procurement system, they need to enact specific 
legislations to provide for clear and unambiguous laws on procurement. 
 
A. Akintoye, M. Beck and C. Hardcastle in the book titled Public-Private 
Partnerships: Managing Risks and Opportunities41 present an overview of the 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public services. The writer 
considered the situation in both developed and developing countries and posited 
that in developed countries, PPPs are mainly used for services and maintenance 
issues like health services, education and management of public buildings. 
Whereas, in less developed countries like the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
PPPs are used mainly to develop critical projects like roads, bridges, dams, water 
and sanitation among others. The book further examines and identifies the risks 
that are associated with specific projects. These include availability, construction, 
cost, credit, design, environment, land, finance, legislative changes, legal 
performance, operations, planning permissions, specification, time and 
technological risks among others. The authors therefore call for prudent risk 
management in order to ensure that before embarking on a PPP Project, risks are 
identified, assessed and or mitigated.  
 
                                                          
41 A. Akintoye, M. Beck and C. Hardcastle, Eds, Public-Private Partnerships: Managing Risks and Opportunities (Oxford , 
Black Science Publishing Company, 2003). 
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M. Bult-Spiering and G. Dewulf42 provide a theoretical foundation for analysing 
the functioning of PPPs. The book illustrated this by drawing examples especially 
from the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The book further 
provides an insight on the various forms of PPPs and concludes that in order to 
ensure more strategic decisions on PPP issues, then stakeholders must understand 
the rationale behind PPPs. 
 
E.B. Yehoue, M.R.Hammani and Jean-Francois43 analysed the determinant factors 
for effective Public-Private Partnerships scheme in infrastructure projects using the 
World Bank Data Base on projects for developing countries. The book categorized 
the determinants of PPPs into Seven broad factors, taking into account the different 
incentives and challenges facing both the private and public sectors. The factors 
according to the writers are; the political environment of the nation where the PPP 
programme is being implemented, the institutional quality, the legal system, 
government constraints, market conditions and past experience with the PPP 
scheme. The writer however did not also specifically examine the legal and 
regulatory frameworks for Public-Private Partnerships in Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa. 
 
K. Sarkodie,44 analyses the provisions of the Ghana Arbitration Act of 2010, 
stressing the importance of a sound and an efficient dispute resolution mechanism 
in PPP contracts to a country like Ghana that intends to attract both local and 
foreign investors. The article further considers the extent to which the provisions of 
                                                          
42 M. Bult-Spiering and G. Dewulf, Strategic Issues in Public Private Partnerships: An International Perspective, (Oxford, 
Blackswell Publishing Ltd, 2006). 
43E.B. Yehoue, M.R.Hammani and Jean-Francois,International Monetary Fund Working Papers: Determinants of Public-
Private Partnerships in Infrastructure, (Washington D.C., I.M.F., 2006). 
44 Kwadwo Sarkodie Arbitration in Ghana – The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, (2011). International 
Construction Law Review, Page 3. Also available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/5ee12231-1295-4559-
8167-89d93cdf2a06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91e048fe-67d4-4e3f-9d10-
8bbf9861e753/ArbitrationGhana_Sarkodie.pdf. 
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the new Act are likely to succeed in facilitating and supporting arbitration as an 
effective tool for resolving conflicts especially in the construction industry.  
 
M.T Adekilekun, O.A.Olatunji, C.C. Gan and M.M. Akanbi45 examined the dispute 
resolution mechanism in PPP contract with a specific focus on Nigeria, South 
Africa and few countries in Asia. The article states that since PPP disputes are 
commercial in nature, the best way to resolve those disputes is through other 
alternatives apart from litigation. The article further sets out the types of dispute 
that may arise from PPP transactions and considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of using the alternative to dispute resolution mechanisms. The article 
concludes that arbitration is the best procedure because the decision of the 
arbitration panel is binding and enforceable in law courts. 
 
T.O. Akenroye, A.S. Oyegoke and Ama Bassey Eyo, ‘Development of a 
Framework for the implementation of Green Procurement in Nigeria46emphasises 
the need to incorporate environmental and sustainable issues (otherwise known as 
Green Procurement) in procurements generally. The writers posited that in 
developed countries, green public procurement is often considered as part of the 
procurement process, whereas in developing countries, green public procurement 
are emerging. The writers stated that the awareness of green issues in public 
procurement has been on the increase since the international conference on 
environment and development which was held in Rio de Jeneiro in 1992. The 
article concluded that developing countries need to consider incorporating Green 
Public Procurement in developing a framework for procurement generally. 
                                                          
45 M.T Adekilekun, O.A.Olatunji, C.C. Gan and M.M. Akanbi Public-Private Partnership Initiatives in Nigeria and Its 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism: An Appraisal (2013) JMCL Vol 40 67-86. 
46 T.O. Akenroye, A.S. Oyegoke and Ama Bassey Eyo, ‘Development of a Framework for the implementation of Green 
Procurement in Nigeria (2013) Int. Journal of Procurement Management Vol 6 No.1 1-23. 
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Peter Zunlik47discussed the procurement of green energy within the countries of 
the European Communities especially considering the effect of the Treaty of 
Lisbon on the energy and environmental policies of the community. The work 
further considered the implications of environmental principles for public 
procurement. The writer considered the provision relating to this policy in the 5th 
and 6th development programme. He concluded that the 6th action programme 
contained provisions on economic incentives for environmentally friendly products 
which can help in developing an objective basis for green public procurement. He 
suggested that government of both developed and developing countries must act as 
leaders in the management and implementation of green public procurement. 
 
A.B Adjei,48 examined the existing legislative and institutional framework for 
public procurement in Ghana. He posited that before the enactment of the Public 
Procurement Act of 2003, the procurement regulations and institutions were 
uncoordinated. The writer specifically examined the procedure for Administrative 
Review for complaints emanating from the public procurement. This was examined 
under administrative review proceedings or review by procurement entity. The 
writer later identified the challenges while seeking to enforce the provisions of the 
Public Procurement Act in relation to administrative review.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Peter Zunzlik, ‘The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy’  in Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law, new 
Directives and New Dimensions’ Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Zunzlik (eds), (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 369. 
48 A.B. Adjei, Challenges in the handling of Procurement Complaints: Ghana’s Experience (2011) 38 JMCL. 
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M.M. Akanbi and O.A Olatunji49 examined the different housing policies which 
successive governments had developed to tackle housing problems in Nigeria. The 
paper further examined the legal framework put in place to regulate the various 
housing regimes in Nigeria. The paper found that there is still a wide deficit in 
housing delivery despite the diverse regulations introduced by successive 
governments to address the problem. The paper therefore considered adopting PPP 
initiative as an alternative solution to providing sustainable housing delivery in 
Nigeria. The paper concluded that although PPPs may be an option, but asked 
government to be wary of it because it may turn out to be exploitative at the long 
run. 
 
M. M. Akanbi50 examined the prospects and challenges that are inherent in the 
Privatisation and Commercialisation programme especially to developing countries 
in Africa. The paper shows how some African Countries are attracting investors 
thereby becoming emerging economies. The paper further traces the history and 
legal regime of Privatisation and Commercialisation in Nigeria since the policy 
was introduced in 1986. The paper concluded that although, the programme can be 
a window of opportunity for growth and development for most African nations, 
they are however not without challenges which should be addressed in order to 
make the programme a success. 
 
                                                          
49 Muhammad M. Akanbi & Olugbenga  A.Olatunji, “Sustainable Development and Housing Delivery in Nigeria: An 
Examination of the Legal Perspective of the Public-Private Partnership Initiativa”, (2012) in Law and Sustainable 
Development in Africa, edited by Bondzi-Simpson P.E, Egbewole W.O,Etudaiye M.A, Olatunji AO. (Surrey: Grosvenor 
House Publishing Limited). 
50M.M. Akanbi,”Privatisation and Commercialisation of Investments:How Beneficial are they to Developing Economies in 
Africa?” (2010) 11 J. World Investment & Trade. Available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/jworldit11&id=421&print=section&section=27&
ext=.pdf. Last accessed 04.12.13.  
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M.T. Adekilekun51 examined the background to the emergence of the concepts and 
workings of Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria Political-cum-economic clime; 
a clime where infrastructure projects were funded solely by the public sector. The 
article further examined the nature of the partnership existing between the parties 
and showed the correlation between Public-Private Partnerships and nation’s 
development. Also, the nature and the legal framework for PPPs in Nigeria were 
also examined. He concluded that PPPs will go a long way in helping both the 
Federal and State governments in Nigeria in addressing the infrastructure deficit in 
the nation. 
 
S. Wlliams-Elegbe,52 defines corruption in its various forms and examines its effect 
on Public Procurement. The thesis compares and contrasts the legal, institutional 
and practical approaches to the implementation of the disqualification measures in 
procurement practices in the European Union, the United Kingdom, United States, 
the World Bank and South Africa. The study further highlighted the problems that 
may be created by the use of disqualification measures especially in determining 
how much discretion should be exercised by the disqualifying authority. The writer 
concluded that the provisions in the South African and United States Corruption 
legislations are quite detailed and they cover several of the difficult issues. 
 
P. Braun53 distinguishes between PFIs and Public Procurement. The thesis 
examined the Three (3) socio-economic circumstances for adopting PFIs, which 
are significant cash constraints, procurement failures of the past and the urgent 
need of infrastructure investment that are necessary to stimulate national 
                                                          
51  M.T. Adekilekun, ”Public-Private Partnerships and Sustainable Development in Nigeria,”(2012) in Law and Sustainable 
Development in Africa, edited by Bondzi-Simpson P.E, Egbewole W.O,Etudaiye M.A, Olatunji AO. (Surrey: Grosvenor 
House Publishing Limited, 2012).  
52 S. Williams Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification Measures, 
(UK, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
53 P. Braun, The Practical Impact of E.U Procurement on PFI Procurement Practice in the United Kingdom. Thesis 
Submitted to the Univeristy of Nottingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
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development. The thesis posited that the significant backlog of infrastructure 
investment, poor management of public projects and effective service delivery 
mechanism as well as the requirement of value for money and sufficient risk 
transfer were part of the reasons why PFI was adopted in the UK. 
 
E. Farquharson, C. Torres de Mastle, E.R. Yescombe and J. Encinas54 discussed 
some of the key aspects to successful and sustainable Public Private Partnerships, 
such as the various financing mechanisms and the diversity of PPP contractual 
arrangements in countries with different legal systems. The writers also discussed 
emerging PPP markets in Africa and discussed the nuances that emerged in the 
recommended paths when taking into account this diversity. The writers also 
examined the different activities involved in transforming a desirable project in a 
government’s eyes to an attractive investment opportunity for private partner, and 
also into a PPP project that would ultimately benefit all parties. However, the 
writers did not focus on the legal and regulatory aspects of Public Private 
Partnerships in Nigeria. 
 
Orginisation for Economic Cooperation and Development55 examined how to 
improve the use of resources in PPPs. The book also shows the extent to which 
countries are now using PPPs in service delivery. Other issues which the writer 
focused on include the roles that affordability and value for money plays in the 
success of PPP, the importance of sufficient competition in ensuring an effective 
transfer of risk. The book further discussed the regulatory questions such as 
transparency, compliance, enforcement issues and the need for legal framework in 
                                                          
54 E. Farquharson, C. Torres de Mastle, E.R. Yescombe and J. Encinas, How to Engage with the Private Sector in Public 
Private Partnerships in Emerging Markets,  (World Bank: Washington DC), 2011. 
55OECD,  Public Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value for Money,( OECD publishers, 2008). 
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PPPs. However, the writers did not beam their searchlight on the legal and 
regulatory issues affecting Public Private Partnerships in Nigeria. 
 
M. Burnett56 explains the need for further legislative initiative and greater legal 
certainty in the award of concessions and the need to promote value for money in 
PPP and concession contracts in the European Union. The writer posits that in the 
absence of legislative initiatives, the rules on the definition and award of 
concessions will emerge from decisions of courts, leaving legal uncertainty to 
persist and its attendant price litigation. Though brilliant as the writer has posited, 
the paper does not consider legal and regulatory issues surrounding Public Private 
Partnerships in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
J. Nyagwachi and J. Smallwood57 pointed out that though, PPPs are still new in 
South Africa, and they have a long history dating back to the Nineteenth Century in 
financing infrastructure. The writers examined cases of some specific projects 
earlier carried out under PPPs such as the Suez Canal, which was a financial 
success until nationalized in the mid-1950s, the toll roads in the United States 
which were operated between 1789 and 1900 and the Motorway Programme 
embarked upon by the Spanish government in the mid-1960s. The writers 
examined some operational PPP projects in South Africa, representing various 
sectors in different stages and which were investigated with regard to their 
operational performance in relation to risks, affordability, project management and 
legal and regulatory framework.  
 
                                                          
56M. Burnett, “A new EU Directive on Concessions- the Right approach for PPP?”(2008), (EPPL Journal) Volume 4 Page 
185(Berlin, Lexxion mbh). 
57J. Nyagwachi and J. Smallwood, “South African Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects”, (2008) Journal of 
Construction, Vol 1 No 2, (Cape Town, Crown Publication Plc). 
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P. Burger58 gave a brief history of PPP and the PPP Unit in South Africa. He traced 
the history since 1997 when the government first appointed an interdepartmental 
task team to develop policy, law and institution reforms till 2009. The article 
further examines the rationale for establishing a dedicated PPP Unit within the 
South African National Treasury. He stated that there would be a great danger if 
the concerned department does not fully appreciate the budgetary implications of 
PPPs. In addition, he posited that a dedicated PPP Unit may be established in order 
to create a center of knowledge and expertise that can provide technical assistance 
to the relevant department that wants to carry-out a PPP project. 
 
A.S. Raquel & A. Andrade59 explained good governance in PPP as putting in place 
the enabling institutions, procedures and processes associated with PPPs. The 
writers also examined the concept of corporate governance which is said to be 
important in achieving success in PPPs. The writers however did not write on the 
legal aspect of the public Private Partnerships. 
 
J.R.A Aryee, in his book titled Saints, Wizards, Demons and Systems: Explaining 
the Success or Failure of Public Policies and Programmes,60 examines why policies 
and programmes fail and how they can become more successful not only in Ghana, 
but in other African countries. He suggested that the right combination of 
committed politicians and bureaucrats (saints); appropriate policy analysts and 
available reliable information (wizards); management of hostile and apathetic 
groups (demons); and insulation of the policy environment from the vagaries of 
implementation (systems). 
                                                          
58 Philippe Burger, “ The Dedicated PPP Unit of the South African Treasury” (2011). Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/37147218.pdf> Accessed on 06.12.13. 
59 A. S. Raquel and A. Andrade,”Corporate Governance in Public Private Partnerships”(2010), EPPPL Journal, Volume 4 
Page 209,(Lexxion mbh: Berlin) 
60 J.R.A. Aryee, “Saints, wizards, demons and systems: Explaining the Success or Failure of Public Policies and Programs 
(2010) (Accra, Ghana University Press, 2000). 
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M. Burnett61 examined the effective ways of implementing competitive dialogue 
from the perspective of obtaining value for money for the public sector. The writer 
also posited that there are clear benefits to standardizing the approach to the 
application of competitive dialogue and clear pointers to aid the development of an 
optimal methodology for promoting value for money. 
 
Andrew Chew and Geoff Wood62 explained the marked increase in cooperation between 
governments and the private sectors for the development, financing and operation of 
infrastructure in Australia. The writers posited that the nature and size of the country 
presents both opportunities and challenges considering the huge amount of resources 
needed. The article specifically examines the DBOM contracts in Australia and its 
advantages and disadvantages.  
R. H. Garcia63 examines International and Regional Procurement, acknowledging 
the different aims of procurement systems in the national and international context 
and the likely difficult interplay between domestic policy goals and international 
trade. He further considers the experiences in individual countries from all region, 
exploring the varied routes to the same basic objectives and recognizing 
discernable trends in procurement regulation and reforms. 
 
B. D. Oloworaran64 examines the institutional and regulatory framework for Public 
Procurement in Nigeria. The writer emphasises the importance of Public 
Procurement to a nation’s development especially a country like Nigeria. He 
elaborates on procurement surveillance and review of public procurement award 
                                                          
61M. Burnett, “Conducting Competitive dialogue for PPP Projects- Towards an Optimal Approach”(2009),EPPPL Journal, 
Volume 4.(Lexxion mbh: Berlin). 
62 Andrew Chew and Geoff  (2011), DBOM Contracts in Australia. International Construction Law Review, Vol 28, Page 
275. 
63R. H. Garcia, International Public Procurement: A guide to Best Practice, (London: Globe Business Publishing Limited) 
2009. 
64Benson Dele Oloworaran, The Law and Practice of Public Procurement in Nigeria,(Porthacourt: Benuch Legal Consult, 
2011). 
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and also on privatization and disposal of public property by public entities. The 
writer however only focused on Legal framework on Public Procurement in 
Nigeria. 
 
G. Oyebode & O. Makinde65 examined the relevant authorities and legislations 
applicable to Public Private Partnerships in Nigeria. The writers focused solely on 
the Lagos State Public Private Partnerships Law of 2005. The writers also 
examined the types and arrangements suitable for public Private Partnerships in 
Nigeria. However, the writers did not consider or mention the Infrastructural 
Concession and Regulatory Establishment Commission Act of 2005 which the 
major legislation on PPP in Nigeria. 
 
Apart from the texts highlighted above, several conference papers, reports, articles, 
international conventions and regulations generally on the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for Public-Private Partnerships were examined. A cursory look at all 
the literature listed above, shows that none has specifically examined the legal and 
regulatory framework for Public-Private Partnerships specifically in Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa. Their discussions on Public-Private Partnerships in 
Infrastructure Development are largely theoretical without reference being made to 
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. In fact, this does not give them the opportunity to 
make a distinction in the practice of PPPs among the selected countries. All these 
are the gaps created by the writers which this thesis will attempt to fill. 
 
                                                          
65Gbenga Oyebode and Ogboho Makinde, The International Comparative Legal Guide to PFI/PPP Projects. (Lagos, Global 
Legal Group Publishing, 2007). 
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This thesis is based on the existing legal and regulatory framework on Public- 
Private Partnerships in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa as at 31st day of January, 
2014. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: MEANING, NATURE AND 
TYPOLOGIES 
 
2.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the various definitions of Public Private Partnership as 
defined by various texts and the nature and types of PPPs. It also discusses the 
distinctions between PPPs and other types of procurement methods like 
privatization and public procurement. The chapter later discusses the different 
kinds of agreements that are necessary in order to ensure efficiency, transparency 
and revenue driven PPPs projects.  
 
2.1  Meaning of Public Private Partnership 
There is no universally accepted definition for the term “Public Private 
Partnerships”.66 It can be used to describe different arrangements involving the 
public and private sectors coming together to provide goods and services. In 
general term, it means an arrangement or agreement involving a public sector 
authority and one or more private partners whereby the private partners perform or 
help in the provision of goods and services which were traditionally within the 
domain of the public sector authority. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships has been defined as arrangements between the public 
sector and private parties whereby private parties participate in, or help in the 
provision of public-infrastructure based services.67 Also, according to the Oxford 
                                                          
66It should be noted here that there are number of alternative names given to PPPs. In the United States of America, the term  
P3 is used; In Australia, it is called Privately-Financed Project(PFP); In England and Japan, it is called Private Finance 
Initiative(PFI); In Malaysia and Nigeria, it is called Public Private Partnerships(PPP) ; In Indonesia and Egypt, it is called 
Private Sector Participation(PSP); It is referred to as Commercially Viable Utilities in India; In South Africa, it is called 
Partnerships while  the World Bank prefers to use Privately Provided Infrastructure.   
67Darin Grimsey and L.K. Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and 
Project Finance (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007) Page 2. 
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Dictionary of Politics, the term has been defined as an agreement between 
government and the private sector whereby the latter helps in the provision of 
public services or infrastructure.68 It helps in bringing together social priorities 
with the managerial skills of the private sector, by relieving governments of the 
enormous burden of providing large capital expenditure and thereby transferring 
the risk of cost overruns to the private sector. 
 
The term has also been defined69 as a legally binding agreement between the 
government and private sector for the provision of infrastructure assets and 
efficient delivery of services that allocates responsibilities and business risks 
among the various partners. During this process, government is actively involved 
throughout the project’s life cycle. The private sector is responsible for ensuring 
the efficient functioning of the entire project, ranging from project design, 
construction, finance, maintenance and operations. 
 
According to the World Bank,70 there is no consensus on the definition of the term 
Public Private partnerships. However, it is referred to as arrangements, ranging 
from medium to long term, between the public and private sectors whereby part of 
the services or works that fall under the domain of the public sector are provided 
by the private partners, with a detailed agreement for the delivery of public 
infrastructure and/ or public services. The term has been defined to exclude service 
contracts or turnkey contract, which are categorized as public procurement and it 
also excludes privatization of utilities wherein there is a limited role for the public 
authority to perform. 
                                                          
68Oxford Dictionary of Politics.  Available at < http://www.answers.com/topic/public-private-partnership>. Accessed on 
08.03.12. 
69An Introduction to Public- Private Partnerships . Available at 
<http://www.partnershipsbc.ca/pdf/An%20Introduction%20to%20P3%20-June03.pdf>. Accessed on 08.03.12. 
70World Bank definition of Public-Private Partnerships<http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-
are-public-private-partnerships>.  Accessed on 08.03.12. 
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The European Union Procurement Law does not clearly define the term PPP.71 The 
term in the EU procurement context is used to show the distinctions with the 
traditional procurement system. Under a traditional approach, the public authority 
identifies and finances a project or service in its entirety through its own efforts 
and resources, while under the PPP arrangement, the private sector assumes greater 
roles and sees to the operation of the project over a long time. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD72 defines the 
term as an agreement between the government and one or more private partners 
(which may include the operators and the financiers) whereby private partners 
deliver the service in such a manner that the objective of the public authority are 
aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the 
effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private 
partners. 
 
However, a more clearer definition was given by E.R. Yescombe as a long term 
contract between the government and a private sector party in which the private 
sector is saddled with the responsibility of designing, financing, constructing and 
operating a public infrastructure with payment over the life of the PPP contract to 
the private sector party for the use of the facility, made either by the government or 
the general public as users of the infrastructure provided, and with the facility 
                                                          
71Jaya Sharma,  Public Private Partnership Projects in The United States, Roberto Hernandez Garcia,( ed), International 
Public Procurement: A Guide (London : Globe Business Publishing, 2009)Page  401. 
72OECD, Public Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value for Money. (OECD Publishing: 2008). Page 
17.The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social 
and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, The 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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remaining in public-sector ownership, or reverting to public-sector ownership at 
the end of the contract term.73 
 
It is important to state here that due to the elusiveness of its definition, the term 
PPPs as used in this research work designates a variety of partnerships between the 
public authority and one or more private sectors for the designing, financing, 
construction, operation and maintenance infrastructure that belong to the 
government with a view to recoup such investment from the direct users over a 
specified period of time. 
 
The public authorities or public sector parties to a PPP contract are known by 
different terms such as Federal, Central and Regional, State, Municipal, Local, 
Governmental Institution, Public Agency or any other entity which is under the 
public-sector control. While the private sector party is normally a Special-Purpose 
Company which includes investors, lenders, and companies providing construction 
and operational services. According to Yescombe, the relationship between the 
parties is not really a partnership in the legal sense, but its contractual, being based 
on the terms of the PPP Contract.74 PPPs have been successfully used in the 
provision of such public services such as Transportation (Rail, Road, Water and 
Air), Power, Health, Water and Sanitation, Prisons, Education; Defense Canals, 
and Telecommunications. PPPs are the latest in a wave of changes brought about 
by the Neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s.75 This partnership arrangements share 
                                                          
73 E.R. Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance, (Oxford: Elsevier Publishing Ltd, 2007). 
Page 3. 
74 Ibid.  
75 In the early 80s, the new government of  Margret Thatcher in Britain advocated and initiated Neo-liberalism as political 
and economic policy of the new Labour Government. Thatcher led the Neo-liberal revolution by demanding for more 
efficiency and competition regarding economic, political and social policies of government. This policy has greatly reshaped 
the face of the global economy. According to this policy, privatization is supposedly the answer to all problems. Privatisation 
started first in the Great Britain before being adopted by the United States of America under the government of Ronald 
Reagan, who served from 1981-1989. To the neo-liberalists, anything that has not undergone privatization is capable of 
being plagued with inefficiency and lack of competition.  
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many characteristics with deregulation, privatization, commercialization and quasi- 
markets. 
 
2.2 History of Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-Private Partnerships have been used as concession to finance infrastructure 
projects in the nineteenth century.76 One of the earliest and best known water 
projects was the Suez Canal which was managed by the private sector until it was 
nationalized in the 1950s.77 Tolling commenced in the United States between 1789 
and 1900.78 Over 2,000 private companies operated turnpikes in Ohio, New York, 
Michigan and Albany as a result of inadequate highways that existed at that time.79 
In the 1960s, Spain embarked on its motorways programme which was financed by 
the private sector because of the inadequacy of the national budget to meet the 
infrastructure demands of the country at that time.  
 
The energy crises of the 1970s led to the collapse of most of these private 
companies which necessitated the nationalization of some of these enterprises. 
Also at that time, the Labour Government in Britain was of the view that the 
market economy was very unfair and imperfect. Leaving the means of production, 
distribution and exchange to market forces was considered inequitable and that this 
would lead to the marginalization and impoverishment of the people.80 
 
                                                          
76 Nyagwachi, Josiah & Smallwood, John, South African Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Projects. Journal of Construction 
Vol. 1, No 2. 
77 Ibid. 
78  The private companies that built these reads were stage companies, miners, and ranchers who built the roads, at least in 
part, to attract business for their primary investments.  See further 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_roads_in_the_United_States. Accessed on 22.05.13. 
79 Ibid. 
80See The Legal Dynamics of Privatisation in Nigeria, Retrieved from  www.babalakinandco.com. Accessed on 15th 
February, 2011. 
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However, changed economic condition saw the process being reversed in the 1980s 
when it became clear that governments as entrepreneurs had not succeeded.81 Most 
of their investments in commerce had been a colossal waste of government 
revenue. Interestingly, the philosophical position in the United Kingdom had begun 
to shift. Then, the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher had defeated the 
Labour government of Sir Harold Wilson.82 Both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan of the United States were of the firm view that Government had no 
business in commerce.83 The only role of Government was to provide a conducive 
and an enabling environment for entrepreneurs to flourish.84 
 
Also in the 1980s, China under the visionary leadership of Deng Xiaoping radically 
pursued a policy of private enterprise which changed his country’s policy of 
overdependence on failed state enterprises.85 This paradigm shift ushered in a new 
era of positive economic outcomes that continue till today. His famous Chinese 
saying was “don’t care what colour a cat is as long as it catches mice” which has 
unraveled china’s economic miracles. 
 
In recent times, a worldwide movement has taken place in respect of Public-Private 
Partnerships.86 The main aim of this innovation is to introduce the effective 
functioning principles of the private sector into the public administration.87 This 
move was necessitated by the need to reduce inefficiencies, wastages in public 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 In May 1979,Labour Party lost the general election to the Conservatives and Margaret Thatcher became Britain's first 
female prime minister. 
83 Both the late Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan championed the concept of Neo-liberalism in the 1980s. 
84 The government can provide good investment laws that will protect the interest of both foreign and local investors. 
85  He abandoned many orthodox communist doctrines and attempted to incorporate elements of the free-enterprise system 
into the China economy. 
86 Darin Grimsey and Mervyn KL,  Public private partnerships: the worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision and 
project finance, ( Massachusetts: Edward Elger Publishing Limited, 2007). Page 3. 
87 Mona Hammami, Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko and EB Yehoue, Determinants of public private partnerships in 
infrastructure, (Washington DC:  International Monetary Fund, 2006) Page 5. 
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spending, lack of managerial skills and to attract private capital in the provision of 
public infrastructure. 
 
2.3  Fundamentals of Public-Private Partnerships 
In Pubic Private Partnerships, there must be a public authority or participant. This 
authority can come in many forms. This as earlier said may mean the Federal, 
Central, National or even Regional, States or Local Governments. Also, there are 
the bodies which are quasi-public authorities like agencies and commissions of the 
Federal or National Government which are creatures of statutes or other relevant 
enabling laws88and are technically independent from the Central or National 
Government although, they are still reliant on the central government for funding 
and supervision.89 There is also the private sector party which is normally a 
Special-Purpose Vehicle (SPV) registered to carry on business. This is usually set 
up by the private sector parties in exchange for shares which represent their 
ownership in the SPV. The Special Purpose Vehicle is established as a legal entity 
in order to protect the interest of the shareholder and it cannot venture into any 
other business apart from that specific project.90 This may include investors, 
lenders, and companies providing construction and operational services. The 
rationale for the formation of an SPV is because in PPPs, a project may be too 
complex and complicated for a single investor to undertake considering the 
enormity of the investment, the size of the management, the risks involved and the 
skills required.  
 
                                                          
88S. 1 of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Establishment Commission  Act of 2005. The Act mentions Federal 
Government Ministries, Agencies and other Federal government bodies which are quasi authorities that can enter into a 
concession contract with a private partner. 
89Nicholas Avery, Public Private Partnerships: A critical Analysis (London: Globe Publishing Ltd, 2006). Page 6. 
 
90 See A Guidebook on Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure. A Publication of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, (Bangkok, UNESCAP, 2011) Page 10. 
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It is important for the parties who want to engage in transactions with these public 
entities to pay a closer attention to the powers and contractual limits and also the 
likely outcome of the federal or central government to intervene if and when they 
fail financially. In most cases on the private sector side, a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) which is totally a consortium of financial institutions and private companies 
will be responsible for all the activities of PPPs including the coordination of the 
financing and service delivery. 
 
Most times, this will be a consortium which will have at least two shareholders. 
The SPV enters into an agreement with the public authority for the building of a 
new infrastructure or the management of existing infrastructures. The public 
authority specifies its requirements in terms of ‘output’, which sets out the public 
services which the facility is intended to provide. By this, rather than providing the 
SPV with a detailed blueprint on how the project is to be carried out, it is for the 
private sector who, through innovation and design, to meet this specification.  
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A classical schematic diagram as illustrated in figure 1.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Fig 1.1: Schematic Diagram of an SPV Agreement 
 
In setting its output target, the authority will normally set a time limit within which 
it requires the output to be delivered. It is crucial therefore that the construction 
contractor delivers the infrastructure within that timeframe. This is because the 
nature of PPPs is such that an incomplete project will be of limited value.91 In 
addition, in order to ensure the long-term stable cash flows, it is equally crucial that 
construction costs do not overrun.92 
 
 
 
                                                          
91Ibid at Page 8. 
92This means the possibility that during the design and construction phase, the actual Project costs will exceed projected 
Project costs. 
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The way in which the infrastructure transactions in PPPs are structured necessitate 
payment of long term service fees usually over the life of the contract( 20-35 years 
on the average) which is usually on a pre-agreed basis with the intention of 
repaying the cost expended in financing the project and to also give return to the 
investors .93 
 
PPP allows public authority to retain ownership while engaging the private sector 
to perform functions such as financing, designing, constructing, maintaining and 
operating infrastructure like roads or providing basic services like water and 
electricity. Both parties stand to benefit from the contractual agreement. 
Government earns the confidence and good image of performing its social 
responsibilities. It also earns revenue by leasing state-owned assets or alternatively 
pays the private sector for improved infrastructure and better service delivery. The 
private sector can do the job more efficiently, which is capable of reducing the 
prices and improving rollout. The private sector also gets reimbursed either by 
government or consumers for doing its work, at a profit. 
 
There must also be the partnership agreement which shall clearly state the rights, 
obligations and liabilities of all the stakeholders. Considering the complex nature 
of PPPs, it is necessary that the partnership agreement is comprehensive enough so 
as to take care of all foreseeable contingencies. The rights and obligations shall be 
made enforceable. It is also advisable that all regulations, codes of ethics, 
guidelines and other documentations relating to the PPP project shall be freely 
made available to the public and private sectors.  
 
                                                          
93 Chris Brown and Norton Rose, Financing Public-Private Partnerships: The Changing Market in Public Private 
Partnerships: A Practical Analysis, Nicholas Avery (ed), (London, Globe Business Publishing Limited, 2006) Page 187. 
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2.4 Basic Principles in Public-Private Partnerships 
There are three benchmarks for determining PPP viability.94 These are 
Affordability, Value for Money (VFM) and Risk Transfer. Whenever any 
government must decide which of the procurement model to choose between PPPs 
and Public Procurement, then, the very important question to ask is which of these 
will be more affordable and deliver the highest value for money between the two?  
 
2.4.1 Affordability, Value for Money and Risk Transfer 
A PPP project is said to be affordable if its expenditure and other mode of delivery 
can be accommodated within the budget constraints of the public authority and it 
should also be assumed that such can be sustained in the future. Affordability does 
not only apply to PPPs, but also to the traditional Public Procurement. The 
government should first of all determine whether the proposed PPP Project can be 
conveniently accommodated within the current level of its expenditure and 
revenue.  If the outcome is in the affirmative, then such PPP project passes the test 
of affordability. 
 
Value for money (VMF) has been defined as ‘the optimum combination of whole 
life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the requirements of the users’95 
In PPPs, Value for Money (VFM) must be the most primary objective of the 
project. A PPP project is said to be affordable if it increases VFM. Any PPP 
Project should be able to demonstrate that users will get value in return for the 
money they are parting with and that the cost to be paid by the users of the PPP 
project will be lower than the one paid for the services provided by the public 
sector.  
                                                          
94 See OECD, Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value For Money. Page 37. 
95 See Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis at Page 135. 
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There are Six major determinants of value for money namely; competition; risk 
transfer; performance measurement; the long term nature of the contract; private 
sector skills and incentives. In order to achieve value for money in PPPs, the 
following are important; 
1. PPP projects should be awarded in a competitive environment: 
2. There should be fair and realistic comparisons between the publicly and 
privately financed options; 
3. Standard economic appraisal techniques including proper allocation and 
appreciation of risks between the public and the private sector should be 
rigorously applied. 
 
Risk plays a very fundamental role in the success of PPP projects. Risk bearing is 
one of the main determinants of whether the project is one under public 
procurement or Public-Private Partnerships. Whereas in the former, the 
government solely bears the risk while in the latter there is transfer of the risks to 
the private sector. The ability of both the public and private sectors to identify, 
analyse and allocate risks will help in a great deal to achieve value for money. The 
rationale for the transfer of risks in PPPs is that risks should be transferred to the 
party who will be best able to manage the risks. Allocation of the risks to the party 
that will be best able to manage it may not necessarily mean that the maximum 
risks are on the private party. The word ‘to best able to manage the risks’ connotes 
‘to manage the risks at the least cost and thereby reduce the long-term cost of the 
project.96  
 
 
                                                          
96 See See OECD, Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk Sharing and Value for Money. 
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Therefore, if the cost of preventing the occurrence of a devastating event is far less 
than the cost of dealing with the consequences of such an adverse event, then risks 
should be transferred to the party who will be in the position to best manage it. In 
most cases, it is the private sector that is most appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
2.5  Public-Private Partnership and the Private Sector 
As stated earlier that PPP is an arrangement between the government and the 
private sector in order to provide basic infrastructures or to modernize the ageing 
ones. Therefore, the private sector has a key role to play in public private 
partnerships. There is no doubt that in order for the governments (especially of the 
developing countries) to meet the challenges posed by infrastructure, there is the 
need to mobilise private sectors to contribute in the development of infrastructure. 
If this arrangement is structured correctly, the government may be able to mobilize 
previously untapped resources from the private sectors that are looking for 
investment opportunities. The major aim of the private sector in the contract is to 
make profit from its capacity and experience in managing businesses (utilities in 
particular). Experience has shown that engaging the private sector in the 
development of infrastructure often brings stronger managerial capacity, 
efficiency, and access to new technology as well as specialized skills.97 
 
As stated earlier, the private sector performs its functions through a company 
which is specifically established for the purpose of providing and maintaining 
infrastructure. This company called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) will have at 
least two or more shareholders who will together have common interest in carrying 
out the functions under the agreement. The shareholders will carry-out their 
                                                          
97Lecture delivered on” Designing a world-class Public-Private Partnerships Infrastructure and Framework for Malaysia”, by 
Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop at Marriot Hotel  Putrajaya on 2nd March, 2010. Available at 
<http://www.epu.gov.my/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a6e97d78-1fe0-40a3-96d5-157afb28d996&groupId=34492>. 
Accessed on 13.03.12. 
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functions as subcontractors of the Special Purpose Vehicle. It is this umbrella body 
(SPV) that enters into a contract with the public authority.  
 
The private sector will perform greater role in providing infrastructure by 
introducing the discipline of the private capital markets in improving the quality 
and efficiency in construction and operations, particularly in order to ensure that 
PPP projects are completed without any delay.98By involving the private sector in 
the construction, financing and operation of the infrastructure, this will certainly 
lead to greater efficiency in the use of resources. 
 
2.5.1  Reasons for the Involvement of the Private Sector in the Development 
of Infrastructure 
 
There are many reasons why the government may need to collaborate with the 
private sector in the delivery of public goods and services. It is not in doubt as 
stated earlier in this work that budgetary constraints and inefficiencies on the part 
of government are among the reasons. Afeikhena Jerome, listed some of the 
reasons why government corporations have failed to provide adequate services to 
the people. He put the reasons succinctly as:99 
“Underpricing; low productivity; poor service quality; long queues and 
large portions of the population without access to basic services; lack of 
transparency; and damaging political interference in the operations of 
these infrastructure entities.” 
 
                                                          
98Darrin Grimsey and M. K.Lewis, Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and 
Project Finance. ( Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007).Page 5. 
 
99 Jerome A, ‘Infrastructure privatisation and liberalisation in Africa: The quest for the holy grail or coup de grace?’, 
September 2004, Johannesburg: National Institute for Economic Policy; paper presented at ‘4
th 
Mediterranean Seminar on 
International Development, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca, Spain.’   
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These reasons have been grouped and discussed under five major sub-headings. 
They are: 
 
2.5.1.1 Attracting Private Capital Investment 
Governments are attracted by the benefits of mobilizing private capital. The 
estimated demand for public infrastructure is huge and sometimes above the entire 
budget projection of a nation. The government alone cannot provide these basic 
infrastructure because of non- availability of funds. So, harnessing private capital 
can help governments to speed up the delivery of public infrastructure without 
delay. The banking and finance markets have moved to accommodate the needs of 
PPP transactions. We have seen extraordinary change in the length of time for 
which financial institutions are willing to lend.100 
 
Loan maturities of 10 to12 years were unusual in the 1980s and 1990s; now we see 
repayment periods of 30 to 35 years (and beyond). In the case of PPPs, there are 
repayment periods of 25-35 Years and even beyond. This is because the way the 
infrastructure transactions are structured guarantees a high degree of certainty of 
stable cash flow in the project. Also, Pension Funds Administrators are also 
becoming interested in long term fixed-income investment which PPPs provide. In 
Nigeria for example, the National Assembly established the Pension Reforms Act 
which provides for the establishment of Pension Fund Administrators.101 There 
have been allegations of financial scandals concerning the fund. If this type of fund 
is applied to the provision of infrastructure, it will surely help both the government 
and the private sectors and it may also result into profit for the pensioners. 
                                                          
100Nicholas Avery at Page 1. 
101See S.1 of the Pensions Reform Act  2004.  
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2.5.1.2  It Increases Efficiency and the use of Resources 
Scarce public resources are not being used efficiently by the government. Also, 
because of the poor incentives for efficiency, the public sector is not rightly 
positioned to efficiently build and operate infrastructure. Combining such 
incentives in the operation and management of the public infrastructure through the 
private sector is therefore necessary. Typically, private sector operators enter into 
such transactions with the intention of maximizing profits which are geared 
majorly by increased efficiency in investment and operations. If the PPPs are 
designed in such a manner as to allow the operator realise this goal, the efficiency 
of the infrastructure services will be achieved. 
 
Philippe Burger102  stated that one major reason why it is better to adopt PPP 
instead of privatization is where effectiveness, rather than efficiency, is also an aim 
of the government. A policy becomes effective where the aim of government with 
respect to which it was conceived is achieved, irrespective of whether the aim is 
carried out in an efficient manner or not. Achieving the result is the aim, and such 
aim is carried out effectively. There is no doubt that the governments have access 
to more funding than the private sector, the efficiency gains from the private sector 
participation may in the long run overweigh the extra financial cost expended.103 
 
The greater efficiency of the private sector can be linked to the following factors:- 
(a) The private sector’s commercial approaches to problem solving with serious 
focus on cost-effectiveness which leads to the rationalization of cost of labour and 
materials; 
                                                          
102 See the Dedicated PPP Unit of the Southern African National Treasury. 
103OECD.  Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure. Available at  http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/38309896.pdf.  Accessed on 13.06.13. 
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(b) By allowing less politically oriented decision making will surely lead to better 
governance and it will improve accountability; and 
© Improving competition and transparency will greatly reduce the opportunity for 
corrupt practices and it will reveal those costs that were hitherto hidden.104 
 
2.5.1.3 Reformation of the Sectors through a Reallocation of Roles, Incentives, 
and Accountability 
 
Once risks, roles and responsibilities are reallocated, there is the tendency that 
efficiency and accountability will be assured. Also, corruption which is common in 
conventional procurement will be greatly reduced thereby enhancing greater 
output. 
 
2.5.1.4 Technology, Innovation and Know-how 
By involving the private sector, access to new technologies and experienced 
management not currently available through the public monopoly is the result. This 
will include access to skills and those technologies and know-how which were 
otherwise not known to the public sector. These technologies may even be 
developed for the project specifically which would not have been developed under 
the traditional procurement system. 
 
2.5.1.5 Transparency and Anti-corruption 
Openness and good governance will lead to equality in the treatment of the 
investors and it will promote competition. Lack of transparency and good 
governance therefore increases the likelihood of bribery and corruption, reduces 
competition, increases costs and reduces quality of the output. PPPs therefore 
                                                          
104 Jeffrey  Delmon, Page 14. 
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provide opportunity to implement good governance in the process of 
implementation. 
These are some of the factors that guarantee good governance in procurement 
systems;- 
1. Improved public access to information concerning the procurement process. 
Once the public have access to the information, people will have trust and 
confidence in the process. This can be done by opening a website with relevant and 
up-to-date information about the contract award; 
2. Enhanced project procurement approach in order to increase transparency, 
competition and control;  
3. Using financial and fiduciary management (an approach to asset management 
which involves an asset owner appointing a third party to manage the total assets of 
the asset owner on an integrated basis through a combination of advisory and 
delegated investment services, with a view to achieving the asset owner's overall 
investment objectives) like providing subsidies from the government.105 
 
2.5.2  The Key Private Actors in Public-Private Partnerships 
Due to the complex nature of PPPs, it is imperative to examine the roles and 
functions of the key private actors in the PPP contract. The most prominent ones 
among them are: 
 
2.5.2.1 The Project Company 
This is a legal entity usually a limited Liability company created to fulfill certain 
specified objectives. This is also called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The 
construction of the new infrastructure is usually entrusted to a specialist 
construction company or a joint venture formed by a number of specialists 
                                                          
105 Ibid at Page 16. 
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construction companies. It is this company that will directly enter into a contract 
with the public authority. The SPV is usually a consortium of both local and 
foreign companies. Where the company does not include any local investors, the 
government may require that local investors be included in order to improve 
transfer of technology and this will also enhance job provisions and training of 
local personnel. 
 
2.5.2.2 Lenders 
These are referred to as ‘the glamour boys’ of the transaction. It is the lenders who 
will be providing the bulk of the funds and it is they who take the highest risks. 
Funding is sometimes provided through project bonds or by sovereign wealth funds 
and other financial intermediaries. Lenders are likely to be involved in most of the 
important phases of the project to oversee how the fund is being applied on the 
project. However, because they will not be involved in the operation and 
construction of the project, they will therefore want to avoid all the risks which 
they are not familiar with. In a standard PPP transaction, there should be a direct 
agreement between the lenders and the government which would provide that for 
the purpose of the security’s enforcement, the lenders will be granted the right to 
step in. 
 
2.5.2.3 Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies 
These may be referred to as development financial institutions that are mandated to 
provide support in form of debt or equity investment. Examples of bilateral 
agencies are the kind of agency funded by only one nation aimed at helping the 
other nation in the execution of infrastructure projects. Example of bilateral agency 
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is the PROPARCO of France.106 Multilateral agencies like World Bank,107 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Public 
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)108 are common examples. Their 
functions include advisory services, providing guarantees or insurance and also 
provision of loans. 
 
2.5.2.4 Operator 
On completion of the project, the company may need to transfer the operation and 
maintenance of the project to the operator for efficiency and service delivery. The 
company may want to tie the operator’s payment to the performance of the project. 
Where the standard of performance is high, it will guarantee a high rate of return 
and it will in turn ensure regular and adequate payment to the operator. However, 
where the standard of performance is low, surely, the operator will be adversely 
affected. In some cases, the operators may want to avoid the risks associated with 
tying their revenues to the standard of performance; they may therefore request to 
be paid fee for the service provided irrespective of the rate of returns.  
 
2.5.2.5 Construction Contractor 
This is engaged by the company to carry out the construction work. The 
construction contractor is saddled with the responsibility of designing, building, 
testing and commissioning the infrastructure project. Completion and performance 
risks are always placed on the construction contractor. Both the company and the 
                                                          
106This is a French Developmental Agency which was established to help in financing the private sector especially in 
developing countries. The company is committed to promoting private investment in developing and emerging economies 
for growth and development. In 2009 alone, the company granted over One Billion Pounds which covered over Eighty 
projects in more than Thirty Countries. (Proparco: Shaping Sustainable Features. Retrieved from 
http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/pays/mediterranee-et-moyen-orient/geo/egypte/Proparco-Egypte. Accessed on 01.04.12. 
107 One of the major responsibilities of the World Bank is to ensure that developing countries have the infrastructure 
necessary for their economic growth and development. The World Bank is open to supporting public and private partners 
coming together to provide critical infrastructure. 
108This was established in the year 1999 to help in increasing private sector participation in infrastructure development in 
developing countries. It helps the government in developing economies by providing technical assistance to support the 
creation of sound enabling environment for the provision of key infrastructure. 
  
53 
 
lenders will always have the right to oversee the construction works being carried 
out in order to ensure standard and prompt delivery. The contractor must execute 
the construction plan to the latter. In addition to the implementation of the plan, the 
building contractor is also responsible for hiring, supervising and, (where possible) 
firing the employees for gross negligence or non-performance. In addition, the 
contractor will also be responsible for the payment of the employees and he may 
engage someone to perform this function on his behalf.  
 
2.6 Public-Private Partnership and Infrastructure  
Infrastructure is very critical to the socio-economic advancement of any nation. In 
fact, they are the wheels through which nations’ economies are run. Infrastructure 
creates the basic services and facilities that are needed for the economic 
advancement of any nation. Poor infrastructure on the other hand hinders economic 
growth and international competitiveness.109 A nation’s level of infrastructure has a 
direct bearing on the competitiveness of such a nation and its attraction to 
investors. 
 
Roads and highways were considered to be the earliest human demand for 
infrastructure. The first world’s known paved roads were laid in Egypt between 
2600 and 2200 BC.110 Indeed, it could not have been possible to build the pyramids 
without the roads on which the heavy limestone blocks were dragged. Also, stone 
paved roads were found in the city of Ur in the modern day Iraq since 4000 BC.111 
No doubt, civilization advanced or declined around the qualities of their road 
networks. The ancient Roman, Persian, Chinese and Indian civilizations built road 
                                                          
109 Jeffrey Delmon, Page 1. 
110John Noble Wildord "World's Oldest Paved Road Found in Egypt". Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/08/world/world-s-oldest-paved-road-found-in-egypt.html. Accessed on 27.04.13. 
111 Roads and Highways, Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica online, 
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/505109/road/71891/Ancient-roads-of-South-and-East-Asia.   Accessed on 20.05.13. 
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networks that encouraged and advanced trade and commerce among those empires 
and also assisted them in the transportation of military equipment.112 The 
technological advancement in the world today could not have been possible 
without the invention of electricity and its applications in the eighteen century by 
the great scientists like Benjamin Franklin, Alessandro Volta, Michael Faraday and 
many others.113 
 
According to the Online Etymology Dictionary114 the word infrastructure has 
commonly been used since around the year 1927, as meaning "The installations 
that form the basis for any operation or system”. The word infrastructure has its 
source from French, which literally means sub-grade, which means the native 
material underneath a constructed pavement or railway. The term Public 
Infrastructure can be referred to those facilities which are very crucial to the 
functioning of the economy and the society. 
 
It helps in supporting a nation’s economy and social activities and they also include 
facilities which are ancillary to these functions such as government offices.115 
Traditionally, infrastructure refers to only the following sectors; 
Telecommunications (fixed lined and mobile telephony), Energy (oil, gas, 
petrochemicals, and electricity generation, distribution and transmission, water, 
transportation and Sanitation. 116 
Infrastructure has been categorized into two broad categories. These are economic 
and social infrastructure. These are as follows: 
                                                          
112 Sawant, R J.  Infrastructure investing: managing risks & rewards for pensions, insurance companies & endowments (New 
Jersey:  John Wiley & Sons Publishers, 2010). Page 1. 
113William Gilbert, History of Electricity. Retrieved from http://inventors.about.com/cs/inventorsalphabet/a/electricity.htm. 
Accessed on 20.05.13. 
114 See the online Etymology Dictionary Retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/infrastructure. Accessed on 
02.04.12. 
115E.R. Yescombe 1. 
116Rajeev J Sawant, Infrastructure Investing: Managing Risks& Rewards for Pensions, Insurance Companies and 
Endowment. Page1. 
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2.6.1 Economic Infrastructures  
These are infrastructures that are so crucial and essential for the daily economic 
activities of a nation. They provide key intermediate services to business and 
industry generally. They also help in enhancing productivities and innovations.117 
Economic infrastructure can further be classified into two. These are hard 
economic infrastructure and soft economic infrastructure. Examples of hard 
economic infrastructures are; highways, energy, ports, dams, bridges, 
telecommunication and many others. 
 
2.6.2 Social Infrastructure 
These consist of those infrastructures that help in providing basic services to the 
people. Social infrastructures help in improving the quality of lives and welfare of 
the people. Social infrastructure can be further sub-divided into hard and soft social 
infrastructure. Examples of hard social infrastructures are prisons, education and 
hospital buildings, sewage, child care and aged care institutions.  
 
Soft Social Infrastructures are those that are very essential for communities to have 
because they are socially desirable. Examples are a range of community services, 
environmental protection institutions and social security system among others. 
Security systems infrastructure can be referred to as a network of electronic 
security systems and devices that is configured, operated, maintained and enhanced 
to provide security functions and services (such as operational and emergency 
communications and notification, physical access control, intrusion detection, 
video surveillance, officer patrol tour management and security administration) to 
                                                          
117 See  Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis at page 21. 
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achieve specific risk mitigation objectives.118 This would also include the Close 
Circuit Television (CCTV) and Satellites to monitor the activities of terrorists and 
criminals in the nation. 
 
According to OECD, hard infrastructures such as rail networks, roads, dams, 
bridges, energy, airports, telecommunications and others are the ‘core’ physical 
infrastructure as compared with others like health and education that involve 
intangible investments.   
 
2.7  Distinctions between PPPs and other Procurement Methods 
The ability of any government to effectively and efficiently acquire the resources 
for its social, economic and developmental goals is crucial and fundamental to its 
sustenance and development. An effective management and co-ordination of public 
procurement may therefore signal a factual test for government’s efficacy.119 A 
good public procurement regime enhances steady development of the economy and 
also gives room for a systematic accomplishment of public development efforts.  
 
Public procurement and Privatisation are prominent procurement methods which 
have been adopted by governments over the years before PPPs. Attempts would 
therefore be made here to show the distinctions between PPPs and these other 
models.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 Ray Bernard, What is Security Infrastructure? Available at http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/10538077/what-is-
a-security-infrastructure. Accessed on 04.12.13. 
119B. D. Oloworaran, The Law and Practice of Procurement in Nigeria, (Porthacourt: Benuch Legal Consult, 2010) Page 1. 
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2.7.1 Public Procurement and Public-Private Partnership  
The term Public Procurement refers to the entire process of government 
acquisitions.120 Public procurement connotes the purchase of goods and services by 
authorities in the market place from another legal entity, generally by contractual 
agreement.121 According to Arrowsmith, there are three phases involved in the 
procurement processes. These are deciding what goods and services are to be 
purchased and when it will be purchased (Procurement Planning); choosing the 
contracting partner together with the terms and conditions on which the goods or 
services are to be provided and lastly, the process of administering the contract in 
order to ensure effective performance of the contract.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships occupy a middle position between Privatisation and 
traditional Public Procurement. PPP is thus an alternative to the traditional 
procurement system by providing the needed facilities to the public sector using 
funding generated by the private sector. In PPPs, the government usually sets a 
target as to the quality and quantity it requires. The designing, financing, building 
and the operation of the project is left to the innovation of the private sector. This is 
because if the government carries out the design itself, it would also have to carry 
the risk resulting from faulty design.122 
 
Thus, the risk and the possible efficiency gains are better left to the private partner. 
In this method, the government does not buy the capital assets from the private 
sector directly rather, it buys the services which the private sector generates 
through the assets. In PPPs, risks relating to the cost of design and construction, 
                                                          
120 Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli and Don Wallace, Jr, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) Page 2. 
121 Peter Braun, The Practical Impact of E.U. Procurement Law on PFI Procurement Practice in the United Kingdom. Thesis 
Submitted to the University of Nothingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Page 2. 
122OECD,  Page 20. 
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usage of the facility, services provided by the facility and the operation and 
maintenance cost are all transferred from the public authority to the private 
sector.123  
 
Furthermore, compliance with the quality and quantity specifications at the price 
agreed by the parties should yield the value for money that the government intends 
to achieve through PPPs. Also, in PPPs, the private partner receives payment 
(Service Fees) over the duration of the PPP contract (normally between 25-30 
years) on the pre-agreed basis with the intention of giving a return to the investors. 
 
While in the public procurement method, both parties (government and the private 
partners) negotiate a price usually through the tender process. The public authority 
funds the full cost of the project, and the operation and maintenance of the project 
are handed over to the public authority. The project contractor takes no 
responsibility for the effective long term performance after the construction-
warranty period has expired.124 
 
It is trite that public procurement already has many challenges both nationally and 
internationally.125 There are generally three socio-economic reasons why 
governments prefer to adopt the PPP model in the procurement of infrastructure. 
The first is because of the urgent need of infrastructure facilities. Secondly, there 
are serious cash constraints on the part of the governments and the third reason is 
because of the procurement failures of the past. Among the challenges that face the 
traditional procurement methods are lack of competition, lack of transparency, and 
inequality of the treatment of the bidders. Also, bribery and corruption, dealing 
                                                          
123E.R. Yescombe 4. 
124 Ibid. 
125Roberto Harnandez-Gracia,” The Global Challenges of International Public Procurement”, In Roberto Harnandez-Gracia, 
(ed),  International Public Procurement: A guide to Best Practices (London: Globe Business Publishing Limited, 2009). 7 
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with cartel, environmental protection issues and non-availability of up to date 
technology also constitute hurdles to the public procurement process. 
 
PPPs ensure transparency, fairness and selection of the best qualified bidder. 
Procurement rules and regulations are in place in order to ensure probity and 
transparency in the selection of the private partners. The main objective is the 
creation of a level playing ground for all project proponents. This is important 
because it enables non-discrimination in the selection and award of contracts and 
therefore would lead to the emergence and selection of the most qualified bidder 
with the most economically viable proposal. Due to the fact that in PPPs unlike the 
public procurement system, there is greater transparency in the selection and award 
of contract, there is then the tendency that there would be greater investor 
confidence in the procurement process. 
 
It should be mentioned here that the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) recognizes both PPPs and Public Procurement by 
adopting different legislative frameworks for the two. For PPPs, there is the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) 
2003 and for public procurement, the Model Law on procurement of Good, 
Construction and Services was adopted in 1994. The United Nations General 
Assembly explained the rationale for its provisions thus:126  
“The decision by UNCITRAL to formulate model legislation on procurement 
was taken in response to the fact that in a number of countries, the existing 
legislation governing procurement is inadequate or outdated. This results in 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the procurement process, patterns of abuse 
and the failure of the public purchaser to obtain adequate value in return for the 
                                                          
126See the official Records of the General Assembly, 49th Session adopted on 17th February, 1995, Supplement N0 17 and 
Corrigendum (A/49/17 and Corr1). The full texts of the provision are available at 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html. 
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expenditure of public funds. While sound laws and practices for public 
procurement are necessary in all countries, this need is particularly felt in many 
developing countries, as well as in countries whose economies are in 
transition”.127 
 
Thus the Model Law is available to national governments seeking to reform their 
public procurement process. However, it should be mentioned here that the 
provisions will become binding only if it is ratified by the national legislators.128 
 
2.7.2  Public-Private Partnership and Privatisation 
 Privatisation connotes the act of reducing governmental roles and increasing the 
roles of the private sectors in satisfying people’s needs. It means relying more on 
the private sector and less on government.129 It also connotes transferring a 
government facility to the private partner, usually with ownership, for it to be 
managed and operated in accordance with some set objectives. 
Privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships reflect market principles and the two 
of them constitute a strategy for improving public management. PPPs are 
sometimes confused with privatization. Privatisation connotes the permanent 
transfer of the public ownership of an asset to the private sector while in PPPs; 
there is a continuing role to be performed by the public sector as partner in the 
ongoing relationship with the private sector.130 
 
 
                                                          
127Guide to the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model procurement Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
services. 
128See S.12 of The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that provides that no treaty between the Federation 
of Nigeria and any other nation shall have the force of law except to the extent to which such treaty was enacted by the 
National Assembly. This was the holding of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in General Sanni Abacha & 3 Ors v. Chief Gani 
Fawehinmi (2000) 4.S.C. (Pt 11) 1, 20-22. Conventions and other international legislations also fall within this term. 
129E.A.Savas, Privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships. Retrieved from  
http://www.cesmadrid.es/documentos/sem200601_md02_in.pdf. Accessed on 17thMarch, 2012. 
 
130Edward Farquharson, Clencia Torres de Mastle, E.R. Yescombe and Javier Encinas,  Page 9. 
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Under the PPPs, accountability for the provision of the service is clearly a 
responsibility of the public sector that is in a continuing relationship with the 
private sector, while in Privatisation, accountability for providing services will 
immediately be transferred to the private sector although, citizens would still have 
the right to complain to the government. For Instance, if a privatized 
telecommunication company is closed, people will complain directly to the private 
sector, whereas, if a road built through PPPs is closed, people will complain 
directly to the government.  
 
Also, Privatisation involves no strict alignment of objectives.131 This is because the 
government is not really involved in the output specification of the privatized 
entity, while also giving room for the private sector to maximize profit.132 Under a 
PPPs scheme, the government usually specifies the standard and quality of service 
delivery expected from the private sector. The two parties also need to agree on the 
price before the contract is concluded and the private sector is then at liberty to 
maximize its profit based on the agreed price.133  
 
Under Privatisition, the ownership of the privatised entity is wholly transferred to 
the private sector entity, while under PPPs, the control and management of the 
entity is only with the private sector for some years usually between 25-30 years. 
Also in PPP contract, substantial risk is transferred to the private sector partner, 
whereas under privatization almost all the risks are transferred to the private sector. 
 
                                                          
131 See E.A Savas, Op Cit. 
132Exception exists in a situation where the government continues to regulate the price and quality of outputs of a public 
monopoly that becomes a private monopoly after privatization. 
133 OECD, Page 19. 
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2.8  Public-Private partnership Models 
Several agencies have attempted to show the various models of PPPs along a 
continuum134 that ranges from public sector ownership of infrastructure acquired 
through the traditional or conventional procurement system to private sector 
ownership of infrastructure through privatization.135 The typology of the PPPs 
examined here is based on the functional approach and attention will be focused on 
the functions performed and risks undertaken.  
 
2.8.1 Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
These are contracts in which the private sector is responsible for the financing, 
designing, building and operation of the project. Ownership and control of the 
project will then be transferred back to the government after the period agreed 
under the contract. This type of arrangement is used in complex and long-term 
projects like in power plants and water treatment facilities. In some arrangements, 
the government does not assume ownership of the project. In those cases, the 
company continues running the facility and the government act as both the 
consumer and regulator.136 
 
2.8.1.1 Main Features of BOT 
(a) In BOT projects, the government gives the private sector the right to develop 
and operate a facility or system for a certain period (the "Concession Period"). 
The facility granted must be a public facility/infrastructure. 
(b) This type of arrangement usually involves building of a new project with little 
or no risks associated with an existing project. Unlike concession which may 
                                                          
134 The OECD terms of reference follows a financial/legal approach and suggests a typology which focuses attention on the 
funding source and the nature of contractual undertaken. The U.K in its private Finance Initiative uses a vocabulary based on 
a functional approach and which focuses attention on the functions performed. 
135Lecture note delivered at the Institute of Public-Private Partnerships(IP3) U.S.A.  
136 See Build Operate and Transfer Contract.  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/botcontract.asp#axzz1pQvK3o40. 
Accessed  on 02.04.12. 
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involve rehabilitation of an existing infrastructure, there may be some unknown 
risks associated with that existing infrastructure. 
© The facility will then revert back to the government after the private operator 
had funded constructed and operated it commercially for the entire period of 
the concession.  
(d) In BOT, lenders will be seriously willing to ensure that projects concerned are 
ring-fenced within the operating project company and will also want to make 
sure that all risks in the project are transferred on to the appropriate actor.  
(e) The company gets funds for the project, and thereafter undertakes the design 
and construction of the works and then operates the facility for the concession 
period.  
(f) There is the Special Purpose vehicle (SPV) which comprises of shareholders 
with appropriate PPP Procurement/ Financial skills who are highly experienced 
in the management of projects.  
(g) The project company (SPV) will coordinate the construction and operation of 
the project strictly according to the concession agreement. The off-taker will 
want to know the identity of the construction sub-contractor and the operator.  
(h) The money generated from the operation of the facility are intended to cover 
operating costs, maintenance, repayment of debt (which represents a significant 
portion of development and construction costs), financing costs (including 
interest and fees), and a return for the shareholders of the special purpose 
company. 
(i) The project company (SPV) assumes a lot of risks. It is common for a project 
company to require some form of guarantees from the government (particularly 
in gigantic projects like power projects), and commitments from the 
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government which would be incorporated into an Implementation 
Agreement.137 
(j) Existing (public) Utility simply buys a key input (electricity, treated water, 
waste treatment, etc.) instead of providing it internally. Retail consumers still 
interface with the existing (public) utility. 
Examples of the BOT arrangement are the Sydney Harbour Tunnel and the City 
Link Project in Melbourne in Australia; the Third Dartford Crossing of the River 
Thames linking two stretches of the M25 Motorway Circling in London and  the 
Murtala Muhammed Airport II (MMII) in Lagos, Nigeria to mention but a few. 
 
2.8.2 Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) 
This is an arrangement whereby the project is designed, financed, operated, and 
maintained by the private sector for the agreed period of the contract. Under this 
arrangement, legal ownership of the project is vested in the private partner. During 
the lifespan of the contract, the developer charges customers who use the 
infrastructure in order to realize the profit. At the end of the period, the private-
sector partner transfers ownership to the public authority, either freely or for an 
amount stipulated in the original contract.138 
 
2.8.3  Design, Build, Operate and Maintain (DBOM) 
The design-build-operate (maintain) DBOM model is a type of arrangement in 
which the private sector combines the responsibility of designing, constructing, 
operating and maintenance of the infrastructure. This project delivery approach is 
practiced by several governments around the world and is known by a number of 
different names, including "turnkey" procurement and in some countries, it is 
                                                          
137See Concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) AND Design- Build-Operate-Transfer Projects. Retrieved from 
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements/concessions-bots-dbos. Accessed on 02.04.12.  
138 Definition of Build, Own, Operate and Transfer. Retrieved from http://searchcio.techtarget.in/definition/BOOT-build-
own-operate-and-transfer. Accessed on 01.04.12. 
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called build-operate-transfer (BOT). The arrangement has a great advantage 
because it confers responsibilities on the private sector to design, construct, and 
maintain - under a single entity. This allows the private partners to take advantage 
of a number of efficiencies. The project design can be tailored to the construction 
equipment and materials that will be used. In addition, the DBOM team is also 
required to establish a long-term maintenance program up front, together with 
estimates of the associated costs.  
 
An example of this is the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital in Durban, South 
Africa, which was contracted to the private sector for 15 years under the Design, 
Finance, Build, Operate and transfer (DFBOT).139 Under the arrangement, the 
Impilo Consortiun will upgrade and manage the facilities and information 
technology of an 846-bed state-of the heart referral hospital. The capital value of 
this project is put at US$746 million. This hospital is well equipped and provides 
services to the people of KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape Province. The 
general opinion has been that PPP through which this hospital was built has 
delivered a quality service which could not have been achieved by the government 
alone.140 
 
2.8.4 Build, Own, Operate (BOO) 
In this type of arrangement, there is no provision for the transfer of ownership of 
the project to the government after the concession period. The private sector is 
saddled with the responsibility of funding, designing, constructing, operating and 
maintaining the project. However, the agreement may be renegotiated giving the 
option to the government to purchase from the private sector developer. One 
                                                          
139 See PPP Quarterly, A publication of the PPP Unit, National Treasury South Africa. Number 28 of February, 2009. 
140 See M.T Adekilekun & C.C.Gan, “Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure Development in Africa: A Magic Wand to 
Socio-Economic Development”. Being a paper delivered at the 2013 Symposium on Finding Solutions to Africa’s 
Development, held at the University of South Africa (UNISA) between 23-24 August, 2013. 
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important feature of this type of arrangement is that the private sector assumes the 
ownership of the project out rightly, but this may later be purchased by the 
government. Both the risks and the revenues are totally for the private partner 
developer. This type of arrangement is mostly common in power projects. 
 
2.8.5  Concession 
This involves a consortium of private firms forming a new project company 
usually called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with the responsibility to finance, 
build, expand, and improve public sector services. Usually, the private sector 
borrows a long-term loan from the commercial lenders. The private sector gets its 
profit from the revenue accruable from the users of the facilities directly for the 
duration of the concession. 
  
Franchise is a subset of concession.141 In Franchise, the private partner takes over 
an existing infrastructure often with a mandate to maintain it within a stipulated 
period of time. In this arrangement, the private party will pay a sum of money to 
the government in order to take over the infrastructure.142 There are no clear 
distinctions between concession and franchise. While concession involves a high 
level of initial investment in new or upgraded project, Franchise involves a limited 
amount as initial investment in the project. 
 
The following are part of the characteristic features of concession contract:-  
1. The private sector provides a monopoly service. In concession, the 
concessioner is the only provider of the utility service; 
                                                          
141Attracting Investors to African Public-Private Partnerships: A project Preparation Guide. (World Bank: Herndon, USA, 
2008) Page 9. 
142 Ibid. 
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2. The consumers will have the direct access to interface with the 
concessioner; 
3. The risk of collection of money like tolls for the utility provided is usually 
very high since it is the sole duty of the private sector to do this; 
4. Concessions sometimes involve the private sector taking over a poorly 
managed infrastructure, there may be a high risk associated with the 
unknown condition of the infrastructure; 
5. The right to provide a public service is usually exclusively ceded to the 
concessioner through the concession agreement; 
6. The concession period is usually between 20-35 years for the investors to 
recoup their profits;143 and 
7. There is a need for regulatory bodies to protect the interests of all parties 
involved, i.e.  Government, consumers and the investors.  
 
For example, in Manila, Philippines, as a result of lack of access to drinkable 
water, the government engaged the private sector by granting concession in order 
to provide and improve access to water in the Eastern Zone of Metro Manila. The 
contract has a capital value of US$17 million. Since the water project was 
completed, the company has met all its obligations regarding water supply. In fact, 
the water project currently serves more than 5.1 million people and the company 
has increased its coverage of 24hours water supply to about 98 percent of the 
area.144 
 
 
                                                          
143 J.L Guasch, Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right. (World Bank Publication: 
Washington D.C, 2004) Page 50. 
144 Ferguharson Edward, Torres de Mastle Clemencia, Yescombe E.R. and Encinas Javier. 2010.  How to engage with the 
Private Sector in Public Private Partnerships, (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2011). Page 73. 
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In Gabon, PPPs have been used to provide water and electricity to the two main 
cities of Port-Gentil and Libreville. In 1997, the government signed a 20 year 
concession contract with SEEG, with a capital value of US$135 million.145 This 
concession contract has been a success and it was the first real output driven water 
project in Africa. Through PPP in water project, more than half of the Gabonese 
population now has access to safe water. 
 
2.9 The Nature and Length of Concession Agreement 
The discussion here centers on the nature and length of concession agreements. 
This is particularly important to note especially when drafting concession 
agreements.  
 
2.9.1  The Nature of Concession Agreement 
Public-Private Partnerships is a legally binding agreement between the public and 
private sectors, which involves new investments by the private sector (the private 
sector concerned should possess the following: technology, money, experience in 
management, reputation, etc.) and in which risks (funding, designing, building and 
operation etc.) are transferred to the private sector in which payments are made in 
exchange for performance, for the services delivered by the private sector. 
 
There is a general consensus that PPPs provide the government with a more 
flexible approach to the regulation, control, ownership and maintenance of the 
project while offering the private sector the opportunity to provide efficient 
services and to maximize profit. The government takes the glory for the project 
provided because ordinarily, the project should be provided by the government. 
 
                                                          
145 Ibid at Page28. 
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A good PPPs contract serves to protect the interest of the private investors from 
unnecessary political interference from the government. It also protects the users 
from the abuse of the monopolistic nature of the private sectors. Because of the 
huge amount of money invested into the project, the government too may be 
tempted to behave opportunistically.146 The need for safeguards arises because 
investment in infrastructure requires very huge amount of money which cannot be 
easily recouped. As a result of these, safeguards to protect the interests of all 
parties involved are usually built into the concession agreement and the framework 
regulating the partnerships. 
Ideally, a PPP contract should be complete, i.e., it should take care of all the 
foreseeable contingent events. The rights and duties of all the parties thereto must 
be specified clearly, so also is the risks and revenues. A typical public sector 
obligation in the contract should include: 
1. Maintaining an efficient legal and regulatory framework necessary for the 
efficient service delivery, including toll rates;  
2. Financial assistance, such as tax breaks and minimum revenue guarantees 
for the private sector; 
3. Construction assistance in the form of resolution of issues relating to land 
like the right of way and services and other issues ancillary thereto;  
4.  Assistance relating to currency and banking issues e.g., currency 
conversion and securing banking permits; 
5.  Ensuring the payment of damages in case of breach by the government or 
any of its agencies; and  
6.  Providing where necessary the law enforcement agencies to ensure 
compliance on the part of the citizen. In all kinds of PPP contracts, the 
                                                          
146 J.L Guash, Page 12. 
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financing, construction, and operation of the projects are the responsibilities 
of the private sector.  
The private sector should bear the risks of financing, designing, constructing, 
operation and management of the project. The Public sector bears the regulatory 
and political risks (This include the followings: delay in project approvals, land 
acquisition, change in laws and policies affecting revenue), and force majeure 
(Like Acts of God, Natural Disasters and War). Both the Public and the Private 
sectors also have certain risks which they share together. These include Project 
default risk, project bankruptcy and loss of revenue. 
 
2.9.2  The Length of Concession Agreement 
The length of concession means the period in which the private sector is 
contractually bound to operate the asset. However, before discussing the length of 
concession contracts, it is important to first state the length of the gestation of the 
project, i.e. the length of the period for the completion of the project. This usually 
depends on the complex nature of the project concerned. However, it is better for 
the completion period to be between a maximum periods of between 6-8 Years. 
 
Majority of the writers are of the view that concession contracts should be between 
20-30 years, by which time; the investors would have recouped the money invested 
in the project.147An unreasonably long period of time is likely to be suboptimal for 
tax payers. Concession period usually reflects the number of years required to 
recover the investment. For long duration concessions, fixing a particular time 
period for full amortization148 is usually not feasible as infrastructure services 
require continuous investments that cannot be predicted well in advance; 
                                                          
147 See for example, the position of E.R Yescombe and Chris Brown, Financing Public-Private Partnerships: The Changing 
Market. 
148 Amortisation is the reduction of the value of an asset by prorating its cost over a given period of time. It may also mean 
the writing off of an amount of money within a specific number of time. 
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investments almost always must be made toward the end of the contract and cannot 
be amortized before its expiration. 
Also, other factors to be considered in fixing the length of contract are:  
 
1. The cost of construction: - It is important to fix a period in which the 
parties to the concession agreement reasonably think that all things being 
equal, the investor would have gained the profit of his investment.  
2. The benefits of competition:-In concessions, an exclusive right to operate 
the facility is usually granted to the private operator. This sometimes would 
lead to monopoly and lack of competition. In considering the length of the 
contract, a shorter concession period which would allow the private sector 
to recover the money invested is better because it would provide room for 
competition. The government may have to make the facility available for 
auction to the other interested operators. 
3. It is more appropriate for the parties to terminate the rights and obligations 
only arising from the contract and not the contract entirely. This is because, 
it is better for the project company to still be held responsible for warranties 
even after the asset has been transferred to the government. However, 
where the entire contract is terminated, it will be difficult for the 
government to still transfer the responsibility regarding warranties to the 
private sector. 
4.  The parties may also need to provide that certain clauses may still be 
operative even after the termination of the concession agreement. Clauses 
relating to confidentiality149 would most fit into this category. It should be 
categorically stated that from the foregoing, that whatever the length of 
                                                          
149 Confidentiality clause is a clause that restricts parties to the contract from divulging information about the activities of the 
contract to a third party or the public. 
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time to be agreed upon, it should be one that will allow the private investors 
to recover their investment. A longer period of concession will likely 
overburden the direct users or toll payers (in case of roads), and this may 
likely trigger both political and economic unrest. 
 
2.10 Other Vital Agreements in Public-Private Partnerships 
Apart from the main agreement that bind all parties together under the PPP 
contract, there are also some other agreements that will further help in defining and 
understanding the roles of the parties. These include; shareholding agreement, 
lending agreement, insurance agreement, Operation and Maintenance agreement, 
Offtake Purchase agreement and input supply agreement. All the above stated 
agreements will be examined one after the other. 
 
2.10.1  Shareholding Agreement 
Since there will be shareholders coming together to execute the PPPs project, it is 
necessary to have a company incorporated under the relevant laws of the country 
concerned.150 It is necessary to have a clear agreement regulating the relationships 
between or among the shareholders within the company. A shareholders’ 
agreement is therefore an agreement which stipulates the rights and obligations of 
the shareholders in relation to the company. This agreement defines the way and 
manner in which the project company is managed, how the revenues accruable will 
be allocated and how intervening events will be dealt with.151 
 
                                                          
150 Where there are foreign companies among the companies that will form the SPV, it is incumbent on those companies to 
first register in that country where the project will be executed. Where licences and permits are to be obtained. Such licences 
must be sought and obtained for the smooth operation of the company in that country. 
151Jeffrey Delmon, Shareholders Agreements, In Jeffrey Delmon (ed) in Project Finance, BOT Projects and Risks (Kluwer 
Law International) 2005 Page 181. 
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This agreement is like the constitutional document of the company. This may be in 
form of Articles of Association or incorporation. This agreement will include the 
names of the parties thereto, and it will cover areas such as the scope of business of 
the development company, their rights, powers and limitations, loans, issuing and 
transfer of shares, meetings, and allocation of project costs and the management of 
the project company. 
 
This would necessarily also include non-competition clauses, decision making 
processes, voting rights and means of resolving disputes which is usually through 
arbitration. It is worthy of note here that it is always better for the document to 
have greater flexibility. This is because, this kind of business requires regular 
changes to suit the prevailing circumstances, and therefore, its flexibility will allow 
the parties to take a prompt action which is necessary in the circumstance. 
 
2.10.2  Lending Agreement 
A huge amount of money is normally advanced by the lenders (mostly banks, 
shareholders and pension fund administrators) for the construction of the project. 
The lenders will advance funds gradually during the construction phase. The 
lenders will want to insist on an unequivocal method of debt servicing. This may 
involve requiring shareholders and guarantors to cover the risks of any probable 
delay which have not been transferred to the construction company. The debt will 
be serviced by the revenue accruable from the completed project. 
 The lender’s main aim of entering into the agreement can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. It is most appropriate for the lender to set out the conditions under which 
it will be obligated to disburse funds under the agreement. 
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2. The arrangement will enable the lender to monitor the financial position of 
the borrower as this will enable the lender to take necessary action in case 
the borrower is in a financial hardship. 
3. It will also provide the lender with legally binding claims in case of 
default of the borrower. A detailed lending agreement which will protect 
the interest of the lender is desirable. Some of the provisions to be 
included in the lending agreement include;- 
a. The right of the lenders over warranties from contractors, liquidated 
damages resulting from delay, and other mechanisms aimed at reducing 
the risks associated with the project. 
b. The lenders should also have the right to halt the disbursements to the 
shareholders where the funds are not being applied appropriately. 
c. The lender may also have the right to fund and control the Reserve 
Account. A Reserve Account is where the company keeps the money to 
take care of contingencies. Also, maintenance expenses, payment of taxes 
and servicing of revenue short fall would also be taken care of by this 
reserve account. This account will usually be domiciled with the lender.  
 
2.10.3  Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Agreement 
On completion of the project, the private sector will be saddled with the 
responsibilities of operating and maintaining the project for the duration of the 
concession period. This contract is important because while the concessionaire is 
responsible for O&M throughout the project life, government does monitor these 
activities to ensure quality of service. O&M is also important because the asset at 
the end of the project needs to be given back to government in the same condition 
as it was at the time of commencing the operation or even in an improved 
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form.152It therefore follows that it is better for the parties to provide a concrete 
agreement for the operation and maintenance of the project. The agreement will 
include the way and manner of operation of the project, replacement of ageing 
equipment, developing the relationship between off-take purchasers. 
 
It is possible that the project company may want to enter into an agreement for the 
provision of skilled labour, or it may want an agreement whereby the operation and 
maintenance obligations will be divided among the contractors. Whatever the 
structure of contractual arrangement, they will still be regarded as Operation and 
Maintenance agreement.153 
 
For efficiency and risk allocation purposes, it is better for the company to engage 
the services of an operation and maintenance contractor (operator). Efficient 
operation should lead to standard needed to fulfill its intended purpose. 
Maintenance activities would involve engaging in physical inspection and caring 
for equipment. When performed systematically, operation and Maintenance tasks 
enhance reliability; they reduce equipment degradation, and lead to energy 
efficiency.  
 
For an effective operation, the parties would need to understand the laws regulating 
the operation of such project like the environmental impacts on the community,154 
knowing about the local market, having a good relationship with the local authority 
and understanding the labour market. The operation should be consistent with the 
obligations set out in the concession agreement and those others required in 
                                                          
152See Infrastructure Concession Contracts: An Introduction. Available at  
http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/Viewpointpaper-InfrastrConcessContract-intro.pdf. Accessed on 10.04.12. 
153 Jeffrey Delmon, Project Finance, Bot Projects and Risks.(Kluwer Law Law International:2005) Page 242. 
154It is very essential for the operator to study what environmental impact the operation and maintainance of such project will 
have on the community at large. 
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ensuring efficient service delivery. The most important terms which the Operation 
and Maintenance Agreement should include are: 
 
1. Provisions relating to performance standards; - The agreement will spell 
out the required standard expected from the operator. Part of the guiding 
provisions relating to the standard must have been set out in the concession 
agreement, off-take purchaser agreement, and the maintenance manual (if 
any).155 The liability to be imposed for failure should be high considering 
the huge investment in the project and the probable loss of confidence by 
the public. 
2. Method of Operation: - Due to the fact that the operator is providing 
public service to the people, there is likely going to be disagreements and 
face-off with the users. It is therefore necessary to take care of the 
operator’s relationship with its employees and the local community in the 
agreement. 
3. Cost of Operation: - It is also necessary for the agreement to spell out the 
means of charging the cost of operation; whether it is fixed, variables and 
the need to consider the prevailing market values in determining the cost of 
operation.  
 
2.10.4  Insurance Agreements 
The importance of insurance in modern day businesses has been globally 
recognized. It is practically a necessity for the protection of public infrastructure. It 
is a means by which a disaster is shared by many, thereby lessoning the burden to 
repair. In PPP projects, it is generally better for the project company to ensure that 
                                                          
155 Maintenance Manual should contain supplementary instructions and guide on the ways and manners the project should be 
maintained. 
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there is a provision for a comprehensive insurance for the project. Although, other 
project participants might have made their own individual insurance for the project, 
the comprehensive insurance made by the company will subsume all the relevant 
provisions so as to avoid overlapping. The provision in the insurance will include; 
insurance of materials, operational damage, third party liability insurance, 
consequential loss insurance, automobile liability insurance, workers’ 
compensation/employers liability insurance, and professional indemnity insurance 
for design faults or for such other professional services rendered.  
 
2.10.5  Offtake-Purchase Agreement 
This is an agreement between the grantor/government or any of its agencies and the 
company whereby the grantor agrees to purchase the output of the infrastructure at 
an agreed price. This is done in order to divert the market risks away from the 
project company and the lenders. This agreement will require the offtake purchaser 
to pay for a minimum amount of the project output or for all fixed costs no matter 
the volume of the output. An example would be a government agency agreeing to 
purchase the power supplied by a power company. 
 
This agreement will define not only the amount of revenue accruable but also when 
those revenue streams can be modified, interrupted or terminated.156 Theoretically, 
this kind of agreement is merely intended to allocate the market risks involved in 
the distribution of the project output to the general public/end users. 
 
 
                                                          
156 Mark Twain, “Offtake Purchase Agreements.” In Jeffrey Delmon (ed) Project Finance, Bot Projects and Risks.(Kluwer 
Law Law International:2005) Page 257. 
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The agreement may provide for the imposition of sanctions if the company defaults 
in delivering the expected output as promised or if the project is not performing up 
to the expected standard. The consequences of a failure to meet the standard may 
be in form of liquidated damages and/or the right to call an event of default. 
Offtake Purchase Agreements are mostly appropriate to certain types of BOT 
projects e.g. Power Purchase agreements where it involves power projects and 
Water Purchase Agreements where the project is a water project.  This agreement 
will not be necessary for some projects, such as hospitals, tunnels, roadways and 
bridges, where no physical off take is produced. 
 
2.10.6  Input Supply Agreement 
The project company may need certain input necessary for the operation of the 
facility. This can be fuel which will be used to power the electricity needed for 
smooth operation. The project company may not want to bear the risk of supplying 
these necessary inputs. It may therefore enter into a contract with an input supplier 
to provide the needed input from time to time. It is important to state that the Input 
Supply Agreement will only be required where some supply of input is necessary 
for the operation of the facility.157 The important issues to mention in the input 
supply agreement include:  
1. Quality and Quantity of the input required; the quality and quantity 
required will be agreed upon and should be delivered as at when due. The 
input supplier will bear the risk and responsibilities associated with late or 
insufficient input delivery. 
2. Price: - The price of the input will include the cost price of the commodity 
and transportation. Where the input is to be imported from another country, 
                                                          
157B.S. Shapiro, P3 Concession Agreements-Risks and Rewards. Available at  
http://www.shk.ca/docs/P3ConcessionAgreements.pdf. Accessed on 11.04.12. 
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the input supplier will be responsible for obtaining the necessary licenses 
and permits for importing such input into the host country. Any failure on 
the part of the supplier as to the input supplied will result in the payment of 
liquidated damages or a decrease in the price paid for the commodity.  
3. Testing and Inspection: - In order to ensure optimal standard, there is the 
need to inspect and test the input supplied. This will help in determining the 
quantity and quality supplied. It is therefore necessary to have this included 
in the input supply agreement.  
4. Duration: - This involves the length of the period in which the input 
supplier will supply the input. The length may be determined by the risks 
associated with the input or the availability of another sources of input. 
There will also be provision for renegotiation incase the need arises. 
 
2.11 Sustainability Issues in PPPs and Public Procurement  
2.11.1 Environmental and Developmental Issues 
Sustainable Procurement connotes a process whereby the government engages in 
buying and selling or provisions of goods and services to meet the needs and 
aspirations of the people whilst still minimising damage to the environment.158 
Sustainable involves incorporating a policy that the government provision of goods 
and services (especially infrastructure, mining and other related matters) will be 
done in such a way that environmental factors of such project will be considered 
and taken care of before the project is implemented. This may entail policy of 
carbon reduction and energy/water conservation among others.  
 
                                                          
158 Cau Fuguo, Yan Yuying & Zhou Fen, Towards Sustainable Public Procurement in China: Policy and Regulatory 
Framework, Current Developments and the Case for a Consolidated Green Public Procurement Code. Available at 
http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/07GreenProcurement/Paper7-7.pdf. Accessed on 13.08.14. 
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Since the resolution of countries at the International conference on Environment 
and Development which took place at Rio de Jeneiro in Brazil in 1992, the 
awareness of environmental and developmental issues (otherwise known as Green 
Procurement) has been on the increase.159 Significantly since then, many member 
countries of OECD adopted a recommendation on green procurement in 2002. In 
addition, other countries especially of developed economies such as United States 
of America, South Korea, Australia and other developing countries in the Asia 
region such as China, Philippines and Thailand have also adopted Green Public 
Procurement into their public and private procurement. 
 
In China for example, sustainable procurement is not enshrined in the law as a 
legal concept under the public procurement laws, however, there has been both 
legal and political justification for sustainable procurement leading to sustainable 
development. Remarkable developments for sustainable procurement laws are also 
on going in china.160 
 
In the European Community for example, since the coming into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon,161 the European Community has adopted a resolution proposing specific 
treaty for energy policy. The EC has developed successive environmental policies, 
however, the 5th policy programme162 (Towards Sustainability) emphasized of the 
common responsibilities of both the public and the private participants to ensure 
environmental protection and states further that government purchase could make 
                                                          
159 T.O. Akenroye, A.S. Oyegoke & Ama Bassey Eyo, ‘Development of a Framework for the implementation of Green 
Procurement in Nigeria (2013) Int. Journal of Procurement Management Vol 6 No.1 at Page 3. 
160 See Cao Fuguo, Supra note 158 at Page 2. 
161 This treaty amended the European Union and establishing the European Community was signed at Lisbon on 13th day of 
December, 2007. Article 176A states that ‘ in the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between members to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the union; (c) 
promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and  (d)promote 
the interconnection of energy networks.’ 
162 (1992-1997) See the European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable 
development OJ, 1993 No. C138/1. 
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have a great impact on the environment considering the size of the public 
acquisition so that environmental factors should be incorporated into procurement 
decisions.163 
 
The 6th Policy programme tagged ‘Environment 2010: Our Choice’164 entrenches 
this aim further. The 6th plan establishes ‘Integrated Product Policy’ which is 
aimed at addressing ways to improve environmental performance of products 
throughout their life cycle. The policy is stated to incorporate action on economic 
incentives aimed at developing an objective basis for green public procurement and 
also to encourage more environmentally friendly designs. 
 
It is cardinal to state here that public authorities are advised to develop 
environmentally friendly regulations and policies in their procurement 
programmes. Sustainability is therefore one of the key issues to be considered in 
the Public private procurement especially as it relates to infrastructure projects. 
 
 
 
 
2.11.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and its impact on Development 
To successfully achieve the global goal of sustainable development, poverty alleviation 
and infrastructure development, private businesses must play a key role.165 After all, 
these industries extract raw materials from the natural resources base of their host 
communities and in turn cause degradation and pollution of the environment. 
                                                          
163 Peter Zunzlik, ‘The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy’  in Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law, new 
Directives and New Dimensions’ Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Zunzlik (eds), (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 369. 
 
164 European Commission, Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, COM (2001) 68 final. 
165 See Agenda 21, Strengthening The Role of the Business and Industry, Ch 30, 1999 and also Johannesburg Declaration on 
Sustainable Development, Paras 27 and 29 of 2002. 
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In November 2004, trade unions and NGOs within the European Union have made a 
call to the EU to propose a new Corporate Social Responsibility agenda in order to 
demonstrate CSR’s credibility globally especially in the context of the developing 
countries.166 This call clearly indicates that in respect of CSR, poverty alleviation and 
development are now intertwined. The World Bank has described the Corporate Social 
Responsibility of the private sector as ‘the commitment of business to contribute to 
sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local 
community and society at large to improve their quality of life, in ways that are both 
good for business and good for development’.167  
 
The modern trend now is not only to ask how CSR affects company behaviour in 
developing nations, but also to ask if and in what manner are businesses affecting 
development within their domains.168 This presupposes that while a company is making 
its profit from the people and resources in a community, it should also imbibe the 
conscience and responsibility of giving back to the community what is due to it. This is 
the only way the company can contribute its quota towards the development of the 
community. CSR should at least prioritise the protection of labour, human rights and 
environmental standards. These should be made an integral part of corporate business 
strategy. 
 
 
                                                          
166 NGO and trade union statement at the European Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility, Maastricht, 7–9 Nov. 
2004. 
167 www.worldbank.org/privatesector/whatwedo.htm, accessed 24 March 2004. 
168 Micheal Blowfield, Corporate Social Responsibility: reinventing the meaning of development? Retrieved from 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/Blanket%20File%20Import/inta_466.pdf. 
Accessed on June 12, 2013. 
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Thus, corporate social responsibility initiative should be understood as a veritable 
vehicle for development especially to all developing nations. It is vital that private 
companies realise their obligation to this important commitment for growth and 
development of the community in which they operate. This will go a long way in 
helping many developing nations with the provision of necessary infrastructure that will 
make life easier and better for the citizenry. It must be pointed out and realised that 
sooner or later CSR will be made obligatory. The sooner modern businesses get to adopt 
this culture of responsibility, the better it would be for everyone. Companies can no 
longer afford to ignore CSR anymore. 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
In this chapter, attempts have been made to define Public Private Partnerships as 
given by different writers in their various texts. Also, other basic concepts and 
principles such as Infrastructure, Affordability, Value for Money (VFM) and risk 
transfer have also been examined among others. It is equally important for 
stakeholders in the PPP procurement to know the difference between PPP and 
other procurement models such as privatisation and public procurement. Lastly, 
there are other important agreements that are ancillary to the main agreement under 
the SPV, these agreements are also very vital for a successful PPP transaction. All 
these have been examined in detail in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPs (PPPs) IN 
GHANA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since Ghana attained independence in 1957, the responsibility of providing both 
social and economic infrastructure for the citizens has been mainly that of the 
government.169 Government became the main financier of the entire public 
infrastructure. In the early 1980’s, the country faced a serious challenge to fund its 
public infrastructure as a result of dwindling revenues, which led the country to 
adopt the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programme.170 
 
Today, Ghana's infrastructure development is relatively poor, both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms, in spite of its growing economic wealth.171 Investment in 
public infrastructure in recent times, has not matched the increasing need of the 
population. The nation's railway network, had suffered serious neglect before it is 
currently being given government attention. Underinvestment in road 
transportation, electricity, housing, water and sanitation has posed a serious 
challenge to the government in its quest for development. 
 
 
                                                          
169 See the Ghana Constitutions of 1957, 1960, 1969 and 1979. 
170 See Public-Private Partnership: A new strategy of infrastructure financing in Ghana. Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/august-2012-policy/755-public-private-partnership-a-new-strategy-of-
infrastructure-financing-in-ghana.html. Accessed on 13.11.13. 
171 Treading a public private partnership path that works. Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/july-2011-policy/364-treading-a-public-private-partnership-path-that-
works.html. Accessed on 09.11.13. 
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As part of the World Bank’s commitment to developing Ghanaian infrastructure, 
the Bank approved an interest free credit of US$30 million for Ghana to 
revolutionise infrastructure Development through the new Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) initiative.172 This support from the World Bank is aimed at 
closing the funding gap and leveraging private sector investment from 2012-
2016.173 
 
In order to give effect to the provisions of Article 36 (2) (b) of the 1992 Ghanaian 
Constitution,174 which gives private individuals the right to participate in economic 
activities, the government, after a wider consultation established the Public 
Investment Division (PID) within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
to regulate private sector participation in public infrastructure delivery.175 This was 
part of the government support to bolster private sector participation in 
infrastructure development through the PPP initiative. 
  
Attempts at formalising the Public Private Partnerships process in Ghana and 
establishing a solid framework started with the then Ministry for Private Sector 
Development in 2003.176 As a result of a series of consultations with the 
stakeholders, a policy document titled “Policy Guidelines for the Implementation 
of Public-Private Partnerships in Ghana” was approved by the cabinet in 2004.177 
 
 
                                                          
172 See New Partnership Project to Mobilize Private Investment for Ghana’s Infrastructure. Retrieved from 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/386267/1/new-partnership-project-to-mobilize-private-invest.html. Accessed on 
11.11.13. 
173 Ibid. 
174 See www.parlirment.gh for the full text of the constitution. 
175 See http://www.mofep.gov.gh/about/objectives. Accessed on 18.11.13. 
176 Since early 2000, under the administration of President Kufuor, a whole ministry was established for private sector 
development with the aim of facilitating public private cooperation in national development. 
177 In the 2004 PPP policy guidelines, it attempted to officially integrate and position both the public and private sectors in 
development process. In fact, the private sector was positioned as Ghana’s “engine of growth” to indicate its importance. 
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Unfortunately however, the guidelines were not fully operational, thereby denying 
the private sector the impetus of participating in national development. In the Late 
President John Atta-Mill’s administration, the initiative was resurrected, 
culminating in the launch of another national policy document for PPPs.178 On 3rd 
June 2011, the government adopted the National Policy framework for PPPs in 
Ghana to provide a guide in the meantime for PPPs. A minister of State in charge 
of PPP was also appointed at the Presidency. 
 
The Public-Private Partnership Bill is currently before the country’s legislature and 
when passed, it is intended to serve as detailed legal framework for Public Private 
Partnership programme in the former Gold Coast.179 While in Ghana and several 
other countries, the strategy of government has shifted from direct government 
procurement of infrastructure and services to privatisation and various other 
arrangements, PPP is considered as a viable alternative of infrastructure 
financing.180 
 
At the opening ceremony of the 2013 Annual Bar Conference held in Ho, Ghana, 
the Honourable Chief Justice of Ghana, Mrs Justice Georgina Wood reiterated the 
importance of having a standard legal framework for PPPs in Ghana.181 At the 
conference with the theme titled 'The Role of the Legal Profession in Developing 
Public Private Partnership Regulatory Framework for National Development,' 
the Chief Justice posited as follows: 
                                                          
178See Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Ghana. Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=269857. Last accessed on 18.11.13. 
  
179 See Ghana Public Private Partnership Bill. Retrieved from http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=news/060713. Last accessed on 
18.11.13. 
180 See Treading a public private partnership path that works 
 http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/july-2011-policy/364-treading-a-public-private-partnership-path-that-
works.html. 
181 See CJ calls for legal framework for public-private partnerships. Retrieved from  
http://www.modernghana.com/news/490314/1/cj-calls-for-legal-framework-for-public-private-pa.html. Accessed on 23 
November, 2013. 
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“There are a plethora of laws with PPP impact in Ghana, though most are 
uncoordinated. The uncertainty of the legal regime for PPPs in Ghana 
results not only in inconsistent approaches to the participation of the private 
sector in the delivery of PPPs, but it also constitutes a potential risk that may 
adversely affect the appetite of private sector partners to participate in PPP 
projects in Ghana.” 
 
She further urged lawyers to forge a radical change in their traditional focus and 
that for lawyers to play their active roles in the nation’s development, they should 
understand the interplay between finance, economics, project financing and 
execution, as well as the prevailing needs of the society. She stated thus: 
“Consequently, legal instruction must not continue to focus solely or purely 
on the traditional law subjects, legal rules, statutes and decided cases only, 
but rather begin to bring to the fore, the economic, political, financial and 
social underpinnings that make the legal rules and principles more relevant 
to society. It is only then that lawyers will begin to be at ease with specialised 
legal documents including PPP Concession Agreements that they might be 
tempted to consider far too technical for their comprehension. In this regard, 
there is the need for lawyers to again acquaint themselves with the rules, 
customs and practices of international trade and finance.” 
 
She said that because of the complex nature of PPP arrangements, effective 
drafting of a sound comprehensive legal framework will require highly 
accomplished legal expertise with adequate understanding of both general and 
sector-specific laws governing PPPs. 
 
It must be stated that PPP is not a recent phenomenon in Ghana, for example in 
2006; the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) signed a 5-year management 
contract with Aqua Vitens Rand. There are other Projects being undertaken under 
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the PPPs that are still in the pipeline.182 However, results were mixed and 
negotiations between the parties to the PPP transaction have proved somehow 
difficult because of the lack of a clear legal and regulatory framework that will 
govern these types of often complex and transactions. 
  
3.2 Sector Level Analysis of Infrastructure Development in Ghana 
Attempt is made here to briefly examine the level of infrastructure development in 
Ghana in various sectors of the economy. 
 
3.2.1  Transportation Sector 
3.2.1.1  Road 
Ghana has a total road network of 66,200 km, out of which 12,400 km are urban 
roads, 42,192 km are feeder roads, while 11,628 km are for trunk roads.183 
Although, transportation in the country is still relatively underdeveloped, the 
country however shows a great potential and a strong environment for foreign 
investment.184 The network of roads is considered adequate to meet the minimal 
requirements for sub-regional integration.185 Nevertheless the roads in major cities 
are mostly congested as a result of heavy traffic. Only 41% of the entire road is 
considered to be in good condition.186 Some critical roads linking the capital city to 
the rest of the country are still under construction for more than Six years and are 
yet to be completed due to resources constraint.187 However, transport projects are 
expected to increase because of oil discovery in the country. No doubt, in order for 
                                                          
182 For example, the Sunon  Asogli Power Plant, a typical PPP project which is expected to produce fifteen per cent of the 
total electricity generated in the country (200 megawatts of power). 
183 See Ghana Infrastructure Plans. Retrieved from http://www.mofep.gov.gh/CG2012/userfiles/file/ghana_infrastructure.pdf. 
Last accessed on 19.11.13. 
184 See Ghana Infrastructure Report Q1 2013. Retrieved from http://www.marketresearch.com/Business-Monitor-
International-v304/Ghana-Infrastructure-Q1-7259384/. Last accessed on 18.11.13. 
185 Ibid. 
186See Ghana Infrastructure Plans supra. 
187 See Updating our road infrastructure. Retrieved from http://graphic.com.gh/editorials/3032-updating-our-road-
infrastructure.html. Accessed on 19.11.13. 
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Ghana to meet the requirements for economic growth, Urban, Highways and feeder 
roads in the country must receive urgent attention. 
 
3.2.1.2  Rail Transportation 
Ghana’s total railways network spans about 1,300km. The rail network links the 
Capital city of Accra-Kumasi-Takoradi and has really helped in the transportation 
of commodities for export.188As the largest producer of cocoa in the world, the 
railroad is considered to have a strong effect in cocoa production and 
distribution.189 Currently, Ghana’s rail system is partially operational because of 
lots of old tracks that need to be rehabilitated and upgraded. This portends negative 
effects on the development of the mining sector and will certainly not support the 
development of the country’s emerging oil sector.190 In order to fully open up the 
country for economic development, the government has considered rehabilitating 
and modernising the road networks in the Western region. In 2010, a contract 
worth US$6-billion was signed with the Chinese National Machinery Import and 
Export Corporation (CMC) for the construction and upgrading of railroads in the 
country.191 When completed, the rail network is expected to link central business 
districts with other parts of the country and also to provide easy transportation of 
containers and petroleum products from the oil and mining regions to the ports of 
Tema and Takoradi.192 
 
                                                          
188 The country is rich in Cocoa, bauxite, timber and manganese.  
189 Transportation Infrastructure and Development in Ghana. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/psewpa/halshs-
00607207.html. Last accessed on 19.11.13. 
 
190 Oil was discovered in commercial quantity in Ghana in 2007. 
191 See Ghana signs railway contract with Chinese firm. Retrieved from 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/306377/1/ghana-signs-railway-contract-with-chinese-firm.html. Last accessed 19 
.11.13. 
192See  Infrastructure – Transportation in Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.gipcghana.com/invest-in-ghana/why-
ghana/infrastructure/transportation-infrastructure.html. Last Accessed on 19.11.13. 
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3.2.1.3  Maritime and Inland Water Transportation 
Ghana’s busiest seaports located at Tema and Takoradi are recently equipped and 
upgraded to provide services to both the local and international traders. Recently, 
the volumes of activity have been on a sharp increase to the extent that there have 
been serious congestions and capacity constraint which are gradually becoming 
impediments to further development in that sector.193 There are usually long 
queues of vessels waiting to berth due to limited facilities available to decongest 
the ports. This may expose the vessels to potential attacks by the pirates. The Volta 
Lake is also an important means of transportation in Ghana. Over the years, it has 
been a major source of transporting petroleum and agricultural products as well as 
passengers.  However, the lake suffers from volatile ecological conditions and 
obsolete equipment.194 The government is carrying out expansion and the 
development of a multimodal transportation system on the Volta Lake. 
  
As a result of increasing demand, ports in Ghana are now being congested. For 
example, the Port of Tema has a container handling capacity of around 375,000 
annually. However, as a result of increasing demand; the port has been handling 
about 420,000 containers. The congestion problem needs to be addressed in order 
to increase efficiency in its operations.195 
 
3.2.1.4  Aviation Sector 
Ghana’s international airport (Kotoka International Airport) is a host to most 
international airlines that fly regularly into the country.196 The airport connects 
Ghana to Africa and the rest of the world. KIA is one of the leading airports in sub-
Saharan with high international safety standards. In 1996, the country embarked on 
                                                          
193 See Ghana Infrastructure Plans. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ghana’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective. 
196 See Infrastructure – Transportation in Ghana. 
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rehabilitation and expansion programme which has brought about refurbishment of 
the facilities at both the international and the domestic terminals. This has greatly 
increased the capacity of the airport to attend to both travellers and cargoes with 
dispatch. However, for Ghana to be able to cope with the global economic trend 
there is still the need to expand and build more airports in the light of the oil 
discovery in the country. 
 
3.2.1.5 Water and Sanitation 
Ghana is one of the few countries in African that has already met the MDG target 
for water supply. Access to safe and drinking water rose from 69 percent in 2003 to 
84 percent in 2008 thereby exceeding the MDG target of 76 percent.197 Despite the 
water utility’s improvements in recent times, cost recovery and revenue collection, 
distribution losses remain high at around 50 percent with adverse impacts on 
service quality. There are two explanations for Ghana’s poor performance in this 
respect. The first is the country’s ageing water distribution infrastructure, which is 
full of leaks.198 The second reason is because of the large scale commercial theft 
from the networks. As a result of these huge losses, water supply is now being 
rationalised as there are intermittent supply. The very poor quality of water output 
is now impacting negatively on the country’s achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goal in the area of water provision, because although there is good 
connection of water pipes to most houses, water supply is not adequate. The 
government will have to carry out reforms aimed at addressing these challenges. 
 
 
                                                          
197 Vivien Foster and Nataliya Pushak. Policy Research Working Paper on Ghana’s Infrastructure: A Continental 
Perspective. TheWorld Bank 2011 at Page 16. 
198 Ibid. 
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While it can be said that Ghana is on track to meet the Millennium Development 
Goal in the area of water supply, the situation on sanitation is different. Evidence 
has shown that although, access to improved sanitation facilities has increased in 
recent times, this still falls below the expected standard required by the MDG. As 
at 2013, it was estimated that about 16 million people do not have access to 
sanitised latrines while close to 1.8 million people do not even have access to 
latrines at all. 199 
 
In a keynote address delivered by the Deputy Minister for Local Government and 
Rural Development at the commemoration of the World Toilet day on 19th 
November 2013, the deputy minister lamented that Ghana may not likely meet the 
2015 Millennium Development Goals target on sanitation.200 He however stated 
that his Ministry is willing to support collaborations with development partners and 
other key stakeholders because the government has put in place the necessary 
policy, institutional, and legal/investments framework to address this 
developmental setback. 
 
3.2.1.6  Electricity Infrastructure 
If Ghana’s economy will continue to grow, the country will have to seriously 
address the challenges of power supply. The country has been witnessing social, 
political and economic stability over the past decade. Since the year 2010, the 
nation’s economy has been growing at a very fast rate. For instance in 2011, due to 
the commencement of oil production, the annual GDP growth was put at 14.4 
                                                          
199 See Ghana: World Toilet Day Commemorated in Accra. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201311201258.html. 
Last accessed on 21.11.13. 
200 Ibid. 
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percent compared to 8.0 in 2010 and 7.1 percent in 2012.201 The growth 
performance was low in 2012 due to lower production of cocoa and oil. The 
country’s medium-term outlook remains healthy, with projected GDP growth of 
8.0% (6.5% non-oil) in 2013 and 8.7% (8.9% non-oil) in 2014, which is an 
improvement over and above the average annual growth rate of 6.5% for the period 
since 2000.202 Investments in public infrastructure like power supply; commercial 
agriculture and oil and gas are expected to drive this growth. 
 
Currently, the country’s power generation stands at about 2,200 MW and by 2017, 
the government plans to increase the generation capacity to more than 4,000 
MW.203 For this to be achievable by 2017, then transmission and distribution 
networks will have to be rehabilitated and expanded. The major causes of the 
challenge facing the power sector are as a result of lack of maintenance of the 
electricity equipment and the refusal to change the obsolete ones. 
 
The government is therefore carrying out both Structural and regulatory reforms 
aimed at encouraging private investment in the development of the power 
industry.204 In doing this, the government has already commenced the reformation 
of the energy sector to bring it in line with the international standards. The 
government also plans to increase the generation capacity and enhance inter 
country connections by expanding the West African Power Pool (WAPP) to boost 
electricity supply within the West Africa Sub-region.205 
                                                          
201 See Ghana's power challenges and national productivity. Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanabizmedia.com/ghanabizmedia/december-2012-cover-story/867-ghanas-power-challenges-and-national-
productivity.html. Accessed on 21.10.13. 
 
202 See Ghana Economic Outlook. Retrieved from http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economic-
outlook/. Accessed on 21.11.13. 
203 See Ghana Infrastructure Plans. Op cit. 
204 See Electrical Power in Ghana – Overview. Retrieved from http://www.mbendi.com/indy/powr/af/gh/p0005.htm. 
Accessed on 21.11.13. 
205Founded in the year 2000. the West African Power Pool (WAPP) is an institution established by the mandate of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to among others, develop a sustainable regional electricity 
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3.2.1.7  Telecommunication Infrastructure 
Before 1996, telecommunication sector in Ghana was under the direct control of 
the government. This monopoly led to inefficiency and corruption. However, with 
the enactment of the National Communications Authority Act, 1996,206 the 
monopoly of the former Telecommunication Corporation was abolished thereby 
giving way to the National Communications Authority (NCA) as the new national 
telecommunication regulator.207  In 2009, the NCA announced that it was prepared 
to give licenses to private investors to install telecom infrastructure in the country 
to boost capacity in that sector.208 The Commission stated this through its Director 
of Regulatory and Administration, Mr Joshua Peprah at a day’s workshop with 
stakeholders in the communication industry.209 The commission reiterated the 
importance of having a good telecommunication bandwidth as follows: 
 
“When we have adequate, clean and reliable international bandwidth, we 
will carve a niche for ourselves in the international outsourcing market and 
that way enterprises will not hesitate to establish anywhere in the country 
outside of the capital. “But we need the citizenry to come along with us on 
this because without the telecom masts, we can’t extend the benefits of the 
bandwidths to the rest of the country.” 
 
There are currently six (6) network operators in the country. These are: Vodafone 
Ghana Limited, Scancom Ghana Limited (MTN), Airtel Communication, Millicom 
Ghana Limited (Tigo), Globacom Ghana Limited (Glo) and Expresso. The market 
for telecom operators stood at 26,616,427 with Scancom Ghana Limited (MTN) 
                                                                                                                                                                 
supply system in order to promote the economic growth of the ECOWAS sub region. To achieve this objective, there is the 
need for WAPP develop and implementation of key infrastructure so that all ECOWAS member states are given access to 
economic energy resources.  
206 Act No 524 of 1996. 
207 See Infrastructure Telephony in Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.gipcghana.com/invest-in-ghana/why-
ghana/infrastructure/ict-infrastructure.html. Accessed on 21.11.13. 
208 See more at: http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2009/04/24/ghana-to-license-third-parties-to-provide-telecom-
infrastructure-for-co-location/#sthash.pGffHtFX.dpuf. Last accessed on 21.11.13.  
209 The Workshop was held in Accra on 24 April, 2009. 
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leading with about 46 percent of the market share, followed by Vodafone with 21 
percent.210 
 
With these improvements in the telecommunication sector, it has been said that a 
great deal needs to be done to improve and sustain higher quality of service in the 
country.211 Appropriate laws which would provide an enabling environment to the 
private sector will be of utmost importance. 
 
3.3 Legal Framework for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Ghana 
The legal frameworks for PPPs in Ghana are as follows:   
 
3.3.1 The Constitution 
The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana makes provisions for the national 
development imperative for the country through the Directive Principles of State 
Policy which requires that all governments must pursue sound policies that would 
ultimately ensure the “establishment of a just and free society”, where every 
Ghanaian would have the opportunity to live long, productive, and meaningful 
lives.212 
 
To complement the efforts of government in the realisation of these objectives, and 
in recognition of the positive impacts the private sector could play in economic 
development, the right of the private sector to participate in economic development 
has therefore been enshrined in the constitution. S.36 of the Constitution provides; 
“(2) The State shall, in particular, take all necessary steps to establish a 
sound and healthy economy whose underlying principles shall include -  
                                                          
210 Ibid. 
211See Francis K. A. Allotey and Felix K. Akorli,  Telecommunications in Ghana. Retrieved from 
http://www.vii.org/papers/ghana.htm. Last accessed 21.10.13. 
212 See S.34(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. 
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(a) The guarantee of a fair and realistic remuneration for production and 
productivity in order to encourage continued production and higher 
productivity;  
(b) Affording ample opportunity for individual initiative and creativity in 
economic activities and fostering an enabling environment for a 
pronounced role of the private sector in the economy;”213 
 
The above quoted provision of the constitution especially subsection 2(b) 
succinctly shows that the government is committed to give room to the private 
sector to participate in nation’s development by creating an enabling environment 
for the businesses to thrive. Although, the constitution does not contain detailed 
provisions for the PPP framework in Ghana, it however sets the ball rolling for 
private sector participation in development through the Public Private Partnerships. 
 
3.3.2 National Policy on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)  
In June 2011, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning developed a 
National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana. This was made to provide 
some degree of consistency in the way and manner PPP projects are to be carried 
out in the country. The policy covers areas such as project identification, selection, 
appraisal, procurement, operation, maintenance, performance monitoring and 
evaluation.  The policy applies to all ministries, agencies and levels of government 
and shall be pursued in accordance with the basic principles of affordability, value 
for money and sufficient risk transfer. 214 
 
 
                                                          
213 S.36(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. 
214 See the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana. Retrieved from 
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/docs/pid/ppp_policy.pdf. Accessed on 23.08.13. 
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In drafting the policy framework, extensive consultations were made with relevant 
stakeholders such as financial institutions, professional associations, industry 
representatives, ministries, departments of government, metropolitan and district 
associations. The views and opinion gathered were codified and reflected in this 
policy. The policy covers basic principles governing procurement processes. These 
include accountability, transparency and competition as well as predictability and 
environmental safeguards among others. It further provides that all projects shall 
be structured in such a way as to encourage local contents and technology transfer. 
The key objectives of the PPP programme as contained in the national policy are 
summarized hereunder as follows; 
a. “To leverage public assets and funds with private sector resources from 
local and international markets to accelerate needed investments in 
infrastructure and services; 
b. To encourage and facilitate investment by the private sector by creating an 
enabling environment for PPPs where value for money for government can 
be clearly demonstrated; 
c. To increase availability of public infrastructure and services and improve 
service quality and efficiency of projects; 
d. To ensure the attainment of required and acceptable local and 
international social and environmental standards; 
e. To protect the interests of all stakeholders including end users, affected 
people, government and private sector; 
f. To set up efficient and transparent institutional arrangements for the 
identification, structuring and competitive tendering of PPP projects; 
g. To provide a framework for developing efficient risk sharing mechanism; 
and 
h. To encourage and promote indigenous Ghanaian private sector 
participation in the delivery of public infrastructure and services.” 
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The policy however does not purport to provide a comprehensive legal and 
regulatory framework for PPPs in Ghana. This is because the policy itself states 
that until a detailed PPP law is enacted by the parliament, the policy shall continue 
to provide legal and regulatory framework to guide parties involved in the PPP 
project in the country. Therefore, until the Ghanaian Parliament enacts the PPP 
Act, this policy shall guide all PPP transactions. 
 
3.3.3 Public Procurement Act, 2003 
In an attempt to stem the tide of corruption in Public Procurement in Ghana, the 
Parliament enacted the Public Procurement Act215 which was substantially 
fashioned after the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.216 The Act 
contains provisions that can ensure transparency and accountability in procurement 
processes. It sets out the methods, structures and tendering procedures for 
procurement and the procedures for reviews/approval and other miscellaneous 
matters connected therewith.  
 
Before the enactment of the Public Procurement Act of 2003 in Ghana, 
procurement regulations and institutions were fragmented and uncoordinated. 
However, since the enactment of the procurement Act, the procurement regulations 
have become harmonised and an independent regulatory body called the Public 
Procurement Authority was also established as a central body responsible for 
policy formulation and regulation of procurement in Ghana.217 The Authority is 
empowered to supervise all procurement activities by all government Ministries, 
Agencies and Departments at all levels of government. To ensure an effective 
supervision, the authority carries out a periodic assessment of activities to uncover 
                                                          
215 Act No 663 of 2003. 
216 See Act 663- Antidotes to Corruption in Procurement . Public Procurement Authority Bulletine. Retrieved from 
http://ppaghana.org/documents/Bulletins/PPAE-BulletinJulAug2013Final.pdf. Accesssed on 24.11.13. 
217 A.B. Adjei, Challenges in the handling of Procurement Complaints: Ghana’s Experience (2011) 38 JMCL Page 1.  
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all probable lapses and therefore initiate appropriate measures to remedy them. The 
Act complements the provisions in the Financial Administration Act and the 
Regulations made thereunder. 
 
3.3.4 Financial Administration Act 2003 and Financial Administration 
Regulations 2004 
 
This Act218 was passed into law on 28th day of October 2003. It was passed to 
promote public sector accountability and combat corruption. The preamble to the 
Act states the main purport of the Act succinctly thus: 
“AN ACT to regulate the financial management of the public sector; 
prescribe the responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial 
management in the government; ensure the effective and efficient 
management of state revenue, expenditure, assets, liabilities, resources of 
the government, the Consolidated Fund and other public funds and to 
provide for matters related to these.” 
 
Section 1 of the Act empowers the Minister of Finance to ensure that transparent 
systems for all government procurement are maintained and that the minister must 
cause the full account of all public moneys and resources to be laid before the 
parliament. The Minister shall also ensure the exercise of regularity and propriety 
in handling all government expenditures.219 
 
Section 2 of the Act further empowers the Minister of Finance to make regulations 
or give further directions that are in compliance with the provisions of this Act 
where they are considered necessary and expedient for the proper implementation 
                                                          
218 Act No 654 of 2003. 
219 See S.1 (3) (c) of the Act. 
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of this Act and for the safety, economy and advantage of public revenue and 
property.220 
 
Pursuant to the Provisions of Sections 2 and 73 of the Financial Administration Act 
2003 which empowered the Minister to make regulations for the conduct of 
financial businesses on behalf of the government, the Minister made the Financial 
Administration Regulations which came into effect on 8th day of April, 2004. Both 
the Act and the Regulations provide detailed directions and control for overall 
sound financial administration for the country.221 
 
3.4 The Institutional Landscape 
These are the government establishments or agencies that are responsible for the 
proper implementation of PPP Programme in the Country. The PPP Policy 
provides that such institutions shall support the following broad functions. These 
are: 
1. Advising on PPP Policy development, monitoring, dissemination and 
enforcement; 
2. Advising and supporting individual project in the areas of preparation, 
designing and execution; 
3. Giving advice, support and promoting PPP Projects; 
4. Giving project approval where necessary ;and 
5. Ensuring proper financial management. 
 
                                                          
220 See S.2 (2) of the Act. 
221 See Main Legislation and Policy Documents Regarding Decentralization and Local Governments in Ghana. Retrieved 
from 
http://books.google.com.my/books?id=BoLxNCD29CkC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=overview+of+the+Ghana+Financial+a
dministration+act+2003.&source=bl&ots=b7TJKsMpPV&sig=pkcuQOn9w_S22VtVcjQeE6IKjow&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5IOR
Upa1AYjZrQfx0YHIAw&ved=0CHMQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=overview%20of%20the%20Ghana%20Financial%20adm
inistration%20act%202003.&f=false. Accessed on 24.09.13. 
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The following are the relevant institutions that are responsible for Implementing 
PPP Programmes in Ghana: 
1. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; 
2. The Public Investment Division; 
3. Contracting Agencies or MDA’s; and 
4. National Development Planning Commission. 
Their responsibilities shall be examined one after the other.  
 
3.4.1 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) 
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is the ministry that is responsible 
for developing the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for PPPs 
programme in Ghana. The ministry is also responsible for issuing standardized PPP 
Provisions and Manuals in order to ensure sound financial management of the PPP 
Programme. The minister in charge of this ministry performs central roles in the 
development of the PPP Programme. The minister is empowered under the law to 
make regulations to support the existing legislations on PPPs in the country. These 
are the Financial Administration Act of 2003, The Public Procurement Act and the 
PPP National Policy. 
 
3.4.2 The Public Investment Division (PID) 
This is a department under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MOFEP) that ensures efficiency in management and delivery of public 
investments for sustainable growth and development.222 According to Mr Ekow 
Coleman,223 this unit is the most important unit that performs a key role in the 
management and implementation of PPP Programme in Ghana. It provides 
                                                          
222 See Public Investment Division. Retrieved from http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=divisions/pid. Accessed on 24.11.13. 
223 Being an interview with Mr Ekow Coleman of the PPP Advisory Unit of the Public Investment Division in Accra on 
Wednesday 9.01.13. 
  
102 
 
advisory services and support to all ministries, Departments and Agencies that 
intends to engage in PPP Programme. He stated further that the Division shall also 
promote a flow of bankable, sustainable and viable PPP deals. The Division is to 
carry out these objectives through a procedure that is transparent and commands 
public confidence. The division has some units within it that assist in carrying out 
these objectives. These are; the PPP Advisory Unit; Project and Financial Analysis 
Unit; Public Entities and Strategic Projects Units. 
 
3.4.3 Government Contracting Entities 
These are Ministries, Departments and Agencies of government both at the Central 
and Municipal levels. It is the MDA’s that have the power to identify a project that 
is suitable and grant concessions in respect thereof. The MDA’s are encouraged to 
develop capabilities within themselves in order to assist in project identification, 
contract management, project monitoring, reporting and evaluation. This will be 
done by setting up Project Management Units within each of the Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies of the government concerned. 
 
An important point to mention here is that Ghana operates a Unitary System of 
Government whereby there is only the Central government and districts.224 The 
laws made by the parliament are binding on all authorities and persons in Ghana.225 
Since the parliament makes law for the country, it also presupposes that the 
decisions of the Public Investment Division will be binding on both the central and 
the district units. Therefore, the likelihood of conflicts between the national laws 
and the state or regional laws as applicable in a federal system will be reduced.226 
                                                          
224 See S.4 (1) of the Ghanaian Constitution. The country has 6 Metropolitan, 49 Municipal and 161 Districts making 216 
MMDs. 
225 See S.93 (2) for the powers of the parliament to make laws for the whole country. 
226 Conflict of laws between the states and Federal Government usually occurs in a Federal System of Government. A typical 
example is Nigeria. This is further discussed in Chapter 4 of this Thesis. 
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Therefore, it will be more convenient for the relevant implementing agency like the 
Public Investment Division to ensure a uniform compliance of the law within the 
country.  
 
3.4.4 National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) 
The Ghana National Development Planning Commission has the mandate to 
prepare the National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) in conjunction with the relevant 
contracting authorities before embarking on the project. The National 
Infrastructure Plan identifies those projects that will be carried out within a specific 
period of time. Therefore, before any PPP Project can be initiated by any agency, it 
must emanate from the National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) otherwise, the relevant 
agency must seek the approval of the commission before embarking on such new 
project. 
 
3.5 The Private Sector Proponent 
The National Policy is silent on the qualification inherent in a Private Sector before 
participating in the procurement process. However, since the general procurement 
law applies to procurement of goods and services including PPP procurement 
especially in the areas where the National Policy is silent, then recourse would 
have to be made to its provisions with respect to the qualification of tenders. 
Section 21 (1) of the Public Procurement Act provides that; 
“(a) A tenderer in all public procurement shall possess the necessary;- 
(i) Professional and technical qualifications and competence; 
(ii) Financial resources to execute the project; 
(iii) Equipment and other physical facilities for the execution of the 
project; 
(iv) Managerial capability, reliability, experience in the 
procurement object and reputation; and   
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(v) Personnel to perform the procurement contract; 
(b) Shall have the legal capacity to enter the contract; 
(c) Shall be solvent, not be in receivership, bankrupt or in the process of 
being     wound up, not have its business activities suspended and not be the 
subject of legal proceedings;  
(d) Shall have fulfilled its obligations to pay taxes and social security 
contributions and any paid compensation due for damage caused to 
property by pollution;  
(e) Shall have directors or officers who have not in any country been   
(i) Convicted of any criminal offence relating to their professional conduct 
or to making false statements or misrepresentations as to their 
qualifications to enter into a procurement contract, within a period of ten 
years preceding the commencement of the procurement proceedings; or   
(ii) Disqualified pursuant to administrative suspension or disbarment 
proceedings.   
(f) Shall meet such other criteria as the procurement entity considers 
appropriate.”  
 
All the above requirements are conjunctive and must be satisfied in addition to any 
other specification(s) that may be included in the tender documents or other 
documents for invitation to bid. 
 
3.6 Key Principles in PPP Procurement 
There are core principles which are very cardinal to any PPP transaction. These 
include transparency, accountability, openness and fairness of the process. These 
will determine whether the procurement process in the country is in line with the 
best practices. 
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3.6.1 Transparency, Accountability and Competition 
Transparency and accountability are very important principles that ensure integrity 
in any procurement process. The National Policy provides that these core 
principles shall guide all PPP Projects. On the requirement of transparency in the 
PPP Procurement Process, the policy states as follows: 
1. That the process of procurement must be well defined and instructions to 
bidders must be clear and unambiguous so as to prevent manipulations and 
abuse of the procurement process; 
2. That the conditions set out for bidding and evaluation must be made 
available to all prospective bidders and must ensure the attainment of value 
for money and efficiency of the process. 
3. That where a decision is taken to consider an unsolicited bid, clear and 
objective reasons must be given to support of such decision which should 
be in conformity with the provisions of the National Policy. 
4. That access to information about the project shall be guaranteed except 
where national security will be prejudiced.  
 
On the need to enthrone accountability in the PPP procurement process, the policy 
has set out some basic principles regarding this. All implementing agencies shall 
ensure that all PPP transactions are in accordance with these basic principles. 
These are; 
1. That every PPP Procurement process shall be in accordance with the laid 
down rules and regulations. 
2. That decisions must be objective and in accordance with law and policy; 
and 
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3. That all public sector authorities must adhere to the prescribed processes 
laid down for taking decisions within their respective organisations.  
 
Furthermore, the policy provides that in order to get value for money in all PPP 
Projects, the project should be subjected to a competitive bidding. This is the only 
way through which the bidder with the most economically viable bid will emerge. 
All procurement processes must be subjected to these three basic principles. The 
provisions of the Financial Administration Act 2003 and Financial Administration 
Regulations 2004 will also help in ensuring transparency and accountability. These 
provisions will further complement the national policy in this regard. Since all 
procurements are subject to the Financial Administration Act and its regulations, 
this will in no doubt go a long way in enthroning accountability. 
 
Currently, Ghana does not have competition law, although, the bill is still pending 
before the parliament.227 This bill when passed into law will ensure efficiency in 
the production of goods and services in the country. The Competition Law will 
complement the scanty provisions in the PPP National Policy to ensure competition 
in PPP Procurement. An authority with the full powers to implement the provisions 
of the law and raise awareness on the importance of competition in procurement 
process should also be established.228 
 
Recently, the country has started reviewing and re-designing public procurement 
procedures in order to make it in line with international best practices and to 
achieve value for money. To achieve this, the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) 
                                                          
227 See Ghana Will Soon Have A National Competition Law. Retrieved from 
http://ghanaconsumerwatch.wordpress.com/2009/06/16/ghana-will-soon-have-a-national-competition-law-isser/. Accessed 
on 25.11.13. 
228 See Karen Ellis, Rohit Singh, Peter Quartey & Elvis Agyare-Boakye. Assessing the Economic Impact  
of Competition: Findings from Ghana. UKaid, London, 2010. Page V. 
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met with other stakeholders in September 2013 to officially launch the reviewed 
Standard Tender Documents (STDs) for the procurement of goods, works and 
services.229 Mr Samuel Sallas-Mensah, who was the Chief Executive Officer of 
PPA, stated that this was informed as a result of the fact that the world of 
procurement had moved on and many changes had occurred in the way tender 
documents were formed, including changes in specifying requirements of how 
goods, works and services are procured. 
 
The PPA boss said further that the review of the documents had become imperative 
at a time the public was demanding greater accountability and transparency in the 
conduct of procurement with public funds. He said the Public Procurement Act, 
2003 (ACT 663), was being amended to reflect current developments. He posited 
that “It is therefore necessary to align our procurement documents and processes 
with such developments.” He said the review and re-design of the PPAs STDs 
formed part of a 2.7 million dollars support from the Swiss Government to assist 
Ghana to initiate a project that would introduce sustainability criteria into her 
public procurement regime.  
 
3.6.2 Openness and Confidentiality 
The National Policy includes the principle of openness as one of the most basic 
principles guiding PPP Projects in Ghana. The general rule is that all information 
relating to the PPP transactions shall be made known to the public. However, such 
information that is commercially sensitive is permitted to be kept from the public 
domain and should therefore be held confidential. The Policy further provides that 
all PPP transactions shall be made open and citizens shall have the right of access 
                                                          
229 See Ghana begins review of procurement processes. Retrived from 
http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/09/12/ghana-begins-review-of-procurement-processes/. Accessed on 25.11.13. 
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to information about the project, except where national security will be prejudiced. 
Therefore commercial sensitivity and national security are the two main issues that 
can make a PPP transaction to be held in secrecy. 
 
It must be stated here that currently, Ghana does not have a law that guarantees the 
right to information. The Bill remains in the legislative pipeline since it was 
initiated in year 2010. The Right to Information Bill when passed into law will 
provide for the implementation of the constitutional right to information held by a 
government agency.230 The law will afford the general public the right to know 
what is taking place in public offices and the ability to monitor the implementation 
of policies and procurement procedures. 
 
The following are the potential benefits of the Freedom of Information Law: 
3.6.2.1 The law will afford Ghanaians to know the activities of the government, 
agencies and the officials with respect to the allocation of public 
resources. This is a potent power to fight corruption. It is trite that 
corrupt practices flourish in darkness and secrecy, so any attempt that is 
aimed at opening governments and their agencies to public scrutiny is 
very likely to advance anti-corruption efforts.231 
 
3.6.2.2 The law when passed will further promote transparency in government 
and this will lead directly to the reduction of corruption in government. 
To buttress this point further, it is necessary to show the corruption 
                                                          
230 See Ghana's cabinet approves Right to Information Bill. 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787808.shtml#.UpRSlsRmxBw. Accessed on 26.11.13. 
231 Freedom of Information Act: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption; ...So Why Has Its Passage Continued To Remain 
Elusive To The Ghanaian Parliament? Retrieved from http://www.modernghana.com/news/454616/1/freedom-of-
information-act-a-powerful-weapon-again.html.  Accessed on 24.11.13. 
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equation thus;   Corruption = Discretionary Powers + Monopoly – 
Transparency. 
 
It is instructive to note that the above equation basically states that the potential of 
corruption is based on three factors. These are; 
(a) If the decision making process in the state is subject to the discretionary 
powers or based on the whims and caprices of the leader or the decision 
is highly subjective;  
(b)  If the state has firmly established a system of monopoly over the 
sources and use of resources in the state and in such a way that it leaves 
no room or very little room for competition. If there are too many 
licenses, permits, subsidies concessions among others;  and  
(c) Lastly, if there is lack of transparency in the decision making process, 
then such government will have a very high potential of being corrupt. 
Therefore, increased transparency will certainly help in reducing 
corrupt practices. 
 
3.6.2.3 Thirdly, information in a democracy is like oxygen in a human body. 
Where the acts of government officials are shrouded in secrecy, the 
people of Ghana will not be able to know the happenings within the 
government and this will in effect limit their access to participate in 
democratic processes. 
 
3.6.2.4 Lastly, a bad government needs secrets to survive. Keeping 
governmental actions in secrecy will ensure continuous wastes, 
ineffectiveness, inefficiencies and gross abuse of power to survive. 
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There is a certain impunity that enables non-performing governments; 
public and even private institutions to continue to hold sway over the 
people because citizens are basically kept in darkness and ignorance. 
The Freedom of Information act is a powerful weapon against this 
culture of impunity. 
In his article titled “Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Ghana”232 William 
Dowokpor lamented on the lack of information regarding PPP projects in Ghana. 
He stated that connected to the concepts of inclusiveness and openness is 
accountability. He wondered why the concept of confidentiality will override 
openness and accountability in the country. He posited thus;  
 
“When the confidentiality practice in corporate governance meets with the 
proverbial inefficiencies of the public sector in a PPP, it results in a total 
mess! In the ragging 15 million cedi guinea fowl project for example, I 
hear arguments for confidentiality as a corporate governance principle. 
But I will counter that with good corporate governance practices which 
include openness and accountability. I think it is premature for a society 
with weak regulatory institutions to put confidentiality above openness and 
accountability in a PPP financed with public money. The controversies 
surrounding otherwise useful projects SADA projects can be avoided if 
adequate information showing how monies spent, are made available to 
oversight institutions such as parliament and the general public. That is 
why we have public affairs departments attached to such projects. Like the 
PPP itself, the relevance of the guinea fowl project remain unquestionable. 
What is fuelling the suspicion is the lack of adequate information at the 
right time. A word to the wise is enough!” 
 
 
                                                          
232 William Dowokpor, “Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Ghana”(2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=269857. Accessed on 30.11.13. 
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It follows from the foregoing therefore that access to information is a veritable tool 
to minimize corruption in the PPP and other procurement processes. This right of 
access will increase transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and integrity in 
government. 
 
3.7 The PPP Processes 
Since there are different players representing various interests in PPP Projects, 
thus, the partnership need to be formalized and there is also the need to follow the 
process laid down in a transparent manner. There is also the need to prepare 
detailed documentation at all the phases of the project. In order to improve 
credibility and transparency in the PPP process, the National Policy states that at 
all phases of the project development, the input of both parties to the PPP project 
shall be assessed so as to ensure compliance with the provisions of the regulations 
and the PPP processes especially regarding the bidding processes, the composition 
of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), and the local contents requirement.233   
 
All the stakeholders involved in the PPP process shall go through the following 
steps in order to ensure strict compliance with the laid down regulations:234  
 
3.7.1 Project Inception 
This is the first phase of any PPP project. Once an MDA has identified a project 
that may be developed through PPPs, then such an MDA must prepare a project 
brief and thereafter follow the procedures states below; 
1. Register such project with the Public Investment Division (PID) of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP); 
                                                          
233 See Paragraph 39 of the Ghanaian PPP National Policy. 
234 See Paragraph 40 of the National Policy. 
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2. Inform the PID of the MOFEP of any available expertise (if any) within 
that institution to go ahead with the project planning; 
3. Appoint a project officer within or outside such institution; and 
4. Appoint a Transaction Advisor where such is requested by MOFEP. 
 
3.7.2  Pre-Feasibility Studies- Approval Stage 1 
In order to ensure that the proposed project will be in the best interest of the nation, 
then the contracting authority, with the support of the MOFEP-PID shall undertake 
a Pre-Feasibility Study so as to ensure that the project;- 
3.7.2.1 Makes a business sense in terms of ; 
a. Explanation about the strategic and operational benefits to the 
contracting authority in live with the authority’s objectives; 
b. Demonstrate that the proposed project is in alignment with the 
National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) and government Policy objectives. 
3.7.2.2 Describe in clear and specific terms ; 
a. The nature of the functions of the contracting authority and the extent 
to which such institutional function can be carried out by the private 
sector. This applies to a situation where the private sector will be 
involved in building a new infrastructure. 
b. While in the case of using PPPs to manage government properties, 
then a vivid description of such property, the uses of the property 
concerned (if any) for which such building was registered at inception 
and the full description of the purpose for which the private sector 
intends to use the property. 
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3.7.2.3 Provide a broad estimate of the total cost of the project, the location of 
such project and give an initial indication whether the project may be 
viable and affordable or not. 
3.7.2.4 All concerned government Ministries, Departments and Agencies shall 
have the responsibility to review and approve the report of the Pre-
feasibility study. 
3.7.2.5 Then the approval referred to above shall be the first approval in the 
procurement process and shall be referred to as Approval 1. 
3.7.2.6 No contracting authority shall have the power to proceed to the full 
stage of feasibility study without a prior written approval of their 
respective Project Management Unit (PMU) and also must have been 
subjected to a review by the MOFEP-PID. 
 
3.7.3  Feasibility Study- Approval II 
In compliance with the provisions of Paragraph 49 of the policy, all contracting 
authorities shall: 
1. Submit a full report of the feasibility study and approval thereon to the 
MOFEP-PID. The report of the feasibility study shall; 
a. Demonstrate affordability to the institution in respect of a project 
where the contracting authority will ordinarily incur expenses; 
b. Set out the proposed allocation of technical, operational and financial 
risks between the contracting authority and the private party; 
c. Demonstrate the anticipated Value for Money to be achieved from the 
project; 
d. Give a detail estimate of the viability gap and the need for incentives 
(if any); 
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e. Give a detailed explanation as to the capacity of the institution to 
procure, manage, implement, monitor, enforce and reports on PPP 
projects. 
2.  Where the contracting authority will require funding to carry out the 
feasibility study for the project, it may in consultation with the MOFEP-
PID include such expenses in its procurement process and pass the cost to 
the private sector. 
3.  A contracting authority will only be allowed to proceed to the procurement 
phase only after a written approval of the approval committee has been 
sought and obtained. All approval shall be communicated to the cabinet on 
quarterly basis.  
4.         The approval referred to above shall be referred to as Approval II. 
 
3.7.4 Procurement Phase- Approval IIIA & IIIB 
This is the Procurement stage of the PPP process. Here, Paragraph 54 of the 
National Policy requires that before any procurement documentation is issued to 
any prospective bidder, such contracting authority must have obtained approval 
from the MOFEP-PID. The draft PPP agreement must also be approved at this 
stage. The approval referred to in Paragraph 54 shall be referred to as Approval 
IIIA.  
 
The Policy regulation further requires that the procurement process must; 
1. Be in accordance with a system that is fair, competitive, transparent and 
cost effective; 
2. Ensure that such PPP activities that are within the scope of Public 
Procurement shall be governed by the Public Procurement Act; and  
  
115 
 
3. Be such that promotes and encourage the use of local content and 
technology transfer. 
After the bid evaluation, but before the selection of the winning bidder, the 
contracting authorities are required to submit an evaluation report through the 
MOFEP-PID to the respective approving authority concerned for the approval of 
the winning bidder. The approval referred to in Paragraph 57 shall be referred to as 
Approval IIIB. 
 
3.7.5 Contracting Phase- Approval-IV 
After the conclusion of the procurement process, but before the contracting 
authority concludes the concession agreement, the contracting authority must 
obtain approval from the respective approving authorities. Such approval 
presupposes that the agreement satisfies the requirements of Affordability, Value 
for Money and risk transfer. It also shows that the satisfactory due diligence has 
been complied with in the contracting process. The approval obtained in 
accordance with Paragraph 59 shall be the final approval and shall be referred to as 
Approval IV.   
 
3.8 Unsolicited Proposals 
The National Policy allows any private sector to submit an unsolicited proposal for 
PPP Project. The main aim of this policy is to stimulate innovation and give room 
for new opportunities and novel ideas from the private sector. However, an 
unsolicited proposal shall only be considered if it is in accordance with the 
National Infrastructure Plan (NIP). All such proposals shall be given a case-by-
case consideration and shall be limited to those projects that are not already in the 
list of the contracting agency and such must demonstrate innovation and shall be in 
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accordance with public policy. In addition, all unsolicited proposals shall be in 
conformity with both the National Development Agenda and the long term 
strategic plan of the relevant contracting agency. 
 
In considering such proposals, the provisions of the Standardized PPP Provisions 
and Manual shall be complied with. All such proposals shall also pass the test of 
Affordability, Value for Money and Risk Transfer. Whatever the case may be, the 
viability of the project shall be assessed by transaction advisor(s) appointed for the 
project.   
 
3.9 Amendment/ Variation of PPP/Concession Contracts 
Generally, amendment or variation is seldom allowed in PPP agreements. 
However, the Policy provides that a material amendment will only be allowed 
where such amendment or variation will continue to ensure; 
1 Affordability; 
2 Value for Money; and 
3  Sufficient Risk Transfer to the private party. 
 
For an amendment to be granted, a prior written approval of the MOFEP-PID must 
be sought and obtained. Such approval is a must where what is sought is a material 
amendment/ variation/ waiver. It must be stated that such must however have been 
contemplated in the PPP/ concession agreement. If such is not contemplated, then 
such amendment or variation will not be allowed.235 
 
                                                          
235 See the Provisions of Paragraph 57 And 58 Of The National Policy. 
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3.10 Participation by Foreign Companies 
A foreign investor may team up with a Ghanaian entrepreneur or company for a 
joint venture, usually in the form of a partnership or a limited company. The law 
allows any foreigner who intends to invest in Ghana to team up with a Ghanaian 
entrepreneur or a firm for a joint venture in order to form a company or 
partnership. Such person or companies must comply with the provisions of these 
legal instruments; - The Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179); the Business Name Act, 
1962 (Act 151) and the Partnership Act, 1962 (Act 152). 
 
In addition, such foreign investor must satisfy the provisions of the Ghana 
Investment Promotion Act 1994 as well as the specific legislations made for each 
sector of the economy. Under the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 
(Act 478), a foreign investor is required to have a minimum equity capital of 
US$10,000 before participating in any joint venture partnership with a Ghanaian. 
The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, 1994 (Act 478), governs 
investment in all sectors of the economy except minerals and mining, oil and gas, 
and the Free Zones. In addition, there are sector-specific legislations to regulate 
energy, telecommunication, banking, insurance, securities, mining, and real estate 
among others.236 
 
The Government of Ghana has no overall economic or industrial strategy that 
discriminates against foreign-owned businesses. In some cases a foreign 
investment may enjoy additional incentives if the project is deemed critical to the 
country's development.237 Foreign companies are permitted to take part in 
government-financed and/or research and development programs on a national 
                                                          
236 See 2013 Investment Climate Statement Issued By The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Ghana. Retrieved 
From Http://Www.State.Gov/E/Eb/Rls/Othr/Ics/2013/204648.Htm. Accessed On 27.11.13. 
237 Being an Interview with Mr. Ekow of the Public Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance in Accra, Ghana on 11th 
day of January, 2013. 
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treatment basis.238In July 2013, Ghana’s Parliament adopted the Ghana Investment 
Promotion Bill 2013. If this Bill is signed into law, it will introduce positive 
changes in country’s investment landscape.239 In the 2013 Bill, the right of 
Ghanaians to invest has been extended to petroleum and mining sectors. This is an 
improvement over the provision of the 1994 Investment Act. 
 All companies that intend to do business in Ghana must first register with the 
regulations and procedures of the following government agencies; 
a. Ghana Investment Promotion Commission; 
b. Registrar General Department, 
c. Ghana Revenue Authority; 
d. Ghana Immigration Service; and 
e. Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). 
 
According to The World Bank's Doing Business 2013 report issued in 2012, the 
report stated that there has been significant improvement in the average time to 
start business in Ghana. From about 129 days in 2003, 33 days in 2010 and now to 
12 days in 2013.240 
 
3.11 Dispute Resolution in PPPs in Ghana 
There is no doubt that mechanism for handling PPP disputes contribute to 
transparency and accountability by ensuring that the provisions of the law and 
other requirements are strictly adhered to. In addition, an effective dispute 
                                                          
238 Example is the Public Private Partnership Programme. 
239 Ghana: Parliament Passes Revised Law Governing Investments. Retrieved from 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403648_text. Accessed on 29.11.13. 
240 Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. Retrieved from 
http://publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=1&products_id=24391. Accessed on 
29.11.13.  
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settlement mechanism ensures that all parties in the transaction are given a fair and 
equitable opportunity in the procurement process.241 
 
The National PPP Policy on PPPs is silent on how to resolve disputes arising from 
PPP contracts in Ghana. However, since the intendment of the provision of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 2010 is to apply to all matters including 
commercial disputes, then its provisions will be applicable to all PPP disputes in 
Ghana. 
 
In order to promote alternatives to the courts in Ghana for the resolution of 
disputes, in 2010, the parliament amended the Arbitration Act of 1961 which 
undoubtedly preceded many statutes that were enacted on businesses and 
investment. It also pre-dated Ghana’s accession of the United Nations Conventions 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Award popularly 
called the New York Convention of 1958.242 
 
The new Arbitration Act replaces the 1961 Act. The Act governs all arbitral 
proceedings as well as the enforcement of both foreign and domestic arbitral 
awards within Ghana. The provisions of the Act are substantially in conformity 
with the UNCITRAL Model Law. Section 1 of the Act provides that subject to the 
provision of the Act, it shall apply to all matters.  The Act upholds and respect 
party autonomy by giving the parties the right to go to arbitration and to determine 
how such arbitration will be conducted.243 
 
                                                          
241 A.B. Adjei, Challenges in the handling of Procurement Complaints: Ghana’s Experience (2011) 38 JMCL Page 1. 
242 Ghana acceded to the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in 
1968.  
243 Kwadwo Sarkodie Arbitration in Ghana – The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, (2011). International 
Construction Law Review, Page 3. Also available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/5ee12231-1295-4559-
8167-89d93cdf2a06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91e048fe-67d4-4e3f-9d10-
8bbf9861e753/ArbitrationGhana_Sarkodie.pdf.  
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 Section 5(1) gives the parties the right to go to arbitration in the settlement of their 
disputes while S.5 (2) provides that except as otherwise provided, the procedure to 
be adopted in the arbitral proceeding shall be as the parties and arbitrators 
determine. Accordingly parties to the proceedings may agree on a set of arbitration 
rules to govern the arbitration. In this way the Act recognises and upholds the right 
of contracting parties to agree to arbitrate. 
  
The Act also governs the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Ghana. 
Specifically, S. 59 of the Act provides that the High Court of Ghana shall have the 
powers to enforce the provisions of the act in accordance with the New York 
Convention. However, such an award must not be a subject of appeal at the higher 
courts. The Act does not limit the arbitral awards which may thus be enforced to 
those made in the territory of a state which is party to the New York Convention.244 
 
3.12 Challenges Facing PPPs in Ghana 
Although, PPP is still new in Ghana, it however has some challenges which need to 
be addressed. These are:  
 
3.12.1 Lack of Comprehensive Legal Framework 
The PPP National Policy, which was made by the Ministry of Finance, is still the 
applicable regulation governing PPPs in Ghana. Ghana does not have a legislative 
framework governing PPPs. According to Professor Bondzi-Simpson,245 he stated 
that the National Policy is not comprehensive and cannot enjoy the same legal 
status with an Act of parliament. He stated further that in the absence of a sound 
legislative initiative, the rules and meanings of concessions will have to emerge 
                                                          
244 Kwadwo Sarkodie Arbitration in Ghana – The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010. 
245 The researcher interviewed Professor Bondzi-Simpson in January 2013. He is the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University 
of Cape Coast, Ghana. 
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from the decisions of the court of law. There are major areas such as termination of 
concession agreement, dispute resolution mechanisms and many others that the 
policy does not cover. The Public Private Partnership Bill is still pending before 
the parliament as at the time of this research. If the country intends to attract 
investors both within and outside the country, then it must ensure that there is 
comprehensive and adequate legal framework that will guarantee future investment 
returns. 
 
3.12.2 Openness and Transparency 
Although, there are few legislations to combat corruption in procurement processes 
in the country, there is need to further ensure openness and transparency through 
the enactment of vital laws that will complement the PPP Policy. The country 
needs the Freedom of Information Law as well as Competition Law. These laws 
will give the citizens the right to know what is going on in relation to PPP 
procurement processes. Secrecy in PPP procurement promotes the likelihood of 
corruption.  These laws will further help to strengthen and enhance integrity in the 
procurement processes. 
 
3.12.3 Inadequacy of PPP Experts 
There are very few experts in the field of PPP Procurement in Ghana. According to 
Mr. Ekow of the Public Investment Division of the Ministry of Finance, he stated 
that this is due to the fact that the initiative is still very new in the country. The few 
experts are the ones that are managing and implementing PPP projects in the whole 
country. Currently, the country has Six (6) Metropolitan, Fourty Nine (49) 
Municipal and One Hundred and Sixty One (161) Districts making a total of Two 
Hundred and Sixteen (216). There is no doubt that all these Metropolitan, 
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Municipals and Districts need to build capacity within each level of authority. 
Therefore, inadequacy of PPP experts is still a major challenge to the PPP 
programme in Ghana. 
 
3.12.4 Corruption 
Although, Ghana has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption as 
well as the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption among others, corruption still poses a great challenge to the 
implementation of projects in the country. This implementation gap is evident in 
the scorecard of the Global Integrity Report for the year 2010.246 The report scored 
the country high in terms of the quality of its anti-corruption legislations but low in 
terms of enforcement. Since PPP is part of the methods for procuring 
infrastructure, it is therefore not insulated from corruption.  
 
Although, the government of Ghana has reiterated its commitment to ensure the 
speedy passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2014, with the aim of 
strengthening the mechanisms for fiscal discipline and enthrone fiscal stability.247 
This Act, if passed, will no doubt complement the provisions of the Financial 
Administration Act of 2003, in reducing corruption in PPPs and other 
procurements in Ghana. 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
With the current stable democratic and economic transitions in Ghana, the country 
needs to seriously step up its drive towards achieving good socio-economic 
infrastructure through the Public Private Partnership initiative. There is the need to 
                                                          
246 See Overview of Corruption and Anti Corruption in Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-
corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-ghana/. Accessed on 30.11.13. 
247 See: The Ghana Action Plan, available at http://www.ghanaopengov.org/wiki/ghana-action-plan. Accessed on 27.11.13. 
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enact and strengthen the laws that will encourage private sector participation in 
infrastructure development if the country intends to achieve its Vision 20-20 
objectives. Legal certainty and regulatory stability are key component that attract 
private sector investment in infrastructure development. 
 
Aryee JRA,248 while delivering his inaugural address titled “Saints, Wizards, 
Demons and Systems” at the University of Ghana explained the reasons why most 
government policies and programmes failed and how they can become more 
successful not only in Ghana, but in other developing countries of the world. He 
suggested that the right combination of committed politicians and bureaucrats 
(saints); appropriate policy analysts and available reliable information (wizards); 
management of hostile and apathetic groups (demons); and insulation of the policy 
environment from the vagaries of implementation (systems) are sine qua non to the 
successful implementation of government programmes generally.  
 
As the Ghana Minister of State for Public Private Partnership249 pointed out that 
Public Private Partnerships should not be seen as ending all developmental 
challenges, it can however greatly help the country in building and modernising 
critical socio-economic infrastructure that can serve as the wheel for nation’s 
development. Thus, in achieving this, the country needs to show more 
commitments in order to allow the partnership work and build capacities by 
training more experts especially in the areas of finance, public governance, 
compliance and transparency, human resources and legal among others.   
 
                                                          
248 Aryee JRA. “Saints, wizards, demons and systems: Explaining the Success or Failure of Public Policies and Programs 
(2010) (Accra, Ghana University Press, 2000). 
249 Being the Statement of the Minister of State for (PPP) in Presidency at a reception organized by the United Kingdom 
Trade and Investment Unit of the High Commission for the Global Training Consulting Limited (GTC) in Accra, Ghana on 
15th July, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.modernghana.com/news/475667/1/public-private-partnerships-not-solution-to-
proble.html. Accessed on 29.11.13. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN NIGERIA 
 
4.0  INTRODUCTION 
The dominant economic policy objective of the Federal Government of Nigeria at 
independence was to expand its roles through direct intervention and ownership in 
the economy of the nation.  With the international donor agencies’ supports, the 
government was able to gain the commanding heights and dominated economic 
activity in the country. 250 
 
With an unprecedented increase in the oil revenues in the country in the 1970s,251 
this further strengthened government’s dominance and thwarted the growth of the 
emerging private sector. During this period, governments in Nigeria252 were able to 
invest in agricultural, infrastructure and industrial production. The oil boom also 
caused a major shift in the activities of the private sector away from agricultural 
and industrial production to government contracting and trade. The increased 
dominance of the public sector during this period led to a huge gap between the 
public and private sectors and created an atmosphere characterised with lack of 
trust. 
 
 
                                                          
250Mary I. Agboli and James J. Emery, Encouraging Effective Dialogue and Advocacy in Nigeria: The Better Business 
Initiative. Retrieved from www.publicprivatedialogue.org/case_studies/The%20Better%20Business%20Initiative.doc on 
15.06.12. 
251 Oil was discovered in large quantities in Nigeria in the early 1970s. Nigeria generated a lot of revenues especially during 
the period of the oil boom. 
252Nigeria is a federation which has Three Tiers of Government viz The Federal, State and Local Governments. 
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The idea of Government in Nigeria divesting itself of its interest in commercial 
enterprises commenced in the early 80’s with the Promulgation of the Privatization 
and Commercialization Decree.253 The experience of Government in Nigeria had 
been very similar to that of the United Kingdom. Interestingly, the philosophical 
position in the United Kingdom had begun to shift. The Labour Government of Sir 
Harold Wilson had been defeated in the polls by the Conservative Government of 
Margaret Thatcher.254 The Conservatives were of the firm view that Government 
had no business in commerce. The only role of government was to provide a 
conducive and an enabling environment for entrepreneurs to flourish.255  The 
source of revenue for Government was not in participating in these enterprises but 
in collecting taxes from these successful businesses. Almost all the businesses had 
become unsuccessful. The magnitude of the failure of these businesses became 
very apparent when it was realized that they failed even though they had no 
competitors as they were virtual monopolies. 
 
By the late 1980s, the Nigerian government began to open up to a more private 
sector-led economy.  There was then the need to engage the private sector in 
dialogue on economic policy making.256  However, the private sector had been 
weakened and lacked the capacity to constructively prioritize and implement 
reforms. In July 1986, the Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida administration embarked 
upon the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).  Part of the major objectives of 
SAP were to pursue deregulation and Privatisation leading to removal of subsidies, 
reduction in wage bills and the retrenchment of the Public Sector ostensibly to trim 
                                                          
253This was the Privatisation and Commercialization Decree No. 25 of 1988; later redesigned “Act”. This Act established the 
Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization and their functions.  
254 In May 1979,Labour Party lost the general election to the Conservatives and Margaret Thatcher became Britain's first 
female prime minister. 
255 The government can provide good investment laws that will protect the interest of both foreign and local investors. 
256 M. I. Agboli and J. J. Emery, Encouraging Effective Dialogue and Advocacy in Nigeria: The Public-Private Dialogue. 
Available at < www.publicprivatedialogue.org/.../The%20Better%20Business%20lni>. Accessed on 04.03.12. 
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the State down to size.257 To actualize this objective, The Federal Government in 
July 1987, set up a Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation 
(TCPC) which was backed up by the Privatisation and Commercialisation 
Decree.258 
 
The resumption of military rule forestalled the limited economic progress made in 
the early 1990’s259 but with the return to democracy in 1999, economic policy 
again shifted in favour of a more open, private sector led economy.  At this time, 
effective representation by the private sector became critical to national economic 
policy deliberations. Given the huge amount needed and the drive necessary for 
economic development, the Nigerian government lacked the requisite capability to 
achieve this on its own and has thus among other options embarked upon the use of 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development to address the 
challenges hindering the growth of the Nigerian economy. 
 
Between 1999 and 2005, projects with arrangements similar to those under PPPs 
came under the control of the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit 
(BMPIU)260 which was set up to ensure full compliance with the laid down 
guidelines and procedures for the procurement of capital projects. Although 
BMPIU did not directly control PPPs, it could be said to be the pioneer unit set up 
                                                          
257See Ehi Oshio and N.F Stewart ‘ The Legal and Institutional Frameworks of Privatisation in Nigeria: A Discourse. 
Available at 
http://nigerianlawguru.com/articles/company%20law/THE%20LEGAL%20AND%20INSTITUTIONAL%20FRAMEWOR
KS%20OF%20PRIVATISATION%20IN%20NIGERIA,%20A%20DISCOURSE.pdf on 23.03.11. 
258Decree No 25 of 1988 now redesigned Act. 
259 Although, few of the military administrations in Nigeria contributed massively to the development in infrastructure in the 
country. Mention must be made especially to both General Gowon and General Muhammad Murtala’s administrations. 
260 M.M.Akanbi and O.O.Olatunji, Sustainable Development and Housing Delivery in Nigeria: An Examination of the Legal 
Perspective of the Public Private Partnership Initiatives in Law and Sustainable Development in Africa P.E. Bondzi-
Simpson, W.O Egbewole, Muhtar Adeiza Etudaiye and Olugbenga Ajani Olatunji (eds). (Grosevenor Publishing Ltd, Surrey 
2012.) Pg 198. 
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to oversee PPPs transactions at the Federal level with regards to contracts that 
come within its jurisdiction. 
 
As a result of the greater use of PPPs in Nigeria, the Federal Government 
considered setting up a separate legal and regulatory framework for regulating and 
controlling PPPs in Nigeria. Following this realisation, the National Assembly 
enacted the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Establishment Act in 2005 
pursuant to which the Infrastructure Regulatory Commission was established in 
2008 to develop policies and provide regulatory and institutional framework for an 
effective PPP programme in Nigeria.261 
 
Since the enactment of the ICRC Act in 2005, some projects have been awarded to 
the private sector for concession through the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
and other methods that are most suitable for the particular project.262 The Murtala 
Muhammed Airport (MMA2) in Lagos and the Lagos Port were the first sets of 
projects concessioned under the ICRC Act.  
 
Some of the states in Nigeria have also adopted the PPP initiative as a means of 
developing their infrastructure. Lagos, Rivers and Osun States have been in the 
frontline. Each of these states is responsible for developing its own investment 
framework and will also create an enabling environment for investors. In 
December 2008, the Lagos State government established the public Private 
Partnership office.263 The Office is expected to draw from best practices in project 
                                                          
261 The commission was inaugurated by late President Umaru Musa Yar’adua on 27th November, 2008. The commission has 
the mandate to provide the MDA’s the requisite regulatory and institutional frameworks for their effective participation in 
PPPs. 
262 This can be Design, Build, Operate and Maintain (DBOM), Design, Build, Operate (DBO) and many others. 
263 See Lagos State Public-Private Partnership Office. Available at<http://www.lagosstateppp.gov.ng/home.asp>. Accessed 
on 13.05.13. 
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management and delivery to ensure that residents of Lagos State get value for 
money in Public-Private Partnership programmes.  
 
In Lagos Nigeria, in an attempt to eliminate the severe traffic jam along Lekki-Epe 
Expressway, the Lagos State Government granted a concession contract to the 
Lekki Concession Company (LCC) to design, construct, finance, and operate the 
toll road project. The Upgrade and expansion of the 49.36 km road will be 
maintained by the LCC for a period of 30 years.264 The capital value is estimated to 
be US$450 million. This project has since been fully operational since 2012. 
 
4.1 Sector Level Analysis of the State of Infrastructure in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, despite its abundant deposit of natural resources, acute shortage of both 
social and economic infrastructures in still poses a great challenge to both the 
government and the governed. There are several cases of infrastructure 
inadequacies such as irregular power supply, bad roads, and unreliable healthcare 
services, lack of safe and drinkable water among others. The combination of poor 
management, poor policies and state monopolies, absence of effective maintenance 
and lack of re-investment had led to deterioration of infrastructure and had 
occasioned massive losses. Since the last three decades, infrastructure in Nigeria 
has now become a hindrance rather than a facilitator to nation’s development. It is, 
therefore, important at this juncture to briefly analyze the current situation of 
infrastructure in Nigeria.  
 
 
  
                                                          
264 See Lagos Infrastructure Project (LIP) Concession. Available at 
<http://www.lagosstateppp.gov.ng/projects/project_portfolio/project_in_construction.asp>. Last accessed on 21.12.13. 
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4.1.1  Electricity Infrastructure 
Power blackout is a regular phenomenon in most Nigerian cities, towns and 
villages with negative impacts on the quality of lives and economic development. 
Most of the electricity equipment that were erected in the 1950s and 1960s are 
ageing and operating at a sub optimal level due to lack of maintenance.265 The 
country is still plagued with serious electricity crisis due to unreliable supplies, 
insufficient generating capacity and high tariffs being paid by the consumers. 
Power outages in the country remain unabated. Power generation today stands at 
about 4,000 Megawatts. It is estimated that the country’s current electricity demand 
is well above 15,000 Megawatts which on a per capita basis is still less than one 
tenth of that of South Africa and two and half times less than Egypt.266 About 
$US50 Billion Dollars was disbursed on electricity within Fourteen years267 
leading to generation of only about 1,000 Megawatts268 from 3000 Megawatts in 
1999 to 4000 Megawatts in 2013. Mismanagement and underinvestment in this 
sector are not unconnected to the fact that since the country’s independence in 
1960, electricity generation and distribution has been an exclusive preserve of the 
Federal Government. Unreliable and epileptic power supply has been a perennial 
problem of these Sub-Saharan African countries for decades.269 
 
However, in an attempt the find a solution to the perennial electricity problem, the 
federal government has embarked on privatization of the power sector in 
Nigeria.  On 30th September 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan formally handed 
over the licenses and Share certificates to 14 new core owners of the Power 
                                                          
265 Africa’s Energy Situation. Retrieved from www.desertec-africa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view. Last accessed 
on 04.05.13. 
266 Nigeria’s Power Situation: Where are The IPPS? 
Http://Www.Ayakaonline.Com/Politics/Nigerias-Power-Situation-Where-Are-The-Ipps/ 
267 This covers a period between 1999-2013. 
268 State of Electricity Supply in Nigeria. http://thenationonlineng.net/new/columnists/state-of-electricity-supply-in-nigeria/ 
269 Enabling Private Sector Participation in Electricity Generation. Retrieved from http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/files/Kenya.pdf. 
Accessed on 23.05.13. 
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Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) successor companies. During the official 
handing over, the president assured Nigerians thus “We can all look forward to a 
better time very soon as we have seen in telecommunication and banking sectors. I 
am confident that the power sector will promise no less, knowing the calibre of 
those who are taking over.”270 
 
It is hoped that with the reform in the Nigerian electricity sector, the nation will 
witness a positive change in terms of stable electricity which will definitely have 
great positive impacts on the Nigerian economy and the standard of living. 
 
4.1.2  Road and Transportation Infrastructure  
The condition of roads in Nigeria ranges from fair to poor. There are relatively 
very few roads in good condition. The existing network of highways in the country 
is not only inadequate but also largely in a deplorable state. Bad drainage system, 
deadly potholes, fallen bridges and lack of maintenance are part of the reasons for 
its deplorable state.271In 2012 alone, 4,620 people died as a result of road accidents 
while 20,757 people sustained various degrees of injuries.272 The situation in most 
Sub-Saharan countries is not so different. Rural Africa has only 34% of access 
roads compared to about 90% in the developed world.273 About 80% of the cargo 
loads in Nigeria are taken through the roads.  Good national and regional 
                                                          
270 The Power Sector Privatisation: The Journey So Far. Available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/the-power-sector-
privatisation-the-journey-so-far/163271/. Accessed on 21.12.13. 
 
271 Akeem Ayofe Akinwale, the Menace of Inadequate Infrastructure in Nigeria (2010) African Journal of Science, 
Technology and Innovation, Vol.2 No 3. Available at http://www.ajstid.com/Sample%20Research%20Note.pdf. Accessed 
on 15.12.2013. 
272 Nigeria: 4,260 Deaths Recorded in Road Accidents in 2012, Says FRSC. Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201310040412.html. Accessed on 13.10.13. 
 
273 African Development Bank, 2010. 
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transportation links are very vital to the governmental policies of reducing poverty 
and hunger.274 
 
The nation’s railway has become moribund for close to 2 decades before it is now 
being attended to. Most of the rail tracks are already dilapidated because the larger 
part of it was laid before independence in 1960. The Nigeria Airways, which is the 
national carrier, has collapsed. Incessant plane crashes have been recorded as a 
result of the poor management and inefficiency of the nation’s aviation system. 
Recently, in order to save the nation’s ports from its deplorable state, the nation’s 
ports have been concessioned to the private operators since 2005 in order to 
improve the quality of its services.275   
 
The exercise which commenced in 2006 has put the concessionaires to be in charge 
of the day-to-day running of the ports, especially cargo handling while the 
management of the Nigerian Ports Authorities still remains the landlord.276 The 
performance of the ports especially after the concession has made the Nigerian 
ports to be more competitive and innovative because the terminal operators has 
have really modernise its operations to an international standard. Port Concession 
is one of the major areas where the PPP arrangements have brought great reforms 
to Nigeria and Nigerians. It has led to more efficiency, innovation and greater 
revenue.      
 
 
 
                                                          
274 Roads funded by EU left to fall apart in sub-Saharan Africa. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/2013/jan/18/roads-funded-eu-sub-saharan-africa. Accessed on 25.05.13. 
275 See Akeem Ayofe Akinwale, the Menace of Inadequate Infrastructure in Nigeria at page 218. 
276See www. Thisdaylive.com/articles/Nigerian ports-and-the-effect-of-repositioning. Accessed on 23.09.12. 
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4.1.3  Water and Sanitation  
According to the United Nations Environmental report, it is estimated that in 
Africa, over 300 million people lack access to clean and safe drinking water.277  In 
Nigeria, like most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, safe and drinkable water 
supply has posed a great challenge. Currently, almost about half of its population 
has no access to safe and drinkable water despite the fact that the country is 
abundantly blessed with water resources.278 Access to water in the country is low 
and does not meet the 75% target of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
This is so despite the fact that the country has series of policy on water supply.279 
 
The effects of lack of access to water and sanitation have a macroeconomic impact 
on the continent and the benefits of improving access to water and sanitation are 
very enormous.  Achieving the water and sanitation Millennium Development 
Goals would increase the yearly economic benefits of the nation. This is 
because,  it is estimated that every $1dollar judiciously spent on this sector will 
bring a return of about $8 dollars in saved time, and it will help in reducing health 
costs and thereby increasing productivity.  If the MDG targets on water and 
sanitation are met by 2015, national governments in sub-Saharan Africa could save 
about 12% of annual public health expenditures.280  
 
4.1.4  Telecommunication and ICT infrastructure 
The telecommunication sector has witnessed significant development since 
privatization in the sector began in 2001.281 Before the advent of the Global System 
for Mobile Telecommunication (GSM) in Nigeria in that same year, the Nigerian 
                                                          
277 See the United Nations Report on Water in Africa. Available at http://www.unep.org/. Accessed on 08.08.13. 
278O.B Akpor and M. Muchie, The Challenges in Meetiing the MDGs: The Nigerian Drinking Water Supply and Distribution 
Sector (2011), Journal of Environmental Science and Technology.  
279 See the National Policy on Water Supply which was approved in 2000. Some states also have similar provisions. 
280 See the United Nations Report on Water in Africa. 
281 The first service provider in this sector commenced service in August 2001. 
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Telecommunications (NITEL) which was a public company was only able to roll 
out about Four Hundred Thousand (400,000) telephone lines for about three 
decades of its existence. In September 2013, the total number of active lines in 
Nigeria stood at One Hundred and Twenty One Million (121,000,000).282 In fact, 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) rated Nigerian 
Telecommunication sector as the fastest in Africa283 with teledensity of 86.62.284 
 
Nigeria, with 48 million internet users has the highest number of internet users in 
Africa followed by Egypt, Morocco, Kenya and South Africa in that order.285 
Although in recent times, the performance of Africa’s mobile networks has 
radically improved, the telecommunications industries all over the world have also 
evolved. Internet broadband is now considered as central to a long term economic 
development strategies of a nation. Attempts at upgrading the Nigerian 
telecommunication infrastructure have remained futile. The first communication 
satellite that was launched by the government failed in the orbit in November 2008. 
The failure was due to lack of maintenance and technical itches and another 
agreement was made in 2009. The replacement was launched in December 19, 
2011 called NigComSat-1R. The new satellite is expected to last for 15 years and it 
will provide an ideal telecommunication infrastructure for Nigeria.  
 
4.2  The Legal Framework for Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria 
Basically, the statutes and laws regulating Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria 
are as follows: 
 
                                                          
282 See the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) Monthly Subscribers Data, July 2013-September, 2013. Available 
at <http://www.ncc.gov.ng/>. Accessed on 18.12.13. 
283 See ITU Telecoms World 2013. Available at <http://www.itu.int/en/itutelecom/Pages/world2013.aspx>. Accessed on 
12.12.13. 
284 See Nigerian Communication Commission Subscribers’ Data. 
285See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm. Accessed on 15.11.13. 
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4.2.1 Privatisation and Commercialization Act 
As part of the structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) embarked upon by the then 
Federal Military Government of Nigeria in 1986, the then military government 
promulgated the Privatization and Commercialization Decree (Now Act)286 in 
1988. The main purpose of this Act was to ensure wider ownership of government 
enterprises in Nigeria and the desire to extend the frontiers and the depth of the 
Nigerian Capital Market.287 
 
The Privatisation and Commercialization Act has Six (VI) major parts. The first 
part (Sections 1-8) deals with Privatization and Commercialization of public 
enterprises, The second part (Sections 9-11) contains provisions that deal with the 
National Council on Privatisation, while the Third part (Sections 12-22) deals with 
the establishment and functions of the Bureau of Public Enterprises. The remaining 
three parts i.e. parts 4, 5 and 6 contain provisions relating to legal proceedings, 
constitution and functions of the arbitration panel and miscellaneous respectively. 
Section 1 of the Act listed those public enterprises that were for partial and full 
privatization. Sections 6 provides for those public enterprises that will be partially 
or fully privatised as contained in the Second schedule to the Act. Section provides 
for the establishment of the National Council on privatisation whose power is 
mainly to approve policies and guidelines on privatisation. Section 12 contains 
provisions on the establishment of the Bureau of Public Enterprises and whose 
function is mainly to implement the Council’s policy on privatisation.  
 
 
                                                          
286 No. 25 of 1988 which later became an Act of Parliament and Cap 369, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Privatization and Commercialization Act”). 
287 Paul Obo Idornigie, “Privatization and Commercialization of Public Enterprises in Nigeria”. Available at 
http://paulidornigie.org/Resources/privatization%20and%20commercialization%20of%20Public%20Enterprises%20in%20N
igeria.pdf. Accessed on 02.12.13. 
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4.2.2 Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment) 
Act 2005288  
 
 The National Assembly enacted the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act in 2005, with the aim of giving room to the 
private sector to partner with the government in the provision critical infrastructure 
in order to fill the infrastructure gap. Also, in line with the provision of the Act, the 
Infrastructure concession regulatory commission was also established to monitor 
and implement the provisions of the Act. The Act lays down broad principles on 
which concessions are to be granted and also gives certain guarantees to potential 
concessionaires in case such is needed.  
 
Section 1 of the Act allows any of the MDA’s to grant concession to any duly pre-
qualified project proponent in the private sector in order to finance, construct, 
operate and maintain any infrastructure that is financially viable or any 
development facility of the Federal Government in accordance with the provision 
of the Act. The scopes of arrangements that can come under the PPP opportunities 
in Nigeria exist in virtually every sector of the economy. These include; power 
plants, highways, seaports, airports, water supply, security, telecommunications, 
railways, as well as other infrastructures and development projects as may be 
approved, from time to time, by the Federal Executive Council. This is specifically 
provided for under S.36 of the ICRC Act.  
 
The ICRC Act basically applies to concession contracts by the Federal Ministries, 
Agencies, Corporations and other bodies empowered to enter into a concession 
                                                          
288This Act is now in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010. 
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contract.289 However, the ICRC Act and the National Policy and its Supplementary 
Notes290 made pursuant to the powers vested in the Commission by the Act will 
also extend to all the infrastructure projects involving the Federal Government and 
any state or Local Governments that are partially funded by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria.  
 
4.2.3 Public Procurement Act 2007 
Before the enactment of Public Procurement Act of 2007 in Nigeria, procurement 
legislations and regulations were generally fragmented. Generally, negotiation of 
contractual conditions was not standardized as deliberate loopholes were created to 
give room for political maneuvering and manipulation in the tendering and award 
processes. In fact, in some cases, the contractors themselves chose the tendering 
method to be adopted. Because of the lack of clarity in the rules regulating public 
purchases, in most cases, reference is made to the publication in the Official 
Gazettes, which were seldom published and if at all, only accessible to only some 
selected few especially those at the corridors of power.291  
 
However, with the passage of the Public Procurement Act in 2007, the 
procurement regulations were harmonized. The Act represents the central 
legislation for the control of Public Procurement in Nigeria at the federal level. The 
Act provides for the establishment of the National Council on Public Procurement 
and the Bureau of Public Procurement in Nigeria as the regulatory agency 
responsible for the monitoring and oversight of public procurements, harmonising 
the existing Government policies and practices by regulating, setting the necessary 
                                                          
289 See S.2 of the Act. 
290See the Provision of S.34 of the ICRC Act which gives the commission the power to make regulations.  
291 Nigeria’s Country Procurement Assessment Report. Summary of Findings And Recommendations Volume 1. Available 
at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/06/08/000094946_01053004005048/Rendered/PD
F/multi0page.pdf. Accessed on 19.08.13. 
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standards and developing the legal framework and professional capacity for public 
procurement in Nigeria.292 
 
Public Procurement relates to the utilization of public funds to meet the daily 
requirements of governance. Although, the provisions of the Act do not specifically 
focus on PPPs, nevertheless, they are very relevant to the way government goes 
about its fiduciary relationship and responsibility in public purchase and 
acquisitions.293 They therefore relate to regulations and standards that must be 
adhered to in public procurement. 
 
Adoption of, and compliance to quality public procurement policies may therefore, 
to a large extent, be a barometer for measuring the genuiness and performance of 
various other general priorities and policies embarked upon by the government to 
foster sustainable economic development. This is because the attainment of key 
government set targets depends on how successful and efficient procurement laws 
and policies are implemented. Public procurement policies are instrumental to 
enhancing all governmental apparatus to produce an effective transparent and 
productive administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
292See the Preamble to the Public Procurement Act, CAP P44, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
293 B.D.Oloworaran, The Law and Practice of Public Procurement in Nigeria, Global Behulah Publications, Porthacourt, 
2011. 
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4.2.4  The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007294  
This Act provides for the prudent management of the nations resources, secure 
greater accountability and transparency in Fiscal operations within the medium 
term of Fiscal Policy Framework, and the establishment of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission which would ensure the promotion of the nation’s 
economic objectives. 
 
It should be categorically stated here that the Fiscal Responsibility Act does not 
have direct provisions on PPPs but on sound financial management of funds by the 
government ministries, agencies and departments, and in so far as PPPs are linked 
to the capital of departments, invariably, it is part of the legislations to be complied 
with and the compliance relates to ensuring compliance in the allocation and 
management of public expenditure these are the issues which the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act addresses and that is why it is one of the legislations that must 
be complied with. 
 
4.2.5 National Policy on Public Private Partnerships and its Supplementary 
Notes 
 
The National Policy was developed by the Commission in 2009 and duly approved 
by the Federal Executive Council to provide clear, consistent and a detailed process 
and procedural guides for all aspects of infrastructure development through PPPs 
and implementation ranging from project identification, evaluation, selection, 
procurement, operation, maintenance and performance monitoring. It contains 
provisions on the legal, institutional and financial frameworks for Public-Private 
Partnerships in Nigeria. It also contains provisions on the policy, economic, social 
                                                          
294See The Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007 Act No. 31. Available at<http://frc-
nigeria.org/Fiscal%20Responsibility%20Act.pdf>. Last accessed on  
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and environmental objectives of the Federal Government of Nigeria for its 
infrastructure development programme. 
 
The Supplementary Notes on the other hand provides further information on the 
National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Nigeria. It sets out the roles and 
responsibilities expected of Federal Government Ministries, Agencies, Cooperation 
and other bodies involved in the planning and procurement of infrastructure 
investment projects. It further explains the roles of the ICRC Board in issuing 
guidelines in project selection and procurement. It also sets out the processes that 
private sector bidders will need to follow in order to prepare for a bidding 
opportunity, to submit a bid, and to arrange finance in finalizing a contract with 
government for the provision of new infrastructure or public services. 
 
4.3 Institutional Landscape 
There are some governmental institutions that play key roles in PPP programme in 
Nigeria. Their functions and powers with respect to PPPs will be examined 
hereunder. These are: 
 
4.3.1 Infrastructure Concession Commission 
This commission is a creation of the ICRC Act.295 It plays a key role in the 
coordination and monitoring of PPP programme in Nigeria. It has the mandate to 
issue and develop policies and procedures for effective coordination of PPP 
programme in Nigeria. It also acts as the national center of expertise for all PPP 
transactions in the country.  It works closely with all the ministries, departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government in order to identify projects that are 
suitable for PPPs. This agency also serves as an interface between the government 
                                                          
295 See S.14 of ICRC Act. 
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and the private sector in order to promote effective communication on government 
policies and programmes. 
 
In addition, it has the mandate to give advice to the Federal Executive Council 
(FEC) on the PPP national development policies and also on whether a project 
submitted to the FEC meets the requirements of the regulations or not. It also 
works with states in the development of their PPP policies in order to ensure that 
those policies and programmes are consistent with the best practice. Although, 
Nigeria being a federation, each of the states is responsible for its own PPP 
investment projects, however, where a state government requires a guarantee in 
order to finance its project, it can get such finance with the support of a guarantee 
from the Federal Government. In providing any such guarantees, the Government 
will have regard to best practices as exemplified by its own PPP Policy and 
guidelines.296 
 
The Contract Monitoring Unit within the Commission has the responsibility to 
monitor compliance with the terms of the PPP contract between the parties. It also 
among others has the responsibility to maintain a database for all PPP projects and 
also be in custody of all PPP agreements between the government and the private 
partners.297  Being a center of expertise, the commission provides technical 
assistance to all MDA in developing PPP Projects. Examples of PPP Projects 
sources from the commission’s website are referred to as Appendix B. 
 
 
 
                                                          
296 See Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission. Available at  http://www.icrc.gov.ng/about.php. Accessed on 
03.09.14. 
297 See generally, Sections 19 and 20 the ICRC Act. 
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4.3.2 Bureau of Public Procurement 
The Public Procurement Act established the Bureau of Public Procurement in order 
to harmonise the existing government policies on procurement practices by 
ensuring probity, transparency and accountability in procurement process in 
Nigeria.298 This Bureau plays a very cardinal role in ensuring that due process is 
followed especially in the procurement of Public works and services. The Bureau 
uses the pricing standards and benchmarks to ensure that prices of goods and 
services are fair and reasonable. 
 
4.3.3 The National Planning Commission 
The commission has the mandate to develop a National Development Plan (NDP) 
for all infrastructure services by the Federal Government of Nigeria.299 The MDAs 
will have to work with this commission in order to identify their long term plant for 
infrastructure projects and in order to determine whether such project can be 
funded through the MDA’s budget or through PPPs. Any agency that intends to 
carry out a project under PPP must have to act in compliance with the 
commission’s plan. The National Planning Commission also provides tools for 
economic appraisal of all investment projects including PPPs and carries out 
research on the economic appraisal of the government’s infrastructure investment 
programme within the specified period. 
 
4.3.4 Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA’s) 
The ICRC Act allocates specific roles and responsibilities to Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies (MDAs) within the Federal Government for PPP 
project identification, planning, approval, procurement, and implementation. It 
                                                          
298 See Section 3 of the Public Procurement Act, 2007. 
299 This is usually for a period of 15 years. 
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therefore means that it is only the MDAs that can enter into a contract and grant 
concessions to the private sector proponents on behalf of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria.300 According to Professor Paul Idornigie,301 who stated that in granting 
concessions, it is important to first determine which Ministry, Department or 
Agency of the government that is empowered by the constitution and the Act 
establishing same to grant concession to the private proponent. This would involve 
determining whether the subject matter falls within the Exclusive, Concurrent or 
residual lists as contained in the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution.302 
 
It is only the National Assembly by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the 
Constitution that can make laws in respect of the items listed on the Exclusive 
Legislative Lists.303 Some of the items that are on the Exclusive Legislative List 
are telecommunications; defence; railways; prisons; arms and ammunitions; 
aviation, including airports, safety of aircraft and carriage of passengers and goods 
by air; construction, alteration and maintenance of federal trunk roads; maritime, 
shipping and navigation on national waters; military (Army, Navy and Air force) 
including any other branch of the Armed forces of the Federation; National Parks; 
Police; Posts, telegraphs and telephones; water from such sources as may be 
declared by the National Assembly. 
 
While Concurrent Legislative List is a list in which both the National Assembly 
and State Houses of Assemblies can legislate on. Some of the items on this list are; 
Education Electricity/Power generation; Industrial, commercial or agricultural 
development to mention but a few. Having listed the areas in which the Federal 
                                                          
300See S.1 of the ICRC Act 2005. 
301 Being an interview granted by Professor Paul Idornigie at the Institute of Advanced legal studies, Abuja in June, 2012. 
302See the Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria for the lists. 
303S.4 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria gives the National Assembly the powers to make laws for the Federation and also 
the State Houses of Assembly the powers to make laws for their respective states. 
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Government Ministries, Departments and agencies can grant concessions, another 
important question to raise is which of these MDA’s has the right to grant 
concession in respect of a particular project? 
 
To answer this question, recourse would have to be made to the enabling Acts or 
laws creating or establishing the agency concerned. While some of these laws are 
clear as to which of these departments and agencies has the right to operate, 
maintain and manage the infrastructure to be concessioned, there are instances 
where the laws seem conflicting as to which authority has the power to do so. 
Some of these conflicting provisions are shown hereunder as follows: 
 
4.3.4.1 The Federal Airports Authority Act Vis-a-Vis the Federal Capital 
Development Authority Act 
 
The Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Act304 provides for the establishment of 
the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria. Section 1(3) of the Act provides that the 
Federal Airport Authority shall have the powers to operate and maintain all airports 
in Nigeria. Section 1 of the Act provides: 
“S.1 (3) As from the appointed day, there shall be transferred to the 
Authority all the Airports maintained by the Ministry pursuant to S.6 of the 
Civil Aviation Act and the Authority shall maintain and manage those 
airports and any other airport provided by the minister pursuant to that 
Act.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
304See S.1(1) of the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Act, CAP F5. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
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A community reading of the provisions of that section reveals that it is only the 
Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria that can grant concession in respect of 
construction, operation and maintenance of airports in Nigeria to any private 
sector. On the other hand, The Federal Capital Territory Act305 which provides that 
the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) shall have the powers to 
establish infrastructural services in accordance with its master plan and shall also 
have the powers to coordinate the activities of all ministries, departments and 
agencies of the Government of the Federation within the capital Territory.306 While 
the Federal Airport authority claimed that by virtue of the provision of S.1 (3) of 
the Federal Airport Authority Act, it is the only authority vested with the power to 
grant concession in respect of airports. On the other hand, the Federal Capital 
Development Authority also claimed that it is the only authority that can grant 
concession in respect of the MDA’s situated within the Federal Capital Territory.   
According to Professor Idornigie, the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport 
concession project was stalled because of the clear conflict as to which of these 
agencies of the Federal Government has the right to grant concession in respect of 
the Airport. While the Federal Airport authority claimed that by virtue of the 
provision of S.1 (3) of the Federal Airport Authority Act, it is the only authority 
invested with the power of granting concession. On the other hand, the Federal 
Capital Development Authority also claimed that it is the only authority that can 
grant concession in respect of the MDAs situated within the Federal Capital 
Territory.   
 
                                                          
305CAP. F6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010. 
306 See generally the provisions of S.4 of the Federal Capital Territory Act. 
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4.3.4.2 Federal Highways Act  
This Act vests the powers of management, direction and control of Federal 
Highways throughout Nigeria in the Minister of Works and Housing, in respect of 
planning (including research and designing of those highways), the construction 
and maintenance, the supervision of users of such highways and the regulation of 
the traffic thereon.307 The Act provides further that the Federal Government may in 
consultation with the State Government concerned acquire land for the purposes of 
construction of highways. Reference to land includes reference to a road other than 
a Federal Highway.308 
 
An important issue which will often lead to disagreement under concession 
contracts is the issue of compensation for land acquired for the construction of the 
Federal Highways.309 The Land Use Act provides that all the lands in a state are 
vested in the Governor of that state. So also, compensation shall be paid in respect 
of lands acquired for public purposes such as construction of Federal Highways. 
The question here is who pays the compensation? 
 
The Federal Highways Act provides that compensation shall be paid in accordance 
with the Land Use Act for lands acquired for construction of the Federal 
Highways.310The Land Use Act provides that compensation shall be paid by the 
State Governor of the state concerned for lands acquired for overriding public 
interest (either for the state or the Federal Government).311 However, in a situation 
where a state Government is not disposed to the construction of such Federal 
                                                          
307See the provision of S.1 of the Federal Highways Act , Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
308See S.3 (1) of the Federal Highways Act, LFN, 2010. 
309 See Section 1 of the Land Use Act 2010. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. 
310See S.3 (2) of the Federal Highways Act. 
311See S.29 of the Land Use Act, CAP L5, LFN, 2010. 
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Highways within that state, then payment of compensation for lands acquired by 
the government will be a problem and this will hinder the progress of PPP projects. 
 
4.4  The Private Sector Participants 
Public Private Partnership projects normally require a range of skills, 
professionalism expertise and resources which may not normally be found in a 
single company.  This is the reason why companies come together to form a 
consortium in order to execute the PPP project. All private participants (both local 
and international) in the bidding process must be commercial companies or 
partnerships operating under the relevant laws of their respective countries and in 
addition must possess the following: 
1. They must possess the legal capacity to enter into the concession 
contract;312 
2. The project proponent must possess the required professional and technical   
qualifications to carry out the contracts;313 
3. Shall  possess the financial capability to execute the contract;314 
4. Shall possess the equipment and other relevant materials to carry out the 
infrastructure development or maintenance;315 
5. Shall have adequate personnel to undertake and perform the obligations 
required under the contract;316 
6. Not be insolvent or bankrupt and must not be involved in any insolvency or 
bankruptcy proceedings, or the subject of any form of winding up petition 
or proceedings;317 
                                                          
312Sections 2(3) of the ICRC Act 2010 and  S.16 (6) (b) of the Public Procurement Act 2010. 
313See Section 16 (6) (a) (i) of the PPA 2010. 
314S.16 (6) (a) (ii) of the Public Procurement Act 2010. 
315S.16 (6) (a) (iii) of the PPA, 2010. 
316S.16 (6) (a) (iv) of the PPA, 2010. 
317S.16 (6) (c) of the PPA, 2010. 
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7. Must have paid all its taxes, pensions and other required social security 
contributions;318 
8. Must not have any director who has been convicted in any country for any 
criminal offence relating to fraud or financial impropriety or criminal 
misrepresentation or falsification of facts relating to any matter.319 
 
These are the legal requirements of a private company that intends to participate in 
project development through the PPPs in Nigeria. 
 
4.4.1 Constitutionality of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure in 
Nigeria 
 
It is important to mention that the legal framework for a sensitive development 
programme like Public-Private Partnerships must be in tandem with the 
constitution or other basic laws of the country. The constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 does not in any way mention the term, “Public-Private 
Partnerships”. However, Chapter II of the Constitution deals with the  Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy wherein the ‘Economic 
Objectives’ of the government are clearly stated. 
 
Section16 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides: 
(1) “The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for 
which provisions are made in this Constitution- 
(a) Harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity 
and an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy every citizen on the 
basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity; 
                                                          
318S.16 (6) (d) of the PPA, 2010. 
319S. 16(6) (e) of the PPA, 2010. 
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(b) Control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the 
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of 
social justice and equality of status and opportunity: 
(c) Without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the 
economy, other than the major sectors of the economy; 
(d) Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of 
the economy within the major sectors of the economy, protect the right of 
every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors 
of the economy.” 
 
Sub-section (4) thereof provides further as follows: 
“For the purpose of [section 16(1)]- 
(a) the reference to the ‘major sectors of the economy’ shall be construed 
as a reference to such economic activities as may, from time to time, be 
declared by a resolution of each House of the National Assembly to be 
managed and operated exclusively by the Government of The Federation; 
and until a resolution to the contrary is made by the National Assembly, 
economic activities being operated exclusively by the Government of the 
Federation on the date immediately preceding the day when this section 
came into force, whether directly or through the agency of a statutory or 
other corporation or company, shall be deemed to be major sectors of the 
economy; 
(b) ‘Economic activities’ includes activities directly concerned with the 
production, distribution and exchange of wealth or of goods and services; 
and; 
(c) ‘Participate’ includes the rendering of services and supplying of 
goods.” 
 
It is clear from the foregoing provisions of the constitution that the Nigerian state is 
constitutionally mandated to (a) ‘operate or participate in sectors of the economy 
other than the major sectors,’ and (b) ‘manage’ and ‘operate’ the major sectors of 
the economy. The statement that   Individuals may ‘participate’ in economic 
activities in any sectors means that private enterprises can be engaged in any sector 
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of the Nigerian economy.320 In addition, the state is positively obliged under 
section 16 (1) (d) to ‘protect the right of every citizen to engage in economic 
activities outside the major sectors of the economy.’ 
 
The above quoted provisions therefore give the government the right to continue to 
operate and manage the major sectors of the economy or to invite private 
enterprises to come forth and help the government in the provision, operation and 
management of the economic sector. 
 
The National Assembly acting pursuant to this and other provisions have therefore 
legislated to allow private enterprises to participate in the economic development 
of Nigeria. It follows therefore that by reason of the meaning of the word 
‘participate’, it goes without saying that the participation of core investors and 
other private individuals in major sectors of the economy has the ‘blessing’ of the 
Constitution. 
The right of the private sector to participate in the economic sector has also been 
given judicial recognition. In Attorney General of Lagos State v. Eko Hotels 
Limited (2006) 18 N.W.L.R.(Pt 1011) 378, 439-440, Paras H-A. The Supreme 
Court stated thus; 
“The facts of this case have once again brought to the fore the need for 
government to stay clear of operating business concerns as the government 
has the tendency to act in business as if it is acting in government. The 
government really has no business being in the running of a business and 
should allow the private sector to take over what rightly belongs to them. 
The government can however continue to hold shares, definitely not 
controlling shares of a purely business concern. This position is advised by 
the changes in the world economy, policies and ideology.”   
                                                          
320Iheme, “Legal Regulation of Privatisation in Nigeria”in Readings on Privatisation, Onyekpere, E. (ed.) (Lagos: 
SERI, 2003) 3. 
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The above quoted portion of the Supreme Court judgment unequivocally shows 
that because of the changes in the world economy, policies and ideology, it is 
better for the government to allow the private sector take its rightful place which is 
the running of business. Therefore, the right of the private sector to participate in 
the major sector of the Nigerian economy is now recognised. Further, in 
recognition of the role of the private sector to boost the infrastructure requirement 
of Nigeria, Dr. Mrs Ngozi Okonjo Iweala put it succinctly thus: 
“One thing we all agree on is that the government will never be able to 
raise the resources needed to close the infrastructure gap in Nigeria. 
Strong and sustainable PPPs…private sector with the public sector acting 
as regulator can help.”321 
 
It is therefore beyond argument that private sector participation in the provision of 
infrastructure is very crucial to the overall development of a nation.  
 
4.5 Basic Principles for Successful PPP Procurement in Nigeria 
There are some basic principles which must be examined in order to measure 
whether a particular PPP procurement is in line with best practices. These 
principles help to enthrone integrity in the procurement process. These are:   
 
4.5.1 Transparency and Openness 
Transparency and Openness are very cardinal to a successful Public Private 
Partnership contract. This is because of the variety of services involved in these 
contracts and the need to demonstrate value for money. It is crucial that the 
contract is understood and agreed upon by all the interested parties and the quality 
of information within it is properly publicised.322The principle of transparency 
                                                          
321 See Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria. Available at http://www.icrc.gov.ng/. Accessed on 15.08.13. 
322See  Why PFI Contracts need to be more transparent. Available at www.guardian.co.uk/local-government-
network/2012/jun/29/pfi-contracts-transparent.Accessed on 6th September, 2012. 
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focuses on the enthronement of accountability in the procurement process and that 
PPP procurement conforms to statutory provisions. The implication of this is that 
PPP procurement must follow a transparent procedure in all cases and at all times. 
 
In PPP procurement, transparency relates to openness and fairness in all the 
processes and stages involved in PPP procurement. Starting from the conception of 
the PPP project through planning, to the stage of the invitation of the project 
proponent to bid and even up to the award level; the Infrastructure Concession 
Commission and other procuring agencies shall exercise and display the highest 
level of transparency. Transparency in PPP procurement helps in eradicating 
corruption, coercion and collusive practices. In all PPP transactions, transparency 
and fiscal discipline must be safeguarded and the public authority should ensure 
that effective measures to enthrone transparency and accountability and combat 
corruption are put in place. 
In order to ensure more transparency, the Nigerian Parliament has passed the 
Freedom of Information Act which in May, 2011 with the aim of enthroning 
transparency, unearthing facts, battling corruption and holding public officials and 
institutions accountable in PPP procurement. The newly enacted FOI Act provides 
for the right of access to information held by government institutions 
notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in any other Act or law.  
 
Section 1 of the Act provides: 
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Act, law or 
regulation, the right of any person to access or request information, 
whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the custody or 
possession of any public official, agency or institution howsoever 
described, is established.   
  
152 
 
(2) An applicant under this Act needs not demonstrate any specific interest 
in the information being applied for.   
(3) Any person entitled to the right to information under this Act, shall have 
the right to institute proceedings in the Court to compel any public 
institution to comply with the provisions of this Act.”  
  
Further, an application for access to an official record can be made in any form 
(orally or in writing) and by any person (whether personally or through a third 
party). Such official to whom such application is made shall provide the required 
information within 7 days from the day the application was received.323 The Act 
also among others requires all government MDAs to proactively disclose basic 
information about their structure and processes and mandates them to build the 
capacity of their staff to effectively implement and comply with the provisions of 
the Act.324 
 
Also in the same vein, by the provision of S.2 (4) of the ICRC Act, the 
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission is required to publish the list of 
projects that are eligible to be undertaken under PPPs in at least three national 
newspapers having wide circulation in Nigeria, and such other means of 
circulation. Also the provisions referred to in S.16 of the Public Procurement 
Act325concerning the qualification and disqualification of such project proponents 
where appropriate must be contained in the notice or the standard forms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
323 See the Provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the FOI Act, 2011. 
324 Freedom of Information Act Signals Consolidation of Nigeria’s Democracy. Retrieved from 
http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=342&cntnt01origid=67&cnt
nt01returnid=122. Accessed on 28th Nov, 2012. 
325See LFN, 2010. 
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4.5.2 Open Competitive Bidding 
This is also one of the means of enthroning integrity in PPP procurement. Open 
competitive bidding will no doubt increase the participation of private sector in 
infrastructure development. It will further ensure that all unnecessary barriers are 
dismantled and business activities are subject to appropriate commercial pressures. 
Due to the complex nature of PPP projects, it is important for the contracting entity 
to have the freedom to choose the private partner who appears to be the best in 
terms of financial strength, professional qualifications, equal treatment of the users, 
ability to ensure the continuity of the service and quality of the proposal. 
 
The ICRC Act provides that the commission shall invite open and competitive 
public bid. 326 By this, it means that the Act gives room for the participation of 
more than one bidder. This will give room for the emergence of a bidder with the 
most technically and economically comprehensive bid.327 The open competitive 
bidding method has also been adopted by the Public Procurement Act as the 
primary method of bid solicitation for the procurement of goods and works 
including related services.328 The rationale for adopting this method as the 
principal method for soliciting bids from the public is that it presents the best 
process for adhering to the laid down objectives of public procurement as it relates 
to transparency, equality of opportunity, fairness, economy, competition and value 
for money.329 
 
A procurement bid under the open competitive bidding method may adopt the 
International Competitive Bidding method (ICB) or National Competitive Bidding 
Method (NCB). While International Competitive Bidding method connotes the 
                                                          
326See S.4(1) of the ICRC Act, 2005. 
327See S.4 (2) of the ICRC Act. 
328 See S.40 of the Public Procurement Regulations for Goods and Works. 
329 Oloworaran B. D. The Law and Practice of Public Procurement in Nigeria at Page 156. 
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solicitation of bids from both domestic and foreign contractors, National 
Competitive Bidding method on the other hand means the solicitation of bids from 
domestic contractors and project proponents registered or incorporated to carry on 
business under the Nigerian Laws.  
 
However, the Infrastructure Concession Act provides the circumstances where 
public bidding may not be necessary. These are: 
1. Where after the close of bidding, only one contractor submitted bid or 
proposal.330 
2. Where after the close of all bids and after examination of the bids 
submitted, only one contractor meets the prequalification requirements. 
Then in such a case, the concerned government institution may go ahead to 
undertake direct negotiation with the private company. 
3. Where there is an unsolicited proposal; - This is purely an initiative of the 
private sector concerning areas where it deems it is expedient for the 
government to award a concession contract. Since this is an initiative of the 
private sector, there may not be any need for competition unless the 
Commission deems it expedient. 
 
In some cases where technical specifications are made to bidders, bidders should 
be given the opportunity to submit tenders that contain and reflect the diversity of 
technical solutions so as to achieve a sufficient level of competition. Where 
technical specification is required, it should be drafted in such a way to avoid 
narrowing down competition through specifications that will favour a class of 
economic operator. Technical specifications are better drawn up in terms of 
                                                          
330See S.5(a) of the Act. 
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functional and performance requirements of the project. This is the only way 
through which innovation and better services can be achieved. 
 
4.5.3 Rules on Confidentiality  
Except otherwise provided, governments or contracting authorities are not entitled 
to disclose information forwarded to them by the economic operators which have 
been designated as confidential, including trade secrets and the confidential aspect 
of tender. The government or contracting authority may sometimes impose some 
requirements on the economic operators which are aimed at protecting the 
confidential information which the government or contracting authority makes 
available during the concession award procedure. 
 
Section 35 of the ICRC Act provides for the protection of information and trade 
secrets that are classified to be confidential and which are within the knowledge of 
the officials of the commission. Section 35 of the Act provides.  
“(1) a member of the Board, the Director-General or any other officer or 
employee shall- 
(a) not, for his personal gain, make use of any information which has come 
to his knowledge in the exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the 
ordinary course of his duty as a member of the Board or as the Director-
General, officer or employee of the Commission; 
(b) Treat as-confidential any information which has come to his knowledge 
in the exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the performance of his 
duties under this Act; 
(c) not disclose any information referred to under paragraph (b) of this 
subsection, except as required by law.” 
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The section further makes provision for punishment of whoever contravenes the 
provision of (1) above thus; 
“(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this 
section commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine of not 
less than N50,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to 
both such fine and imprisonment.” 
 
4.5.4 Unsolicited Proposals 
An unsolicited proposal means a written proposal for a new or innovative idea that 
is submitted to the Ministries, Departments or Agencies of the government on the 
initiative of the private sector for the purpose of getting a concession contract from 
the Government. This proposal is not made in response to any request for proposals 
from the government. This is purely an initiative of the private sector concerning 
areas where it deems it is expedient for the government to award a concession 
contract.  Unsolicited proposals may result from the identification by the private 
sector of an infrastructure need that may be met by a privately financed project. 
They may also involve innovative proposals for infrastructure management and 
offer the potential for transfer of new technology to the host country. 
 
There are some sectors that require huge amount of money in order to develop the 
infrastructure such as electricity generation, unsolicited proposals is much 
encouraged since the Federal Government intends to develop a market for 
electricity supply in the country. However, in other sectors that do not require such 
huge amount and extra-ordinary technicalities, the MDAs should generally identify 
their priorities for investment through the planning process set out in the PPP 
Policy Statement. 
  
157 
 
4.6 Procedure for the Award of Concessions 
Basically, the contracting authorities normally indicate either in the contract notice 
or in the concession documents a detailed description of the minimum 
requirements to be met by the project proponent. All these information will enable 
the private party to decide whether to participate in the award procedure or not. 
Concession contracts shall be awarded to the private proponent on the basis of the 
criteria set out by the contracting authority and the relevant enabling laws.331The 
tender must comply with all the requirements, conditions and criteria laid down in 
the concession notice or in the invitation to confirm interest and in the concession 
award documents. 
In Nigeria, the following cumulative procedures must be followed in awarding 
concession to a private partner: 
1. Any Federal Government ministry or agency who wishes to award any 
concession contract in its ministry or agency must first of all prioritise its 
infrastructure projects in order of their importance to national 
development.332 
2. After the relevant ministry has prioritised such infrastructure projects and 
before entering into any contract with any private proponent, the list of the 
projects will be sent to the Federal Executive Council for approval on the 
recommendation of the relevant sector, ministry or agency. 333 
 
3. The procurement process formally starts with the advertisement in at least 
three national newspapers having wide circulation in Nigeria.334  The notice 
                                                          
331Other enabling laws like the Public Procurement Act, Fiscal Responsibilities Act, the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
and other enabling laws. 
332See Section 2(1) of the ICRC Act. 
333See Section 2(2) of the ICRC Act. 
334See S. 4(1) of the ICRC Act. 
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will invite bidders to submit Expressions of Interest for inclusion on a short 
list of private parties invited to bid for the project.   
 
4. The bid documents shall provide all the necessary information to the 
bidders. These shall include the invitation to bid; Form and conditions of 
contract; Specific instructions to bidders; Technical specifications; Bills of 
Quantities and Drawings; Bill of Engineering Measurements and 
Evaluation; Delivery of time or schedule of completion; Schedule of Prices 
and other necessary appendices, including forms for pro forma Bid Bonds 
and performance guarantee.335 
 
5. There is the need to organize a bidders’ conference before the deadline for 
bidding expires, to provide further background (including possibly a site 
visit) and to show the authority’s commitment to the project.  These 
conferences may provide an opportunity for firms to identify viable 
potential bidding partners or advisers.  
 
6. After the closure of the submission of bids by the project proponents, the 
Commission will then set up a committee to rigorously evaluate the 
different kinds of interests already expressed.  
 
7. The Prequalification Document will provide more information on the 
proposed risk allocation for the project and the criteria against which 
tenderers will be prequalified and, ultimately, the contract awarded.  The 
                                                          
335See 120 (a-k) of the Public Procurement Act- Subsidy legislation, CAP 44, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
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Procurement Procedures Manual provides further information on both the 
criteria for selection and the contents of the Prequalification Document.336 
 
8. Where the evaluation committee has shortlisted the list of the qualified 
bidders, the criteria and the procedure for such short listing should be made 
known to the public.  
 
9. In contracts concerning purchase of most works or goods, it is required that 
the lowest priced bid against a common specification or requirement is the 
most ideal and appropriate way of maximizing the overall benefit to the 
public. However, for contracts involving services and some works projects, 
quality and price should both be taken into consideration in choosing the 
winner of the bid.  This is because; Value for money is the criterion that 
should be applied to determine the evaluation of bids and the award of 
concession contracts. 
10. Also, during the concession award process, contracting authorities should 
ensure that all bidders or potential bidders have equal access to the same 
level of information. They should not provide information in a 
discriminatory manner which may put other bidders at a disadvantaged 
position. 
 
11. It is also very cardinal to have a consultation with the private sector as part 
of project preparation process.  The purpose of this consultation is be to 
ensure that the private sector has the capacity required to meet the range of 
services required  and, in the case of investors, the willingness to finance 
                                                          
336See the Public Procurement Manuals. 
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the investment.  The consultation may be structured and formal or 
conducted through informal contact. This task is to be performed by the 
PPP Resource Centre which is the body mandated to communicate with the 
private sector and advertise and also advertise the concession bidding 
opportunities to the general public.  
 
12. The Bureau of Public Procurement, having satisfied that a private 
proponent that met all the conditions stipulated by the law and in the 
bidding document would then issue a certificate of “No Objection” before 
the concession will be finally ratified by the Federal Executive Council.337 
 
4.7 Contract Close 
The procurement process will be brought to an end after the final evaluation of 
either the initial tenders or Best and Final Offers from at least two of the bidders. 
This will identify the “most technically and economically comprehensive bid” 
and the pricing and other technical information it contains will form part of the 
information included in the Full Business Case submitted to the Federal Executive 
Council for approval.  This Federal Government approval signals the end of the 
procurement process.338 The documents to be submitted to the Federal Government 
for approval will define the affordability and value for money required for the 
project, as well as the limits of any Federal Government support or 
guarantee.339Once these have been done and provided the negotiations are still 
within the terms agreed upon, then the Accounting Officer of the relevant 
                                                          
337See S.16 of the Public Procurement Act. 
338 See the provision of S.2(2) of the ICRC Act which provides that all projects for concessions must be approved by the 
Federal Executive Council after the recommendation by the relevant Ministries, Departments or agencies concerned. 
339See S.3 of the ICRC Act which provides that no Federal Government Ministries, Departments or agencies shall give any 
guarantee, letter of comfort  or undertakings in respect of any concession except it has been approved by the Federal 
Executive Council. 
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Ministries, Department or Agency will have authority to sign the PPP contract or 
concession. 
 
In most cases during this stage, the Preferred Bidder may decide to commission 
some advance design or mobilisation work and the authority has the responsibility 
to ensure that the process of gaining legal access is completed.  Nevertheless the 
period between appointing a Preferred Bidder and reaching financial close may 
take several months.  During this time, the Authority will usually retain the option 
of reverting to the second placed bidder if an agreement can no longer be reached 
with the Preferred Bidder.340 
 
4.8  Duration of Concessions 
There is no specific time mentioned in the Act for the duration of concessions in 
Nigeria. However, most of the infrastructure concession contracts in Nigeria are 
normally for a period of 25 years.341 Various factors influence the term or duration 
of the concession agreement. These include but not limited to the type of 
investment envisaged, the period it will take to recoup such investment and general 
government policies. S. 6 of the ICRC Act provides: 
“The duration of any concession shall be as may be specified in the 
agreement or contract governing the concession.” 
 
Both the MMA II and the Lagos-Ibadan expressway concession agreements 
stipulated 4 years gestation period and concession duration of 25 years so that the 
investors would have been able to recoup their monies. The agreement should 
include a consideration for the possibility of renewal of the contract and the 
Transition Period. There may also be need to re-negotiate or negotiate for early 
                                                          
340See S.4(3) of the ICRC ACT. 
341 Both the MMA II Airport concession and the Lagos Ibadan Expressway concession were granted for a period of 25 years.  
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cancellation of the contract. Thus, the contract can provide for several cases for 
early cancellation, for instance, there may be a provision that the contract can be 
cancelled due to interference by the State or early cancellation on mutual 
understanding.342 Such provisions may also include automatic cancellation in the 
event of dissolution, force majeure or liquidation or it may be at the instance of the 
State in the event of a serious breach of obligations.  
 
4.9  Participation by Foreign Companies 
In Nigeria, where an alien or a foreign company is interested in participating in the 
development of infrastructure through PPPs, such a person or company will have to 
first join in the formation of a company in Nigeria. Such company must comply 
with all enactments regulating their rights and capacities to undertake or participate 
in trade or business in Nigeria. A foreigner or foreign company must first take 
steps in order to get the company incorporated as a separate legal entity in 
compliance with the relevant legislations and until such company is incorporated, it 
cannot carry on business in Nigeria. Such a foreign company may however be 
allowed a place of business only for receipt of notices and other documents as 
matters preliminary to incorporation.343  
 
A foreign company may also freely invest and participate in the operation of any 
enterprise in Nigeria except petroleum enterprises and enterprises in the “Negative 
List”. The alien may operate alone or in joint venture with a Nigerian by means of 
a company which must first of all be registered by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and thereafter registered with the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission (NIPC). 
                                                          
342 Paul Obo Idornigie, Designing, Negotiating And Drafting of Concession Contracts. Retrieved from 
http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/commercial%20law/DESIGNING,NEGOTIATING%20&%20DRAFTING%20OF
%20CONCESSION%20CONTRACTS.pdf. Accessed on 09.12.12. 
343 See S.54 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, LFN 2010. 
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However, by the provision of S.55 of CAMA, a foreign company may apply to the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for exemption from the provisions of 
S.54 of the Act if that foreign company belongs to one of the following categories, 
that is: 
(a) “Foreign companies (other than those specified in paragraph (d) of 
this subsection) invited to Nigeria by or with the approval of the 
Federal Government to execute any specified individual project;  
(b) Foreign companies which are in Nigeria for the execution of specific 
individual loan projects on behalf of a donor country or international 
organization; 
(c) Foreign government-owned companies engaged solely in export 
promotion    activities; and 
(d) Engineering consultants and technical experts engaged on any 
individual and specialist project under contract with any of the 
governments in the Federation or any of their agencies or with any 
other body or person, where such contract has been approved by the 
Federal Government.” 
 
It follows from the above provisions that such companies invited into Nigeria to 
provide financing, engineering and technical experts may be exempted from full 
registration with the relevant agencies prior to their engagement in infrastructure 
development projects in Nigeria. 
 
4.9.1  Exempted Foreign Company to Have the Status of Unregistered 
Company 
A foreign company exempted pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall have the 
status of an unregistered company and accordingly, the provisions of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act applicable to an unregistered company shall 
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apply in relation to such an exempted company as they apply in relation to an 
unregistered company.344 
 
According to Professor M.M. Akanbi345an alien or foreign company that intends to 
participate in the formation of companies or business in Nigeria must familiarize 
him/itself with the following laws: 
(1) Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree No. 16 of 1995;  
(2) The Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 
17 of 1995 
(3) Investment and securities Act No. 45 of 2010. 
(4) Immigration Act Cap 171 LFN 2010. 
(5) Industrial Inspectorate Act 180 LFN 2010 
(6) National Office of Technology Acquisition and Promotion Act Cap 268 LFN 
2010. 
(7) The Companies and Allied matters Act cap 59 LFN 2010. 
(8) Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission Establishment Act, 
2005.” 
 
4.10  Dispute Resolution in PPP Contracts in Nigeria  
The legal framework for the settlement of dispute is an important consideration in 
the implementation of the PPP projects. Parties especially the private partners will 
feel safer and will be more willing to participate in the projects when there is the 
guarantee that disputes between/among the parties can be resolved fairly and 
efficiently.346 Disputes may arise in all phases of the PPP projects, namely, 
                                                          
344 See S. 58 of CAMA. 
345 Being an interview granted at the Faculty of Law, University of Ilorin, Nigeria on 10.06.12. 
346 United Nations ESCAP, A Guidebook on Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure, (United Nations, Bangkok) 2011, 
Pg 74. 
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construction, operation and even at the stage of final handing over to the public 
authority. 
 
The legal framework for dispute resolution may be found in a number of statutes 
and different rules and procedures in the country concerned.347 The legal 
instrument may include tax law, competition law, consumer protection law, laws 
relating to public procurement, company law, property law, Arbitration and 
Conciliation law, foreign investment law, acquisition and appropriation law and 
various other relevant statutes which can aid in the resolution of disputes between 
or among the parties.  
 
It is important that the settlement mechanisms considered in the contract agreement 
are in line with the international best practices, particularly when large-scale 
investments from foreign private partners are involved. The commonly used 
dispute resolution methods include: facilitated negotiation, conciliation and 
mediation, adjudication by regulatory authority, arbitration and legal proceedings. 
Of all these methods, legal proceedings are the most unsuitable for settling disputes 
arising from PPP arrangement except in extreme circumstances.348 
 
The contractual relationships of PPP arrangements suggest that parties to the 
agreement will be involved in performing various roles in the execution of the 
project. Undoubtedly, this situation will create a changing and dynamic 
environment. Further to this, uncertainty of contract terms and the bearing of risk 
will create disputes. Irrespective of the degree of complexity of the contractual 
structures, there are four major identifiable levels of dispute which SPV partners 
                                                          
347 In Nigeria for example, the main law on dispute resolution is the Arbitration and Concilliation Act and also most of the 
agreements contain clauses on arbitration which are intended to govern the particular transaction. 
348 This is because litigation is time consuming, costly and neither of the parties may even be satisfied with the outcome of 
the proceedings. 
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may likely be faced with. These are: upstream, intra-parties, downstream and third-
party disputes.349 
 
Upstream disputes are those disputes between the private sector and the public 
authority/government. These may involve unilateral actions of the government 
which may likely affect the policy or the legal and regulatory framework i.e. the 
issuance of ministerial decisions which results in project cancellations and 
variations. This change will impact upon the consistency of the PPP network of 
contracts: it will cause the project company to restructure the downstream 
substantive contracts, as well as its loan agreements with third-party financiers. 
 
The second type, the Intra-parties disputes are the ones which relate to the project 
performance agreement. Partners may disagree over each partner’s financial 
contributions to the financing of the SPV, or, one partner may go insolvent, and the 
financial burden falls in the arms of the remaining partners. 350 Downstream 
disputes occur from defaults of contractors, e.g. where sectional completion is not 
certified for reasons of contractors using materials that are substandard or the ones 
different from the ones specified in the contracts. 
 
Risks in the PPP scheme may occur by actions of third parties to the scheme. 
Financiers often resort to overburdened unilateral change of interest rates affecting 
the process of repayment loans. This financial reform brings along a specific risk: 
Refinancing the project will amount to pursuance of further deals which may be 
negotiated on much more burdened terms than the previous agreements. Clearly, 
time overruns will amount to lower levels of profitability, as returns will be at less 
                                                          
349 Dimitrious Athanasakis, Effective Dispute Regimes for Large Infrastructure Projects in Greece; Being a paper delivered 
at the 3rd Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on 14th & 15th June, 2007. 
350 Ibid. 
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percentages and start at a later stage. Whatever the level of disputes, these will 
have a domino effect upon the progress of the parties’ contracts and lead to some 
interfacing level of liability. But, there is a common decisional thread: the 
determination of causation and liability.  
 
Therefore, the existence of a viable and adequate legal basis for the settlement of 
these disputes likely to arise in PPP contracts is inevitability in the effective 
implementation of PPP projects. Private parties (including the concessionaire, 
financiers and contractors) feel encouraged to participate in PPP projects when 
they have confidence that any dispute arising between/ among the contracting 
authority or other governmental agencies and the concessionaire; or between the 
private parties themselves can be resolved fairly and efficiently without wasting 
time. 
 
Each PPP contract in Nigeria usually provides for the acceptable modes of settling 
disputes which must, of course, not be antithetical or obnoxious to the allowed 
dispute resolution system under the legal framework of the concerned country.  
The commonly used methods for dispute resolution in PPP contracts include 
facilitated negotiation, conciliation and mediation, non-binding expert appraisal, 
review of technical disputes by independent experts, arbitration, and legal 
proceedings.351 
 
Even though most dispute resolution clauses often start with negotiation, as far as 
Nigerian court is concerned, an agreement to negotiate between the parties is 
                                                          
351 Peter Sheridan: PPP In-depth: PFI/PPP Disputes at p. 1 retrieved from 
http://www.sheridangold.co.uk/articles/pfi_ppp_disputes.pdf. Accessed on 15.03.13.Page 72. 
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unenforceable as it is void for uncertainty.352 The only advantage of negotiation is 
that it is believed that tiered dispute resolution provisions (which include 
negotiation) assist in providing parties with flexibility to try and resolve low value 
or less important problems/ disputes more swiftly and with lower costs and 
management time than those common under more traditional forms of contract.353  
Additionally, the pressures created by the security package required by the lenders 
and banks frequently act as a stimulus to settlement or early resolution of disputes 
using negotiation. Its failure is however those parties are not legally bound by it 
and as such if either of the parties is discontented with the outcome of the 
negotiation, the fact that the contract provides for an agreement to negotiate cannot 
stop such party from approaching the court. 
 
Mediation is another dispute resolution option. The only difference between 
negotiation and mediation is the involvement of an independent third party known 
as a mediator. A mediator is a person called to assist the parties in concluding a 
settlement which may or may not be binding on the parties. Mediation is therefore 
an advanced negotiation. The effect of a mediation clause in PPP contract is not 
significantly different from that of a negotiation clause. The determining factor lies 
in the existence or otherwise of a special procedure to be followed in carrying out 
negotiation.  
 
In mediation, the main objective is to resolve the differences between the parties 
through a negotiated agreement. The mediator does not have the authority to make 
a binding decision on the parties.354 The only situation where such decision would 
be binding is where all the parties have agreed to such outcome. This is because, 
                                                          
352 Ibid. 
353 Peter Sheridan, op cit. 
354 H Brown and A Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice 2nd Edition,( Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at Page 129. 
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the mediator has no authority or power except the one given to him by the parties 
involved.  If any of the parties withdraws the authority or power so given, that ends 
the mediation process. Therefore, if the parties are unable to settle their dispute 
through this means, they will be at liberty to have their issues dealt with in another 
way. It is as a result of this that mediation may not be suitable for disputes 
involving big commercial transactions like PPP contracts because either of the 
parties may decide to opt out of the mediation process if he or she thinks that the 
outcome may not be favourable. 
 
Where a contract provides for mediation as a means of resolving disputes without 
specifying a procedure to be followed, such mediation clause will have the same 
effect as a negotiation clause. On the other hand, where the parties have not only 
agreed to negotiate in good faith (assisted by a mediator) but have gone further to 
identify a particular procedure (such as the CEDR355 mediation procedure), the 
effect will be different. In the latter case, there will be a sufficient certainty for a 
court to ascertain whether the parties’ obligations have been complied with or 
not.356 
 
This distinction is pivotal in that where there is a clear procedure as opposed 
simply to an agreement to negotiate with no specific procedure; the court can 
investigate and see whether the specific steps the parties agreed to take have or 
have not been undertaken. Be that as it may, since a mediation is conducted on a 
without prejudice basis, if the parties are not successful in concluding a settlement, 
the mediation will be of no effect and cannot be referred to in a court action. 
 
                                                          
355 This means Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution. 
356 See Cable & Wireless Plc V. IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm), [2003] B.L.R. 89. 
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From the above cursory examination of both negotiation and mediation, it is 
obvious that they are both ridden with problems which go a long way to puncture a 
hole in their appropriateness to resolving PPP disputes. Litigation is equally not 
apposite for its time-wasting and cost-gulping propensity. Owing to this, the need 
to consider other viable options, such as arbitration, becomes necessary. The 
usefulness and effectiveness of arbitration vis-à-vis PPP dispute resolution is 
considered below. 
 
4.10.1 Resolving PPP Disputes through Arbitration 
The Nigerian ICRC Act which is the principal law that governs PPP contracts in 
Nigeria does not extensively provide for how dispute arising from the contract will 
be resolved. It only states thus:  
“No agreement reached in respect of this Act shall be arbitrarily 
suspended, stopped, cancelled or changed except in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act.’’357 
 
It is worthy of note that there is nowhere in the Act where the procedure of 
settlement of disputes has been mentioned. Recourse would therefore be made to 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act358 in the resolution of disputes arising from 
PPP contracts in Nigeria. 
 
Arbitration is a mechanism whereby two or more parties agree that their dispute 
will be decided confidentially by an independent tribunal. To be binding, it is a 
requirement of the law that the parties must agree that the dispute will be resolved 
by arbitration. Parties are also at liberty to include any specific requirement they 
deem fit within the agreement to arbitrate. For instance, the parties may agree that 
                                                          
357 S.11 of the ICRC Act, 2005. 
358 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap 19, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
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the dispute is to be determined by a single arbitrator, by a panel of three arbitrators 
or indeed fifteen arbitrators359. It is also within the exclusive discretion of the 
parties to specify the procedural rules to be applicable, the national law to be used, 
the language of arbitration360 and even the country in which the arbitration is to be 
held.361 
 
That arbitration provides a veritable platform for resolving emerging disputes in 
PPP is a widely conceded fact as shown in its global application in PPP dispute 
resolution. Its advantages are well documented and all this further underscores its 
appropriateness to PPP disputes.362 For instance, one of the numerous advantages 
of arbitration is the ability of parties to have their disputes determined by an 
arbitrator knowledgeable in a relevant specialist area. This will go a long way in 
ensuring quick disposition of cases before the arbitral Tribunal; more so when PPP 
projects encapsulate multifarious technical and specialised subjects. By so doing, 
the parties will not need to spend so much time “educating” the arbitrator upon a 
particular specialised area; compared with a court which may have no experience 
in such area and may need considerable assistance from the parties. Invariably, the 
dispute is resolved more quickly and at a lower cost than equivalent court 
proceedings thereby bringing to the fore another invaluable advantages of 
arbitration (time saving and low cost). 
 
The fact that a huge sum of money is often committed to PPP projects makes 
litigation undesirable. For example, the MMA2 project gulped a whopping sum of 
N20 billion. When some government agencies flout the contractual terms of the 
                                                          
359 See Section 6, ACA 2004. 
360 See Section 18, ACA LFN 2004. 
361 See Section 16, ACA LFN 2004. 
362 M.T. Adekilekun, O. A. Olatunji, C.C Gan and M.M Akanbi, ‘ Public-Private Partnership Initiative in Nigeria and its 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: An Appraisal, (2013) JMCL Vol. 40, 67-86. 
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agreement between the FG and BCSL, the latter had to engage in extensive 
negotiations to resolve the issue not because its rights have not been violated but 
because of the fear of protracted litigation that may ensue if those rights are to be 
pursued in a court of law.363 
 
Another feature of arbitration that makes it apt for PPP disputes is that the award 
issued by an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal is both binding and final, and may be 
enforced through the court.364 Even though the fact that the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act365 allows for the setting aside of arbitral awards may appear to 
pose some irreconcilable drawback, upon closer perusal of the provisions of the 
Act, however this is not in any way a problem. That law specifically provides for 
when an arbitral award can be set aside in the following words:  
“A party who is aggrieved by an arbitral award may within 3 months by 
way of an application for setting aside, request the court to set aside the 
award in accordance with subsection 2 of this section.”366  
 
By that subsection, the court will only intervene to set aside an arbitral award on 
the proof of the party making the application that the award contains decisions on 
matters which are beyond the scope of submission to arbitration.367 Even where 
this is the case, in order to prohibit facetious complaint against arbitral awards the 
subsection further provides that only the part of the award which contains decisions 
on matters not submitted to the tribunal may be set aside.368 
 
                                                          
363 See the Presentation by Wale Babalakin, op cit. 
364 See Section 31, ACA LFN 2004. 
365 Cap 19, LFN, 2004. 
366 See Section 29(1) ACA, LFN 2004. 
367 See Section 29(2) ACA, LFN 2004. 
368 Ibid. 
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The above provision, no doubt, goes a long way in limiting the influence of the 
court in off-setting arbitral awards and in discouraging parties from approaching 
the court for setting aside of such awards since proof is required. This makes it 
more appropriate to PPP disputes where parties cannot afford the luxury of time 
wasting. 
 
In other climes, in recognition of the over-burdening effects of risks on the 
concessionaire, there are statutory provisions making the inclusion of arbitration 
clause in PPP contracts a non-negotiable. In Greece, for instance, any dispute 
regarding the implementation, interpretation or status of a PPP contract or ancillary 
agreement is settled exclusively by means of arbitration.  In addition, the arbitration 
decision is final, irrevocable, not subject to appeal and is a legally executable 
title.369 In Russia, the Concession Law clearly allows the inclusion of arbitration 
clauses providing for dispute resolution by arbitration tribunal or international 
commercial arbitration. 
 
Provisions such as these are essential to checkmate what may at times be the 
excesses of the government. Since the government knows that the concessionaire 
will usually be unwilling to go to court because of fear of time-wasting, and in the 
absence of arbitration clause in such contract, government tends to contravene the 
contractual terms with impunity.  
 
 
 
                                                          
369 Article 31(2) of the Greece PPP Law. 
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Added to the above is the fact that PPP projects are capital-intensive with most part 
of the risks involved being shouldered by the concessionaire who is expected to 
build, design, operate and then transfer the project within the stipulated number of 
years. The concessionaire undertakes the operational risk, construction risk, 
commercial risk, and other forms of risks and therefore deserves to be protected 
against protracted litigation which may delay the recoupment of his invested 
loaned capital and prejudice his profit. The only available effective insulation to 
the concessionaire is the inclusion of arbitration clause in PPP contracts.  
 
4.10.2  Implication of Arbitral Clauses in PPP Contracts in Nigeria 
The implication of arbitral clauses in PPP contracts in Nigeria is that such 
provision suspends the jurisdiction of the court pending the conclusion of 
arbitration. This would apply only in a situation where the issue is raised before the 
defendant takes any step in the matter. An application seeking a stay of 
proceedings in the matter to enable parties to arbitrate is not granted as a matter of 
course. For such an application to be granted, the applicant must have taken no step 
in the proceedings.370 
 
S.5 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides; 
“If any party to an arbitration agreement commences any action in any 
court with respect to any matter which is the subject of any arbitration 
agreement may, at any time after appearance and before delivering any 
pleading or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to court to stay 
the proceedings”.  
 
                                                          
370 See Kano State Urban Development Board V. Fanz Construction Co. Ltd. (1990) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt 142) 1. 
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The above stated principle has also been given judicial recognition in the case of 
Enyelike V. Ogoloma & Ors (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1107) @ page 247. 
 
4.11 Termination of Concession Contracts 
The ICRC Act 2005 is silent on the termination of PPP agreement. However, as 
stated earlier in this research work, provisions relating to termination will be 
contained in the agreement between the parties. Such agreement must state the 
circumstances where termination is allowed and reasons for such termination.  
Thus, the contract can provide for several cases for early cancellation/ termination. 
For instance, the agreement may contain a provision for early termination by 
mutual understanding. However, whatever the case may be, there should be 
provision to the effect that no contract shall be arbitrarily terminated by any of the 
parties. 
 
Nigeria has a history of arbitrary termination of contract. In November 2012, the 
Federal Government of Nigeria announced its decision to revoke the N89.53Billion 
Concession of Lagos/Ibadan expressway awarded to Bi-Courtney Consortium 
since May 26, 2009 on grounds of what it described as serial breaches of the 
concession agreement by the construction firm, specifically its failure to meet up 
with the financial close agreed upon.371 
 
The Minister of Works, Architect Mike Onolememen while briefing the newsmen 
on the termination stated thus; 
 
                                                          
371See “Federal Government revokes Lagos/Ibadan Express way”. Retrieved from  http://scannewsnigeria.com/news/fg-
revokes-concession-of-lagosibadan-expressway/. Accessed on 20.11.12. 
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“The Federal Government today, terminated the concession of the Lagos-
Ibadan expressway granted to Bi-Courtney Consortium on 8th May, 2009, 
the concession agreement of which was signed by the parties on 26th May, 
2009. The termination of the concession is consequent on the serial 
breaches of the concession agreement by Bi-Courtney Consortium and 
especially the failure of the company to reach financial close as provided 
for in the agreement.” 
 
“The federal government wishes to assure that while it will continue to 
uphold the sanctity of contracts entered into by the federal government, it 
will not shy away from implementing provisions of contract agreements 
dealing with non-performance on the part of the contracting party”. 
 
On the legal implication of terminating the contract, the Minister for works said;  
“The legal implications of this termination have been carefully considered 
by both the Federal Ministry of Works and indeed the Federal Government. 
If you recall we have been on this issue for quite sometime now and we 
have meticulously followed the concession agreement. We have complied 
fully with the provisions of this agreement. We have had cause even in the 
past to write the concessioner to detail the breaches which it had committed 
in this agreement in this particular transaction and we have also followed 
the minimum and maximum number of days the contractor was expected to 
remedy the situation but failing which the Federal Government had no 
alternative but to take this course of action” 
 
 “For your information under this concession the construction period is 
supposed to last for four years and the four years will come to a close in 
about six months’ time and right now there is nothing on ground to suggest 
that the company is capable” 
 
On the likelihood of refunding the money spent on the project by Bi-Courtney, the 
Federal Government has said that there is no such plan because the firm did not 
keep to the terms of the agreement.  
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However, Bi-Courtney has instituted an action at the Federal High Court for 
unlawful termination of the contract. The company stated that as at the time the 
contract was terminated, the Federal Government had no right to do so and thereby 
claiming that it has spent over N3 Billion on the road since 2009.372 According to 
Mr Oshobi of Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited,373 he stated thus:  
“If a project is supposedly not being well-executed, the appropriate thing is 
for the government to go to an arbitration panel and take up issues with the 
erring firm. What they have done now is to use executive fiat without 
consultations with Bi-Courtney Consortium to cancel the concession. This 
is never done anywhere in the world. This kind of attitude might scare away 
foreign investors.” 
 
The above stated fact signals that PPP contracts are being terminated with impunity 
in Nigeria. Before a party can terminate such a contract, there must have been a 
material breach of the contract by the other party and this, must have been 
communicated to the party in default. Also, the innocent party must ensure that it 
has complied with what is required of him by this Act and other relevant agreement 
before his decision to terminate the contract. 
 
4.12  Challenges Facing PPPs in Nigeria 
There are so many challenges facing PPPs in Nigeria. For ease of explanation, 
these will be discussed under the following: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
372 See Bi-Courtney to Contest Contract Cancellation. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/news/bi-courtney-to-
contest-contract-cancellation-2/. Accesses on 26.11.12. 
373 Being an interview granted by Mr. Oshobi of Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited at the office at Afribank Street, Lagos Nigeria 
on 30.11.12. 
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4.12.1 Cultural Issues 
4.12.1.1 Resistance from the Civil Service 
Public-Private Partnerships are meant to be partnerships between the public and 
private sector in which responsibilities, risks and obligations are shared between 
the two in the most optimal way, to guarantee the highest benefit to the public. 
Unfortunately in Nigeria, the average civil servant tends to perceive the private 
sector concessionaire as the enemy that wants to deprive him of his job, relevance 
and income. The tendency is therefore to treat the Concessionaire as an adversary 
that must be overcome and run down at all costs. 
 
According to Dr. Wale Babalakin SAN, 374the resistance occurs in various ways, 
one example is the insistence on carrying out functions or charging fees from 
projects that have already been concesssioned to the Concessionaire. For instance 
in Murtala Muhammed Airport II built through PPP in Lagos State, the regulator 
continued to charge fees for the delivery of aviation fuel to aircrafts operating from 
MMA II, a fee that should rightfully accrue to the  Concessionaire under the 
Concession Agreement. The Concessionaire has had to engage in extensive 
negotiations to resolve this issue. 
 
4.12.1.2 Negative Perception from the General Public 
The average Nigerian is still very suspicious of PPPs and believes it is a means of 
transferring the commonwealth of the nation to the favoured friends and cronies of 
the government in power. For instance, it is strange but true that till date most 
Nigerians believes that the Federal Government awarded a contract to the 
Concessionaire to construct the MMA II from which the Concessionaire made a 
                                                          
374 See the lecture delivered by Dr.Wale Babalakin at the Faculty of law 2009. 
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handsome profit and in addition won the right to operate the airport which is a gold 
mine. 
 
According to Mr. Oshobi, the reality is that the Concessionaire invested in excess 
of N10 billion in equity and incurred debt in excess of N20 billion at double digit 
interest rates to complete the project. Solely at the initiative of the Concessionaire, 
the project was constructed to a standard that far exceeded what the government 
planned when it invited bids for the construction of Airport with the attended costs.  
 
4.12.1.3 Resistance from Staff Unions 
This is similar to the challenges faced with the civil service which constitute the 
staff union. The difference is that instead of using the regulatory functions, the 
union puts pressure on the government and the regulating agencies through union 
activities. For instance, the Concessionaire of MMA II has been prevented by the 
activities of the staff union from taking possession of a piece of land adjoining the 
airport which is paid for at a rate beyond its market value and for which it has an 
executed lease agreement. The land is intended to improve the facilities at the 
airport. The excuse was that the land was administratively allotted to the union in 
1978. 
 
In spite of the fact that the union has not been able to develop the land for the 
purpose for which it was allotted for a period of more than 30 years, and the fact 
that the Concessionaire, without prejudice to its legal rights, has offered to develop 
the required facility at its own expense on a nearby plot of land within the precincts 
of the airport complex, the staff union has refused to budge. Therefore in some 
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cases, the pressure from staff union could also be a challenge to the smooth 
operation of PPP agreements. 
 
4.12.1.4 Failure to Honour Contractual Agreements 
This is the most important challenge which the private sector is facing as regards 
the implementation of PPP contracts in Nigeria. An average public servant belief 
that government is not bound to honour its contractual obligations or that the 
government can unilaterally rescind contracts it voluntarily entered into after the 
counter-party has altered its position. Disregard for contractual obligations has 
been a re-occurring issue on concession contracts in Nigeria. For example, in the 
MMA II project, the most notable insistence is the failure or refusal of the Ministry 
of Aviation (the regulator agency) to perform its obligation to ensure that all 
schedule domestic flight into or out of Lagos State is operated from MMA II.  
 
Two Airlines refused to relocate their schedule domestic flight operation to MMA 
II and the regulators condoned their recalcitrant behavior until one of them was 
eventually forced to re-locate after 2 (two) years of its operations. The other airline 
is still permitted to operate its scheduled domestic flights to Lagos State from the 
international wing of the airport. The flagrant refusal of the regulators to compel 
these airlines to relocate their operation to MMA II has had a significant negative 
impact on the revenue profile of the Concessionaire. Revenue expected from leases 
and advertisements have gone down due to the low traffic of passengers. 
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In 2012, the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) inaugurated the General 
Aviation Terminal (GAT) which is in violation of the concession agreement 
entered into between the Federal Government of Nigeria and Bi-Courtney Aviation 
Services Limited. The concession agreement had given the exclusive right to house 
all domestic operations in Lagos State to Bi-Courteney Aviation Services Limited. 
However, the Minister of Aviation, Mrs Stella Oduah, had claimed that the newly 
reconstructed GAT does not belong to Bi Courtney Aviation Limited.375 
 
Industry analyst and the Managing Director of Zenith Travels lamented the sorry 
state affairs and cautioned the government to avoid scaring away investors from 
the sector. He stated unequivocally thus: 
“I congratulate government for GAT but we need to look forward on 
sustainability which can only be achieved through PPP environment. But 
sadly looking backwards, almost all such arrangements were messed by 
shoddy packaging from government side and their inability to respect same 
agreement. It will hurt our airports and has almost wiped out our domestic 
airlines. Investors are fleeing; we use force to reverse agreements. It is not 
good.”   
 
The above averment clearly depicts the culture of impunity in honouring 
agreements voluntarily entered into by the respective ministries and departments of 
the governments and the resultant effects on the sector. This is certainly not good 
for the country. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
375 See the Punch Newspaper of 23rd October 2012. Accessed from www.punchonline.com. 
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 4.12.2 Funding Issues 
 4.12.2.1 The Challenge of Raising Long Term Credit Facilities Locally 
PPP projects are mostly for long term. Most Nigerian banks only grant a short term 
or medium term finance. As a result, raising fund to finance any PPP project in 
Nigeria has become a major challenge. According to Mr Oshobi, he stated as 
follows: 
With respect to the MMA II, most banks were initially very reluctant about 
the project. At the beginning, the shareholders had to fund the project 
exclusively from equity. Eventually one bank showed interest and began to 
support the Concessionaire.376 It was only after the project has taken shape 
that most banks finally showed interest and agreed to refinance the project. 
Infrastructure development requires long term finance and raising long 
term loans remains a challenge in the Nigeria. 
 
In the same view, in an interview with Dr. Femi Soyeju of the Department of 
International Development Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, he 
submitted as follows: 
“Nigeria has not made an appreciable impact in closing the infrastructure 
gaps due to lack of access to long-term financing. The fact is that private 
investors are in dire need of long term funds for investment in 
infrastructure. With easy access to finance, the appetite for private 
investment in the nation’s infrastructure market will increase exponentially. 
For example, banks in Nigeria tried in the past to fix these gaps in 
financing for long term infrastructure projects with short term loans which 
ended up in cost over-run by pushing up the cost of borrowing and leaving 
many projects un-bankable or financially unviable before even getting 
underway.”377 
 
                                                          
376 That was Oceanic Bank of Nigeria now absorbed by Eko Bank. 
377 Being the text of an interview with Dr. Femi Soyeju on 4th day of March, 2013 at the University of Pretoria Campus, 
Pretoria, South Africa. 
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The situation seems to have improved in recent time with the consolidation of 
banks378 which greatly increased the capacity of Nigerian banks to bear long term 
credit risk. The reforms Nigerian pensions system379 and the consolidation of 
Insurance Sector (which in other economies are sources of long term funds) 
coupled with the gradual development of the nation’s bond market may have begun 
to address this problem.  
 
The recent Pension Funds and Revised Guidelines allow Infrastructure funds and 
private equity funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), as well as Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs/Notes) and Eurobonds 
“issued by listed Nigerian companies for their operations within Nigeria, as 
certified and approved by SEC”.380 For infrastructure projects to attract 
investments of pension assets in Nigeria, the guidelines provide that the projects 
must have been awarded to a concessionaire through an open and transparent 
process; must not be less than N5 billion in value; should be managed by a 
concessionaire with a good track record; should meet the due process requirements 
of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Policy; 
“and of the nature of core infrastructure which includes roads, railways, 
airports, ports, power and gas pipelines and related facilities, and other 
projects that may be approved by the commission from time to time.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
378 This was done in 2005 where the minimum capital was put at N25 Billion. As a result, most banks had to merge and 
others were being taken over by other banks in order to meet the target. 
379 Pension reform in Nigeria started in 2004 with the enactment of the Pension Reform Act. As at August 2012, the total 
employees registered in the Contributory Retirement Savings were 5.23 million and the assets under management in the 
Retirement Savings Account Funds as at May 2012 is N1.4tn. 
380 See Kehinde Ibrahim’Nigeria Pension Funds and Revised Guidelines retrieved from 
http://nigerianpilot.com/index.php/business/4672-nigerian-pension-funds-and-revised-guideline. Accessed on 4th November, 
2012.  
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The guidelines provides further that for Specialist Infrastructure Funds seeking to 
attract pension fund investments, the guidelines stipulates that it must have 75 per 
cent of its projects located in Nigeria. Not more than 5 per cent of pension fund 
assets can be invested in Infrastructure funds, but up to 35 per cent of pension fund 
assets can be invested in infrastructure bonds, mortgage and asset backed securities 
and corporate debt securities. 
 
In addition, raising funds internationally is not much easier and country risk issue 
always posed a major challenge. International financiers do not want to bring their 
moneys into financing infrastructure in Nigeria unless there is a government 
guarantee. Also, there may be some stringent laid down rules which the private 
sector have to strictly comply with before the international financier will part with 
their moneys.381 
 
An alternative source of long term funding is the capital market particularly the 
bond market.382 However, the recent downturn in the capital market suggests that 
this may not be a viable option for the time being. It should be noted however that 
Nigeria’s capital market is probably still too shallow and underdeveloped for 
green-field infrastructural projects. 
 
Typically in other countries, governments give sovereign guarantees to the 
Concessionaire of key infrastructure, as well as all kinds of other incentives to 
make it easier for the Concessionaire to raise finance. These are countries that have 
                                                          
381 See for example, Guidelines Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credit of May 2004 and Revised in October 1 
2006 and May 1, 2010. 
382The economic environment in Nigeria is sophisticated and suitable to create a sustainable vibrant bond market that can be 
vital in economic development. The economic environment in Nigeria is sophisticated and suitable to create a sustainable 
vibrant bond market that can be vital in economic development. The success of the bond market depends on the 
collaboration between the market operators and financial institutions including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
 
  
185 
 
single digit interest rates unlike Nigeria. The idea in PPPs is to share the risks and 
the benefit between the public and private sector. The benefit for the government is 
essentially the infrastructure or service provided to the public and not profit for its 
operation. 
 
In the case of Lagos/ Ibadan Expressway that was concessioned to Bi-Courtney 
Highway services Ltd under the Design, Build, Operate and Transfer (DBOT) 
agreement which was signed in May, 2009. The company was expected to raise 
money to finance the project. It was argued that in the face of the global economic 
meltdown, financing massive infrastructure projects had become a big challenge, 
and the government had to follow modern approach to infrastructure development 
all over the world. After 2 years when the concessioner could not raise funds 
locally, it signed an agreement with two South African giants in order to handle the 
project.383 These were- Rand Merchant Bank and (RMB) and Group Five. Rand 
Merchant Bank was described as the Second largest financial institution in South 
Africa which won the 2011 banker Investment Banking Award as the most 
innovative investment bank from Africa. 
 
Other partners include Vela VKE supporting engineers and consultants; Project 
Management International (PMI), experienced South African based construction 
expert, and Yolas Consultants. According to the concessioner, Group Five is a 
multi-disciplinary construction group with an established and growing international 
client base engaged in resources, energy and infrastructure delivery in Africa. 
Group Five was said to have completed five major highways like the Lagos/ Ibadan 
Expressway in Africa and many more around the world. 
                                                          
383 Armsfree Ajanaku, Lagos-Ibadan Expressway: Diary of a failed Road Concession. Retrieved from 
www.ngrguardiannews.com. Accessed on 4th December, 2012.  
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Its accomplishment also include; the successful delivery of King Shaka 
International Airport, KwaZulu-Natal, and a range of contract related to the World 
Cup organized in 2010 by FIFA in South Africa. Apart from being rated as one of 
the most empowered companies in South Africa, Group Five emerged as the 
winner in the Basic Industrial Sector by the Financial Mail in its Top 
Empowerment Company survey in 2011.  This concession contract was however 
stalled because these foreign partners who were ready to finance this gigantic 
infrastructure project in Nigeria needed sovereign guarantee by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria which the government simply declined. 
 
In the cases of MMA II and the Lagos/ Ibadan Expressway, no sovereign guarantee 
or other similar incentive was granted to ease the challenges of funding. 
Conversely, the Agreement was structured in a manner in which all financial risk 
accrued to the Concessionaire with none accruing to the government and the 
Concessionaire still had an obligation to pay concession fees to the government 
even before it began to make profit from its investment. The perception appears to 
have been that the primary objective of PPPs for the government is revenue 
(without incurring any risk or making any investment) instead of the provision of 
infrastructure and services to the public. 
 
4.12.3 Regulatory Issues 
4.12.3.1 Incessant changes in Relevant Political Office Holders 
Incessant changes of the relevant political office holders are also one of the 
challenges of PPP in Nigeria. Over a period of Seven (7) Years, the concessionaire 
of MMA II has had to deal with six different ministers and five different chief 
executives of the Federal Airports of Nigeria (FAAN). This has also imparted the 
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issue of inconsistency in policy. Maintaining and managing a relationship with the 
successive ministers and chief executives of the contracting agencies have been a 
major challenge. In the case of MMA II, each time the Concessionaire reaches a 
consensus or understanding on fundamental issues affecting the operation of MMA 
II, either the minister or the chief executive is changed; the process has to begin all 
over again. This is because each of these ministers has different policy thrusts, 
divergent opinions and perspectives on the Concession Agreement and the 
concession itself. 
 
4.12.4 Political Issues 
4.12.4.1 Absence of the Political Will to ensure that PPPs work 
Despite the commitment of the Federal Government of Nigeria to ensuring that 
PPPs work, the respective agencies meant to implement government policies have 
sometimes failed to display the political will to ensure that these policies succeed. 
Unless governments and their agencies are absolutely determined that PPPs 
succeed there are sufficient vested interests in the country against PPPs that would 
ensure that the government’s initiative to promote PPPs fail. This is particularly 
important in these early stages because if too many pioneering efforts to implement 
PPP schemes fail, potential investors will lose interest and this very useful tool for 
economic development would have been lost. 
 
For example, the ongoing airport concession dispute between the Federal Airports 
Authority of Nigeria and its concessionaire, Bi-Courtney Aviation Services 
Limited, took a new twist in October 2012, with Federal Airport Authority of 
Nigeria disclosing that the Build, Operate and Transfer arrangement it had with the 
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company over the Murtala Mohammed Airport Terminal II in Lagos was only for a 
period of 12 years and not 36 years.384 
 
4.12.4.2 Risks associated with Political Transition 
Political transition may bring about a change in the governmental policies 
especially as PPP contracts are concerned. The Lagos Ibadan-Expressway was 
concessioned to Bi-Courtney during the administration of Late President Umaru 
Musa Yar’ Adua whose administration had the zeal to take advantage of the 
opportunities inherent in the private sector. However, the present administration of 
President Goodluck Jonathan is not pursuing this drive with vigour. 
 
One of the major concerns with the MMA II project was ensuring that it was 
commissioned before the administration that granted the concession left power.385 
This was borne out of anxiety for the tendency of new administration to reverse 
policy decisions of previous administrations.386 Due to this concern the 
Concessionaire had to expedite action on the project to ensure it was suitable to 
commissioning before the terminal date of that administration. This significantly 
increased the cost but the objective was attained.  
 
4.12.5 Legal Issues 
4.12.5.1 Legal Framework 
There are issues with the legal framework for PPPs in Nigeria. Some of these 
issues bother on inconsistencies of the relevant laws. Nigeria, being complex 
federating states, still has conflicting provisions as to which of the Ministries, 
                                                          
384http://www.newsnet.com.ng/news/05/11/mma2-faan-bi-courtney-disagree-over-concession-tenure.  
385 This was conceived and commissioned during the regime of Former President Olusegun Obansanjo (1999-2007). 
386 Being an interview granted by Mr Tola Oshobi of BOB & Co, Legal Practitioners in Lagos State oon 30.09.12. 
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Departments or Agencies of Government that has the exclusive right to grant 
concession contract.  
 
The Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Act387 provides for the establishment of 
the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria. Section 3 of the Act provides that the 
Federal Airport Authority shall have the powers to operate and maintain all airports 
in Nigeria. A community reading of the provisions of that section reveals that it is 
only the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria that can grant concession in respect 
of construction, operation and maintenance of airports in Nigeria to any private 
sector.  
 
On the other hand, The Federal Capital Territory Act388 which provides that the 
Federal Capital Development Authority shall be powers to establish infrastructural 
services in accordance with its master plan and shall also have the powers to 
coordinate the activities of all ministries, departments and agencies of the 
Government of the Federation within the capital Territory.389 While the Federal 
Airport authority claimed that by virture of the provision of S.1 (3) of the Federal 
Airport Authority Act, it is the only authority invested with the power of granting 
concession. On the other hand, the Federal Capital Development Authority also 
claimed that it is the only authority that can grant concession in respect of the 
MDAs situated within the Federal Capital Territory.  There is the need to have 
clarity in the legislation so as to avoid conflict between these agencies of 
government. 
 
                                                          
387See S.1(1) of the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Act, CAP F5. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
388CAP. F6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010. 
389 See generally the provisions of S.4 of the Federal Capital Territory Act. 
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Furthermore, the Act does not give the Commission sufficient power to supervise 
concessions and enforce compliance with its provisions. It appears that the 
Commission is largely a policy-making body. There is a real need to strengthen the 
Commission and make it a one stop shop for handling every detail pertaining to 
any infrastructure or service the government has decided to concession. Since its 
sole business will be concessioning, it should not be constrained by the tendency of 
other government agencies and ministries to hinder the progress of PPPs, due to the 
perception that it undermines their powers and sources of revenue. 
 
4.12.5.2 Slow pace of Justice Delivery System 
This is a major impediment to doing business in Nigeria. Because of the complex 
nature of the PPP agreements, there are bound to be disputes arising from the 
transaction. It is therefore envisaged that parties would approach the court for 
amicable settlement of their disputes. However, the justice system in Nigeria is 
indeed very slow. Delay of cases in Nigerian courts has become so worrisome. The 
Chief Justice390 of Nigeria has urged judicial officers on speedy dispensation of 
justice because justice delayed is justice denied. Some cases spend as much as 20-
30 years before they are finally concluded. As a result, the Concession Agreement 
for MMA II made extensive provisions on dispute resolution. There are about 3 
levels of dispute resolution before the parties to the concession can head for court. 
The idea is that, any dispute would be satisfactorily resolved before it degenerates 
into protracted litigation. This has been very useful between the parties. However, 
where a third party dispute arises, parties will still have to resort to the courts and 
face the challenges of a slow justice delivery system. 
 
 
                                                          
390 Justice Aloma  Mukhtar became the Chief Justice of Nigeria in2012. 
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4.12.6  Other Issues 
4.12.6.1 Corruption  
This is a major impediment to doing business in Nigeria. This has become a 
national malaise and the greatest monster that Nigeria is facing. Corruption within 
the country’s public sector poses a major challenge to the PPP Programme and 
development generally. The areas that are most affected by corruption are the 
Police, Judiciary, Public sector procurement and many others too numerous to 
mention. According to the 2013 Transparency International Index,391 Nigeria was 
ranked 144 out of the 177 countries that were examined.  There is no doubt that 
abuse of powers, bribery and secret dealings have continued to ravage public 
procurement in Nigeria. Despite the fact that anti-corruption agencies were 
established by successive government, very little has been achieved.392  The legal 
loopholes and lack of political will in government facilitate both domestic and 
cross-border corruption in Nigeria. The country’s public institutions and 
corporations must be more transparent in order to reduce the incidence of 
corruption in the country. 
 
4.12.6.2 Dearth of Experts 
Nigeria is a federation with Thirty Six (36) states and the Federal Capital Territory. 
For PPPs to work successfully there is the need to build capacities in all the states 
so that each state and Federal Capital Territory can handle PPP arrangements 
independently. In South Africa, apart from the PPP Unit at the National treasury in 
Pretoria, each Municipal Unit has experts who handle PPP projects within their 
                                                          
391 See the Transparency International Index for 2013. Available at < http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/> Accessed 
on 23.12.13. 
392 During the regime of President Obasanjo, two anti-graft agencies were established to fight corruption in Nigeria. These 
are Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and also the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
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municipality. Therefore, there is need to train more experts who would handle PPP 
projects in the various states and local governments. 
 
  4.13  Conclusion 
In Nigeria and other African countries, access to critical infrastructure and services 
can be accomplished through Public Private Partnerships, where the government is 
expected to deliver the minimum standard of services to the people; the private 
sector brings capital, skills and their competencies.393 Such collaborations will help 
in bridging the information gap between the public and private sector 
organisations, reducing the level of poverty and promote access to social and 
economic infrastructure which is critical in nation development. 
 
The objectives of a typical PPP arrangement in Nigeria is the mission to contribute 
to the economic integration of the country, accelerate its economic growth and 
sustainable development, engender and sustain private sector collaboration in 
traditionally public sector projects and also expand local access to international 
market thereby ensuring a deeper economic integration with the global world.  
To achieve the above stated objectives, there should be more commitments on the 
part of the stake holders to the PPP agreement. Governments should show more 
commitment to respect the sanctity of the partnership agreements. Government and 
its agencies should not see themselves as being superior to the private parties. It 
should also show that it has created an enabling environment for the PPP scheme to 
thrive in Nigeria. This would encourage especially the foreign investors to 
participate in infrastructure development in Nigeria.  
 
                                                          
393A. AUzodima, Public Private Partnership and Nigeria’s Development. Accessed from www.Phishare.org on 23.08.12. 
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Nigeria, with its huge population, has the propensity for a large PPP market in 
Africa. This among others may make it a good destination for private investors. 
However, investors would not want to waste their monies where a good enabling 
environment has not been created.   
 
In order for Public Private Partnership to thrive well in Nigeria, government must 
put in place sound laws, policies, regulations and institutions or in the alternative 
enhance the existing ones that are already in place as well as improve the enabling 
environment for private investors to thrive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
5.0  INTRODUCTION 
The government of the Republic of South Africa recognizes the fact that 
infrastructure investment is a key priority if the country is to achieve its desired 
growth potential over the next few years. It is a key pillar of both the National 
Development Plan394 and the New Growth Path395 and provides a mechanism to 
support economic transformation, national growth and essential job creation in the 
country at a pivotal time in its economic history.  
 
By a developing country standard, South Africa has better developed infrastructure 
such as roads, water, dams and health facilities, but investments in key economic 
infrastructure such as energy have lagged far behind the domestic demand.396 In 
addition to this, the bulk of the existing infrastructure such as roads, railways and 
ports need adequate investment on maintenance and upgrading.  
 
As part of this strategic approach to building economic resilience in South Africa, 
the investment and participation of private investors are considered as cardinal to 
the growth and development of the country. The country is now on a development 
plan to remedy the poorly implemented infrastructure plan during the apartheid 
                                                          
394 According to the NDP, it is the aim of the government of South Africa that by the year 2030, the country would have 
eliminated poverty and reduce inequality to the minimal level. The government seeks to realize the above stated goals by 
building capabilities, growing an inclusive economy, promoting leadership, enhancing the capacity of the state and 
promoting public private cooperation. 
395 This programme was launched by President Jacob Zuma in 2009. This initiative’s main aims are to create decent work, 
reduce inequality and poverty and attract more investment for South Africa. 
396 Infrastructure Investment Key to improving Service Delivery. Retrieved from www.treasury .gov.za. Accessed on 
16.05.13.  
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years, and to meet the demands of a growing economy and population.397 If the 
government is to successfully lay a solid foundation for growth and development, 
reduce poverty and provide decent work for all South Africans, this type of 
partnership is essential.  
 
In the year 2012, the cabinet established the Presidential Infrastructure 
Coordinating Commission to tackle the challenge of infrastructure deficits being 
faced by the country in recent times.398 Its mandate amongst others are to plan and 
co-ordinate a national infrastructure plan, backed by the necessary political will to 
synergize infrastructure planning and implementation across all spheres of 
government, state agencies and private partners. 
 
Public Private Partnerships began in the mid1990s’ with the tolling of part of the 
major national roads by the National Roads agency as a result of budgetary 
constraints.399 The first project executed was a R2.6 Billion PPP project for the N3 
and N4 toll road. This road links the South African provinces of Gauteng 
(comprising Johannesburg and Pretoria which is the main economic hub of South 
Africa), Limpopo and Mpumalanga to the port of Maputo in Mozambique. The N4 
road project is a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 30 – year PPP concession 
                                                          
397 See Infrastructure Development in South Africa. 
http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=125:South. Accessed on 
13.04.13. 
398 The cabinet set up the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) whose objectives among others is 
to bring together representatives of the three spheres of government for development cooperation. The PICC’s mandate is to 
develop a 20 year infrastructure pipeline, to ensure forward planning of infrastructure development and curtail the stop-start 
syndrome around building infrastructure. Over the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) period, R845 billion has 
been approved and budgeted for public sector projects with some R300 billion in the energy sector and R262 billion 
allocated to transport and logistics projects. 
399 E.R Yescombe, Public-Private Partnerships Principle of Policy and Finance supra. 
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arrangement, at the expiration of which ownership will transfer to the two 
governments.400  
 
Mozambique lacked the required funds to rehabilitate and maintain its own part of 
the N4 highway, the railway line and the ports which were long damaged as a 
result of the civil war that ravaged that country.401 As at 1997, the total estimation 
of South Africa’s requirement to fix its roads was estimated to be R37 billion,
 
both 
governments were thus in need of funds to finance and maintain this all important 
infrastructure.
  
As a result of this, the PPP approach was then resorted to, and with 
the cooperation of the private sector, the project became a reality. 
 
For many years, government was committed to developing an investment friendly 
environment for PPPs. In April 1997, a team was appointed to come up with 
legislative and institutional frameworks for PPPs in South Africa. In 1999, the first 
major legislation on Public Private Partnerships in the country was enacted. These 
provisions are set out in Treasury Regulation 16 issued by the National Treasury in 
accordance with the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (PFMA)402 which for 
the first time established a dedicated PPP unit within the treasury in the year 2000. 
The main objectives of this Act are to enhance sound financial management and 
maximize service delivery through the effective and efficient utilization of limited 
resources.403 
 
 
                                                          
400See Public-Private Partnerships in Africa, Part 1. Retrieved from  
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=954:public-private-partnerships-in-
africa-part-i-infrastructure&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266. Accessed on 16.04.13. 
401 Civil war began in Mozambique in 1977 and ended in 1992. During this time, most of the critical infrastructure was 
damaged and this led to a serious infrastructure deficit. 
402 Act No 1 of 1999, (As Amended by Act No 29 of 1999. 
403 See http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/PFMA/default.aspx. Accessed on 21.03.13. 
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In addition, a PPP Manual and Standardised PPP Provisions have been issued by 
the National Treasury as PPP practice notes in accordance with Section 76(4)(g) of 
the Public Finance Management Act to make the application of the Act and the  
regulations less difficult. Also, in order to carry along the various municipalities in 
the development drive, the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (MFMA) 
was passed with its regulations. This legislation provides for municipal PPPs which 
are consistent with financial accountability. 
 
The South African National Treasury, the key department which is saddled with 
the responsibility of monitoring and approving these deals, has developed various 
programmes and sound policies which are key factors in the growth of the scheme. 
The first PPP that was carried out in South Africa in accordance with National 
Treasury Regulation 16 was the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital which was 
contracted to the private sector for 15 years under the Design, Finance, Build, 
Operate and transfer (DFBOT).404 Under the arrangement, the Impilo Consortiun 
was to upgrade and manage the facilities and information technology of an 846-bed 
state-of the heart referral hospital. The capital value of this project is put at US$746 
million. This hospital is well equipped and provides services to the people of 
KwaZulu Natal and the Eastern Cape Province. The general opinion has been that 
PPP through which this hospital was built has delivered a quality service which 
could not have been achieved by the government alone.405  
 
 
 
                                                          
404 See PPP Quarterly, A publication of the PPP Unit, National Treasury South Africa. Number 28 of February, 2009. 
405 See M.T Adekilekun and C.C. Gan, Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Development in Africa: A Magic-Wand 
for Socio-Economic Growth and Development. Being a paper Presented at the 2013 Symposium on Finding Solutions to 
Africa’s Development, held on 23rd August, 2013. 
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Since the enactment of these laws, over 300 of such partnership projects have 
already been executed at both the national, provincial and municipal levels since 
the country became a constitutional democracy in 1994.406 The government 
recognizes the fact that investment in the construction of roads, ports, railway 
systems, electricity plants, hospitals and dams will contribute to faster economic 
growth. 
  
Former President Thabo Mbeki once put it succinctly thus on the challenges of 
sustaining economic growth and public spending and extending opportunities to all 
as follows; 
“We have to construct a new world that is more equitable and responsive to 
the needs of the poor, mobilize the all our people voluntarily to act together 
to achieve goals of reconstruction and development and to consolidate the 
practice of creating Public Private Partnerships”407   
 
As part of its projected plan in the 2013 budget, the government will invest over 
the next three years about R827 billion (about $94) billion in the building of new 
and upgrade of existing infrastructures in the country.408 South Africa’s economy 
continues to grow, but at a slower rate than expected. A growth rate of 2.7% is 
projected in 2013, 3.5% in 2014 and 3.8% in 2015.409 
 
The pace of economic recovery of the nation will depend on the rate at which 
private investment and export are strengthened and the government is therefore 
exploring the measure to encourage Public-Private Partnerships for infrastructure 
development. 
                                                          
406 Philippe Burger The Dedicated PPP Unit of The South African National Treasury accessed from 
http://Www.Oecd.Org/Mena/Governance/37147218.Pdf.  Last accessed on 27.12.13. 
407 See PPP Quarterly Supra Note 8 at Page 2. 
408 Infrastructure Investment Key to Improving Service Delivery. Budget 2013, People’s Guide. A joint Publication by the 
National Treasury and South African Revenue Service. 
409 Ibid. 
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5.1  Sector Level Analysis of the State of Public Infrastructure in South 
Africa 
5.1.1  Power 
South Africa's consistent economic growth and industrialization have witnessed a 
sharp upsurge in the demand for electricity. The demand for energy by the year 
2030 is expected to be twice the current level.410 This growth, together with rapid 
industrialization and electrification programmes especially in the rural areas means 
there would be an increase in electricity demands which may lead to overworked 
electricity infrastructure. 
 
As a result of lack of adequate investment in the country's power infrastructure in 
the past few years, the demand for energy has increased and has gone more than 
what Eskom,411 the state-owned agency which is in charge of energy generation 
and distribution can meet. Eskom produces about 34, 000 Megawatts of electricity 
in South Africa to meet the current demand, and the above figure is expected to 
grow on yearly basis.412 
 
According to the South African Infrastructure Development Plan for 2013-2015, 
the biggest portion of investment in infrastructure is expected to come from Eskom 
which will invest R205.1 billion (about USD220 million) on power generation over 
the next 3 years.413 Together with Eskom, the Department of Energy is taking steps 
to bringing electricity supply and distribution system into balance. Also, Eskom’s 
new power stations in Medupi in Limpopo and Kusile are expected to start 
producing electricity by the year 2014 and 2015 respectively.  
                                                          
410See South Africa Energy Supply. Retrieved from  
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/energy.htm#.UW75qdnMYqA. Accessed on 18.03.13. 
411 Eskom  (Electricity Supply Commission )is a South African Public Utility which was established in 1923 by the 
government of South Africa. 
Generating Electricity in South Africa,. Retrieved from http://www.eskom.co.za/c/article/208/generating-electricity/. 
Accessed on 09.04.13. 
413 See budget 2013, Peoples Guide, op cit. 
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Also, through the Integrated Resource Plan, the government has embarked on 
promoting sustainable green energy scheme on a larger scale as envisioned in the 
Integrated Resource Plan 2010.414 This plan envisages that 42% of electricity must 
be generated from the renewable resources within the 20 years projected. Also, 
there is the Integrated Municipal Infrastructure Project which will focus on 23 of 
the least developed districts. This will help in addressing and upgrading the 
infrastructure needs; this will include electricity, water, road and rail transportation 
which is meant to serve about 17million people living in these municipalities.  
Independent power generation companies have been chosen.415 The projects to be 
carried out include solar photovoltaic technology, wind, small hydro and 
concentrated solar thermal generators. The South Africa government is expected to 
procure from these private entities to meet the challenges of power generation and 
distribution.416  
 
5.1.2  Transportation  
South Africa has a well-developed transport infrastructure more than any country 
in Africa.417 The total network of road is about 747, 000 kilometers which are 
substantially motor able and in good condition. The country's ports and their 
facilities serve as a natural stopover for shipping from within the continent and the 
world over. In recognition of its importance to the country’s growth and 
                                                          
414 The Integrated Resource Plan (2010-2030) is a plan that  places specific emphasis on how to  broaden electricity supply 
technologies in South Africa to include gas, imports, nuclear, biomass, renewable (wind, solar and hydro), in response to 
both the country's future electricity needs as well as reduce its CO2 emissions. South Africa expects to procure about  
3, 725MW of renewable energy through this process. 
415 In May 2012, the Department of Energy announced the names of 19 bidders who were selected as the preferred bidders 
for Window 2 of the Renewable Energy  (IPP) programme that is expected to  contribute to South Africa's energy mix .  
416 See Independent Power Producers Chosen. Retrieved from 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/ippbidders-230512.htm#.UXFqZtnMYqA. Accessed on 
16.04.13. 
417 See South Africa’s Transport Network. Retrieved from 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/transport.htm#.UXGDe9nMYqA. Last accessed on 26.11.13. 
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development, the government has highlighted the transport sector as a major 
contributor to the nation’s economy. In fact, it is considered as an important engine 
for economic growth, national and international integration and social 
development, and in recent times, the government has unveiled its plans to invest 
heavily in order to improve the country's transportation network.  
 
5.1.2.1  Road Infrastructure  
South Africa has a total road network of about 747, 000km which is in good 
condition. The Department of Transport has the responsibility for overall policy 
formulation while the responsibility of road construction and maintenance is vested 
in the South African National Roads Agency (SANRA) and the nine provinces and 
local governments.418According to a report credited to the South African Institute 
of Civil Engineering,419 SANRA is responsible for about 16, 200km of the national 
road network; there are about 185,000km under the supervision and maintenance 
of the Provinces and a total of 66,000km fall under the maintenance of the 
municipalities.  
 
According to Finance Minister while commenting on the 2013 budget,420 stated 
that government has allocated the sum of R32.9 billion over the next 3 years (2013-
2015) for the upgrade of national roads. He stated further that a whooping sum of 
R27.6 billion has been allocated for the upgrading of provincial roads.421 Only 
about 19% of the national roads in South Africa are toll roads, most of which are 
being supervised and maintained by SANRA, while the rest have been 
concessioned to private companies on build, operate, maintain and transfer basis. 
                                                          
418 See especially the 4th Schedule to the South African Constitution which spells out the areas of concurrent national and 
Pronvicial legislative competence. 
419 Retrieved from http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/transport.htm#.UXGDe9nMYqA. 
Accessed on 14.04.13. 
420 See budget 2013, Peoples Guide op cit. 
421 Ibid. 
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The Department of Transport is planning to vigorously engage the private sector in 
the building and maintaining of road infrastructure in the country to boost socio-
economic growth and development. 
 
5.1.2.2  Rail Infrastructure 
South Africa has an extensive rail network connecting the country with some other 
countries within the sub-Saharan region.422 If the largest economy in Africa will 
continue to grow, improving its rail network of about 20, 247km will remain its 
priority. The rail network is managed by Transnet423 which is an agency under the 
Department of Public Enterprises. Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) is the largest 
railroad and heavy hauler in southern Africa. It has about 21, 000km of rail 
network, out of which about 1, 500km are heavy haul lines with over 8, 200km of 
the lines electrified. Transnet Freight Rail is proudly placed to strategically 
improve the rail industry. It is the sixth-largest freight railway in the world with 
about 65,000 active wagons and over 25, 000 employees across the country. About 
2.2-million passengers travel through train on daily basis in South Africa.424 
Metrorail commuter services is also helping in transporting people especially it 
covers towns and cities like Durban, Eastern Cape Province, Cape Town, and 
greater Pretoria and Johannesburg, focusing mainly on poorer South Africans. 
 
Also, there is Gautrain which is a rapid rail link that connects Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. It is a R25.2 billion PPP project and it is the Africa’s only high-speed 
train.425 About 40,000 people use the service every day. The train travels at a high 
                                                          
422The South African Transport System. Retrieved from  
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/transport.htm#.UXGDe9nMYqA. Accessed on 16.05.13. 
423 Formerly known as Spoornet, it is an outstanding heavy haul freight rail company which specializes in the transportation 
of freight in the Southern Africa. 
424 See http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/transport.htm#.UXJ8_9nMYqB. Accessed on 18.04.13. 
425 See Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa. http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/transport.htm. Accessed on 12th April, 2013. 
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speed of 160 km/h, therefore making the journey between Pretoria to O.R Tambo 
International airport to be covered within 42 minutes.426  
 
5.1.2.3 Airports 
South Africa has ten airports that handle more than 98% of the country's 
commercial traffic, with about 200, 000 aircraft landings and more than twenty 
million departing passengers every year. The O.R Tambo International Airport 
alone caters for more than Seventeen Million passengers annually and receives 
more than 105, 000 aircraft landings annually.427 
 
In the year 2010, the sum of R20-billion was approved for the upgrade of all the 
airports ahead of the 2010 World Cup which was hosted by South Africa in 2010. 
These are O.R Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, Cape Town 
International Airport and King Shaka International Airport which is outside the city 
of Durban and other seven domestic airports. 
 
5.1.3 Telecommunications 
The telecommunication industry is one of the fastest growing sectors in the 
national economy, with physical infrastructure in particular playing a role in recent 
developments. In March 2009, Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) 
announced a R4.6 billion infrastructural operation to establish a next-generation 
network for its 17.5 million subscribers. For several years, the telecommunications 
industry in South Africa was the exclusive preserve of Parastatal Telecom. 
Telecom controls the Sat-3 under undersea cable, which enters South Africa near 
Cape Town and links the country to Europe via the west coast of Africa, 
                                                          
426 http://gautengcompanies.co.za. Accessed on 17.04.13. 
427 See http://gautengcompanies.co.za. Accessed on 17.04.13. 
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connecting South Africa to Europe and India via Kenya. The deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry has brought competition into the sector and this has 
created opportunities for increased competition in the telecommunications 
industry.428In the Guateng Province and other urban centers, telecommunication 
products and services are the equal of anywhere in the world. 
 
5.2  The Legal Framework for Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa 
5.2.1 The Constitution 
The preamble to the South African Constitution which is the statement of intent 
and purpose for the Constitution, and those who are saddled with the control of the 
state and the entire citizenry provides among others for the duty of the state to 
improve the quality of lives of all citizens and build a nation that will be able to 
take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the comity of nations. It provides as 
follows: 
“We, the people of South Africa,  
Recognise the injustices of our past; 
  
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;  
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and  
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity.  
 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to;   
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;  
 
                                                          
428 The emergence of Neotel as competitor to the already established parastatal, Telkom, has created opportunities for 
increased competition and efficiency into the sector. 
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Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government 
is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by 
law;  
 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person; and  
 
Build a united and democratic South Africa that is able to take its rightful 
place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.  
 
May God protect our people.”  
 
This introductory statement emphasizes the role of the government to improve the 
qualities of lives of the people by increasing their access to basic necessities of life 
like water, good roads, hospitals, and telecommunication infrastructure among 
others. 
Procurement regulation in South Africa has an interesting socio-political history.429 
During the long apartheid era, public procurement was used in such a way as to 
protect the interests of enterprises owned by the white minority and a clear 
discrimination against the black-owned enterprises. In particular, "tender 
procedures were complicated and favoured large firms to the detriment of small 
emerging firms."430 After the apartheid, the new government of democratic South 
Africa resolved that public procurement would be utilised to democratise the 
economy and provide employment and business opportunities for marginalized and 
                                                          
429 Sope Williams Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures, (UK, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
430 World Bank, "Public and private sector procurement programmes and their contribution to emerging  
enterprises in South Africa" (Report prepared for the Workshop on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise  
Development and Financing, 3 Nov. 1994); Sharp et al, Assessment of Public Sector Procurement to Small,  
Medium and Micro-Enterprises (1999). 
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disadvantaged individuals and communities, commonly referred to as `target 
groups'.431 
No doubt, in recognition of the importance of procurement to national 
development, the basic principles in which procurement system in the country were 
based were sanctioned by the constitution.  Section 217(1) of the constitution 
provides for the way and manner that procurements including the PPP 
Procurements are to be carried out. The section provides thus: 
“When an organ of state contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective.” 
According to the above quoted provision of the constitution, procurement process 
which includes the PPP procurement in goods or services must be done in a 
manner which is fair, transparent and cost effective. 
Furthermore, Section 33 (1) of the constitution gives the citizens’ rights to fair 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This 
provision is to the effect that whoever feels that his rights have been adversely 
affected by any administrative action has the right to challenge this in a court of 
law. This provision applies to all procurements carried out by the government in 
order to promote efficiency in administration. Further to this provision, the 
parliament has enacted the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) 2000. 
This Act gives effect to the provision of S.33 of the constitution and other matters 
connected thereto. It must be pointed out and emphasised that in South Africa, 
                                                          
431 See Sope Williams Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures. Page 84. 
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constitutional litigation may reach all the way to the Constitutional Court which is 
said to be fearlessly independent.432  
 
5.2.2  Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
The Act433 seeks to promote the principle of sound financial management with the 
aim of maximizing service delivery and to effectively utilize the limited resources. 
The main objectives of the Act include modernizing a system for the management 
of finances in the public sector; enabling public sector managers to manage the 
financial resources, and be held more accountable; ensuring the prompt provision 
of quality information; eliminating the waste and corruption in the use of public 
assets and other matters connected therewith. The PFMA is very cardinal to the 
functioning of public procuring institutions because it states the ground-rules for 
public financial transactions and mandates public institutions (especially those that 
are involved in procurement) to maintain sound procurement system.434 
 
According to Mr. Innocent Khumalo435, the PFMA does not have direct provision 
on PPPs but on sound financial management of funds by the government 
departments, and in so far as PPP is linked to the capital of departments, invariably, 
it is part of the legislations to be complied with and the compliance relates to the 
powers of approvals of funds and if there is any guarantees to be given, these are 
the issues which the PFMA addresses and that is why it also applies to PPP 
projects. 
 
                                                          
432 Dikgang  Moseneke, Deputy Chief Justice of South African Constitutional Court, delivered a lecture at the Georgetown 
University Law Centre entitled ‘ A journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness Towards a just Society: Salient Features of 
the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa’. It was reported in the open-access law journal of the 
university (2012) Georgetown Law, The scholarly Commons. It is also available at the official website of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa. 
433 Act No 1 of 1999. See the Government Gazette  No 33059 dated 1 April, 2010. 
434 See S.38 (1) of the Act. 
435 Being an interview granted by Mr. Innocent Khumalo, Associate Partner, Ledwaba Mazwai & Co, Pretoria, South Africa  
on 28th February, 2013. 
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This Act gives effect to the provisions of Sections 213436 and 215 to 219 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. According to their combined 
provisions, there should be a national legislation enacted which shall among others 
establish the national treasury; provide for uniform treasury standards; prescribe 
the means and procedure of ensuring transparency and expenditure control by the 
government;  and also to set the operational procedures for borrowing, guarantees, 
procurement and oversight over the various national and provincial revenue 
funds.437  
 
Specifically of note is the provision of Section 76 of the Act which empowers the 
Treasury in making regulations and or issuing instructions to the relevant 
institutions to which the Act applies in the determination of a framework that is 
appropriate for procurement and system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost effective. Pursuant to this provision, the Treasury has issued 
Regulation 16 in accordance with the power vested on it. This regulation governs 
PPP at the national level in South Africa. 
 
5.2.3  Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) 2003 
The Municipal Finance Management Act438 enacted in 2003 was made to ensure 
consistency in financial accountability for local spheres and it also provides for 
municipal PPPs and Treasury on feasibility. This Act provides in details for the 
three major tests of which PPP in South Africa is based. These are Affordability, 
Value for money and Risk transfer. It also provides in clarity for the PPP project 
cycle to be undergone by the parties to PPP contract. These are Inception, 
Feasibility Studies, Procurement and PPP contract management. Specifically, 
                                                          
436 This sector provides for the establishment of the National Revenue Fund into which all moneys received by the national 
government must be paid. 
437 See the preamble to the PFMA. 
438 Act No 56 of 2003. 
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Section 120 of the MFMA provides that a municipal authority can enter into a PPP 
contract if it can demonstrate that the three tests mentioned above i.e. affordability, 
value for money and appropriate risk transfer to the private party are taken into 
consideration. 
 
To ensure compliance and more accountability, the Minister of Finance in 
consultation with the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
have by the powers conferred on them by Sections 168 and 175 of the Act make 
regulations to deal effectively with the matters bothering on municipal financial 
misconducts. These regulations439 also introduce measures to fight corruption in 
the public and private sectors through advocacy, strengthening the legal and policy 
frameworks and the proper implementation thereof.  
 
5.2.4  Treasury Regulation 16 
This regulation was issued by the National Treasury in accordance with Section 76 
of the Public Finance Management Act 1999. This is the main regulation that 
governs PPP in South Africa. This regulation regulates the powers of the project 
officers and the accounting officers. It also provides for the stages in the PPP cycle; 
what approvals are to be obtained and also at what stage are the approval to be 
obtained.  
 
5.2.5  The PPP Manual 
The South Africa’s PPP Manual was issued by the National Treasury as a guide for 
best practices for government institutions and the private parties and all PPP 
practitioners. There are Nine (9) different modules in the PPP manual and each of 
these modules is issued as a National Treasury PPP Practice Note in accordance 
                                                          
439 See Notice 556 of 2012. 
  
210 
 
with the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (PFMA). This manual and the 
Standardized PPP provision issued by the National Treasury as Note 01 of 2004 are 
complementary and should be read together. National Treasury’s PPP Manual 
mainly deals with what are expected to be done during the Project Preparation 
period. Different approvals including approvals I, IIA, IIB and III must be made in 
accordance with the provisions of the manual. 
 
The manual is based on the past project experience of the country and also on the 
international best practice. It sets standards as to the risk-assessment whereby the 
government is required to prioritize affordable projects that are best suitable for the 
PPP project for quality public service delivery. Also, this manual also ensures the 
achievement of the black economic empowerment programme in PPPs, not only in 
ensuring equality and fairness in the selection and management of the private 
sector party, but also in subcontracting the projects so as to have local socio-
economic impacts on the black people. It also stipulates what approval and at what 
stages to seek for these approvals. 
 
5.2.6 The Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003 
In an attempt to redress the economic effects of apartheid on the blacks in South 
Africa, the government has adopted a policy of Black Economic Empowerment 
which is designed to be broad-based, inclusive and in accordance with the 
objectives of overall growth and development. In accordance with the Black 
Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 and Section 76(4)(g) of the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 (PFMA), it is the requirement of these laws that the Special 
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Purpose Vehicle, (SPV) should be structured in such a way as to demonstrate the 
black economic empowerment.440 
 
Specifically, the provisions relating to the code is contained in Module 2 of the 
National Treasury Public Private Partnership Manual, issued in compliance with 
Section 76(4) (g) of the PFMA 1999. This code applies to all government 
departments441 and applies to all PPP transactions carried out in accordance with 
the National Treasury Regulation 16 to the PFMA. The code sets out government’s 
policy instruments for achieving the BEE target. These are:  
1. Direct black ownership of equity in the private party; 
2. Black participation in the management and control; 
3. Substantial subcontracting to black people and enterprises established by 
the blacks and  
4. Local socio-economic impact of such project on the black people. 
Section 12 of the BEE Act gives the Minister of Trade & Industry the power to 
publish and promote “a transformation charter for a particular sector of the 
economy” if he is satisfied that such a charter ”has been developed by major 
stakeholders in that sector; and advances the objectives of [the BBBEE Act].” This 
Code for BEE in PPPs acknowledges the fact that the implementation of such 
transformation charters in the private sector will have a remarkable contribution in 
the economic empowerment of the blacks in South Africa, especially as PPP 
procurement is concerned.  
 
 
                                                          
440 Extract from Mr. Innocen Khumalo’s interview. 
441 See S.10 of the BBBEE Act. 
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Some observations need to be made regarding the term “Black People”. It is 
pertinent to point out that “a black people” is “a generic term which means 
Africans, Coloreds’ and Indians”. This is a term capable of broad and liberal 
interpretation. It cannot be given a narrow and literal interpretation. This is clearly 
amplified by the landmark case of CASA442 at the High Court in Pretoria in June 
2008 which, inter alia, extended the protection of section 1 of the 2003 BEE Act to 
include the disadvantaged Chinese South Africans who could only be categorized 
as blacks because they are not whites. 
 
Another matter of some constitutional importance may also be highlighted here. It 
must be emphasized that the affirmative action policy and law cannot be 
challenged for unconstitutionality on the ground that it causes reverse 
discrimination to the advantaged group despite their unpopularity. In South Africa, 
this is amply demonstrated by the famous case of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others.443 Although this 
case is not a case of public procurement, its principle, i.e., constitutional validity of 
affirmative action policy and law, is applicable here nevertheless. The BEE policy 
will be applied by the government departments and the PPP unit in two distinct 
phases of the PPP transaction. The first is in the appointment of a transaction 
advisor and the second, in the selection of a private party. 
 
5.2.7 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act  
In accordance with Section 217(3) of the Constitution of South Africa which 
provides for a framework in the implementation of the procurement policy 
contemplated in section 217(2), the legislature has therefore enacted the 
                                                          
442 Acronym for “Chinese Association of South Africa”. Unfortunately this case was no reported. 
443 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
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Preferential Procurement Framework Act.444 By the provision of Section 217 (2) of 
the constitution, governments and their agencies are empowered to use preferential 
procurement policies in order to advance and protect the interest of the blacks and 
coloured who were at the disadvantage end especially during the apartheid. 
Therefore, all state departments and agencies are required to put in place a sound 
policy regarding the preferential procurement and also to follow a standard 
procedure for procurement of goods and services. However, in adopting such a 
policy, the respective agencies must use a point system to ascertain whether the 
bids meet the contract criteria. 
  
5.2.8 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
South Africa has adopted a number of initiatives with the aim of combating 
corruption especially in the public sector.445 In order to further prevent, combat, 
investigate and prosecute public sector corruption, the government harmonised the 
legislative framework on corruption and came up with the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.446 This act provides for stringent measures to 
combat corruption and the establishment of a register of persons and companies 
convicted for corruption and thereby prevent them from benefiting from public 
sector procurement. Once a name of a person or enterprise is registered in the list 
of corrupt persons, he or she is disqualified from participating in the PPP 
procurement process. 
 
                                                          
444 See Act No 5 of 2000. 
445 One of these is the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy which was launched to fight bribery, embezzlement, fraud, 
extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, insider trading, favouritism and nepotism in the public service. 
446 See Act No 12 of 2004 vide the (Government Gazette 26311,28 April 2004). 
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5.3 Institutional Landscape 
This refers to the agencies of the government that have the right to grant or monitor 
the award of concession process. The main authorities that will be discussed 
hereunder are the government departments, PPP Unit of the National Treasury and 
Municipal PPP Unit. 
 
5.3.1   The National Treasury 
The National Treasury’s PPP Unit which was established in the year 2000 is the 
most important of all the dedicated PPP units in South Africa. According to 
Section 215 of the South African Constitution, the National Treasury has the 
mandate to ensure accountability, transparency, and sound financial controls in the 
management of public finances. Section 76 of the Public Finance Management Act 
provides further that it is the duty of the National Treasury to make regulations for 
series of issues dealing with the effective and efficient management and use of 
financial resources. Some of the matters mentioned under this section are also 
applicable to PPPs.  
 
Ahadzi and Bowles447 posited that where there is a dedicated PPP unit which 
coordinates the PPP scheme, this will increase the confidence of the potential 
private investors. It stated thus: 
 
“…it is not surprising that the private sector is more concerned to see an 
established PPP unit within the client organization. A PPP unit suggests an 
experienced and able client team that has the power and authority 
necessary for an effective negotiation process. The absence of such a team 
may raise concerns about the public sector’s project management 
                                                          
447 Ahadzi, M and Bowles, G. ‘Public-private partnerships and contract negotiations: an empirical study’ (2004). Journal of 
Construction Management and Economics, 22(November), 967-78. 
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strengths. This will be particularly pertinent where the functions of the 
public sector client are fragmented across a number of departments.” 
 
The roles of the National Treasury PPP unit can be broadly categorized into two. 
These are: 
1. Providing technical assistance to government departments, provinces and 
municipalities through project feasibility, procurement and management, and; 
2. Providing National Treasury approvals during the pre-contract phases of a PPP 
agreement.  
 
The PPP unit shall ensure that all PPP agreements are in compliance with the legal 
requirements of affordability, value for money and sufficient risk transfer448 to the 
private sector. In addition to this, the unit shall promote an enabling environment 
for PPPs, facilitate certainty in the legal framework, guide public institutions in 
developing International best practices, provide training, drive the black economic 
empowerment initiative and disseminate information to the public on the activities 
of the unit. 
  
The PPP unit serves as a center of knowledge and expertise and provides technical 
assistance to individuals and government departments during the PPP cycles. It 
also monitors the activities of these departments through its regulatory approval 
mechanism. The PPP Unit is comprised of fourteen different sectors with 
Seventeen professional staff.449 Each of the staff is allocated projects based on their 
expertise and interests.  These sectors are: 
 
                                                          
448Philippe Burger The Dedicated PPP Unit Of The South African National Treasury accessed from 
http://Www.Oecd.Org/Mena/Governance/37147218.Pdf. Accessed on 19.05.13. 
449 That was as at February 2012 when the researcher conducted an interview at the South African National Treasury. 
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1. Accommodation  8. Health 
2. Transport    9. Education 
3. Water    10. ICT 
4. Energy               11. Contract Management 
5. Budget Support  12. International Relations   
6. Waste    13. Business Development 
7. Tourism    14. Project Development Facility. 
 
5.3.2   Municipal PPP Unit  
South Africa has 284 Municipalities. The areas in which a municipality can carry 
out a PPP project are as listed under Parts A & B of Schedule 5 to the South 
African Constitution. According to Section 120 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act, a municipal government may enter into a PPP arrangement only 
where it can demonstrate affordability, Value for Money and sufficient risk 
transfer. Section 120 (1) provides: 
“A municipality may enter into a public-private partnership agreement, but 
only if the municipality can demonstrate that the agreement will— 
(a) Provide value for money to the municipality; 
(b) Be affordable for the municipality; and 
(c)Transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to the 
private party.” 
 
Like the National Treasury, municipal PPP unit acts as a regulatory agency for the 
municipality and works independently from the government department which is 
desirous of implementing PPP. It ensures that the principles of affordability, value 
for money and risk transfer are complied with before the final ratification of a PPP 
agreement. The unit also provides technical assistance to government departments 
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during the PPP project cycle and monitors the department and agencies during the 
entire process. 
 
5.3.3 Government Departments and Institutions 
This refers to the state departments and other institutions that can grant 
concessions. Regulation 16 defines an institution as  
“Institution” means a department, a constitutional institution, a public 
entity listed, or required to be listed in Schedules 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D to 
the Act, or any subsidiary of any such public entity.”  
 
Institutions therefore includes state departments, provincial entities, public entities 
and other government business enterprises listed in Schedules 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D 
of the Public Finance Management Act. It is only government department and 
institutions that are vested with the powers to grant concession contracts. S.44 of 
the constitution gives the parliament the power to legislate on some matters listed 
in Schedules 4 and 5 of the constitution. These matters include airport, housing, 
public transport, public works and many others listed in the schedule. 
  
Also, Section 104 of the constitution confers legislative competence on the 
provinces with respect to certain matters which they can legislate. These matters 
include provincial roads, provincial parks, facilities for accommodation, public 
transportation and other numerous items listed thereunder. 
  
In essence, before an institution can grant concession contract, it has to first 
consider whether it is one in which it is only the national government that has 
power to grant concessions in respect of, or whether it is an area where the two 
governments have concurrent powers to legislate on. Therefore, the powers of the 
institutions must be exercised in accordance with the law.  
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5.4 The Private Sector Proponent 
The National Treasury PPP Manual defines a private party in a PPP arrangement in 
terms of what is not. Therefore, a private party excludes a public institution or 
department of government involved in the PPP agreement to which the Act applies. 
They also neither include municipal entities, nor the accounting officer or other 
persons nor bodies acting for and on behalf of either the National Treasury, not any 
of the municipalities. Also, entities that are not out to make profit are also included 
in the definition of a private party so long as they can demonstrate that they have 
the capacity to carry out substantial financial, technical and operational risk in a 
PPP project. 
 
The Standardized PPP provision which was issued by the National Treasury 
defines a Private Party (as defined by Regulation 16 issued by the National 
Treasury) as a special Purpose vehicle (SPV) which is incorporated to carryon a 
business in South Africa in accordance with the laws governing private company 
for the sole purpose of performing his rights and obligations under the PPP 
contract. All privately-owned firms seeking to participate in the contract award 
process must not have been found guilty for any crime related offences, or declared 
insolvent by any court of law, or blacklisted by their respective professional bodies 
or the Office of the Tender’s Board and its successor (The Tender’s Board was 
scraped in 2004). 
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In addition to the above stated qualities of a private partner, Module 5 of the PPP 
Manual states the necessary information/questions which are required from a 
private partner and which must be in the affirmative before the contract can be 
awarded to the private proponent.450 These are: 
1. What is the consortium capability and strength of the party? 
2. What does the proposed consortium composition and structure with their 
roles look like? 
3. It is important to know the previous experience and skills of relevant bodies 
and subcontractors in projects that are similar to the one under 
consideration. 
4. The genuiness of the agreements among the lenders, consortium members 
and subcontractors (if any)? 
5. What is the financial and market standing of the consortium? 
6. Directorship, equity and ownership of the business is also important 
criteria. 
7. Does the party have the ability to fulfill the objectives of the Black 
Economic Empowerment and other socio-economic objectives? 
8. Does the company have the capacity to deliver in the project? 
9. Commitment of the company and the capacity to meet project timeline is 
also very important. 
10. Does the company have the ability to raise debt and equity and to provide 
security for same? 
11. Does the company have the competence to management the project?  
12. Does the company also have the competence to manage the risk associated 
with PPP projects? 
                                                          
450 Module 5 of the South African PPP Manual. Accessed from 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Legal%20Aspects/PPP%20Manual/Module%2005.pdf, on 5th May, 2013. 
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13. The company should demonstrate an understanding of key project 
complexities associated with PPP projects. 
14. Whether the company has a previous relationship with the government or 
not? And 
15. What are the Quality assurance systems that have been put in place?  
All these are information/questions which the company/private sector must supply 
in the affirmative before the contract can be awarded to the company. 
 
5.5 Key Principles in the South African PPP Regulatory Systems 
There are important principles that are applicable in the South African PPP 
regulatory systems. These principles help in the proper implementation of the 
actual objectives of PPPs. These are:  
 
5.5.1 Equity, Fairness and Publication in Procurement  
The Constitution, National Treasury Regulation and other relevant legislations set 
out the procurement procedures in South Africa. This regime also applies to PPP 
transactions.  The requirement for a system that is `fair and equitable' in Section 
217(1) of the constitution can be construed as requiring the adoption of a system 
that is fair without unjustifiable preferences and discrimination.451  
Furthermore, Section 33(1) of the Constitution gives every person452 the rights to 
fair administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This 
section states as follows: 
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. 
                                                          
451 See Sope Williams Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures, (UK, Hart Publishing, 2012). Pg 85. 
452 This may either be natural or juristic person. The latter will include a company or corporation or any commercial entity 
set up to operate a business enterprise. 
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(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must - 
(a) Provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) Impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in 
Subsections (1) and (2); and 
(d) Promote an efficient administration.” 
 
Sub-section (1) of Section 33 in particular is discussed here. It provides for 
reasonableness, lawfulness and procedural fairness in all dealings or transactions 
with the government or any of its departments or agencies. Procedural fairness 
relates to the principles of fairness going far beyond the common law principles of 
audi alteram partem and nemo iudex in causa sua.453 Therefore, where a person’s 
right to administrative justice has been adversely affected, such a person has a right 
to be given written reasons.454 These reasons must be adequate, relevant, and 
cogent and must relate to the administrative action under scrutiny. The provisions 
on the right to be given written reasons are arguably meant to promote a more 
transparent, public-participatory, democratic and efficient administration. On the 
other hand, reasonableness relates to the substantive aspect of the ultra vires 
doctrine, by which a court is afforded the opportunity to investigate the 
justification of administrative actions. This fundamental right to just administrative 
action is evolving rapidly since the enactment and application of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 2000 (PAJA). 
 
                                                          
453 See the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of PAJA 2000 and also the rules and regulations made under PAJA.  
454 See the provisions of s 5 of the PAJA. 
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The purpose of administrative justice among others include ensuring good 
governance in administration, ensuring fair dealings in administrative context, 
enhancing protection of the individual rights against abuse of state power, 
promoting public participation in decision-making, and strengthening the notion 
that public officials and governmental bodies are answerable and accountable to 
the public they are meant to serve.455 
 
This456 has been identified, developed and showcased by the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa and it has become a rich source and the new hallmarks of the 
country’s administrative law going far beyond Wednesbury review. The right to 
just administrative action applies to all exercises of public power, and its contents 
generally include the concepts of lawfulness, rationality, procedural fairness and 
even the giving of reasons by administrators.457 The three grounds of judicial 
review under Section 33 of the Constitution and the laws enacted thereunder apply 
equally to public procurement inclusive of PPPs. Each ground may operate 
independently and separately.458  
 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA), imposes obligations 
on public authorities while discharging their administrative duties. For an 
administrative action to qualify as just, as required under the Act, it must satisfy 
the requirements of lawfulness,459 reasonableness460 and procedural fairness.461 By 
                                                          
455 L.J. Kotze, The Application Of Just Administrative Action In The South African Environmental Governance Sphere: An 
Analysis Of Some Contemporary Thoughts And Recent Jurisprudence. 
456 The right to just administrative action. 
457 See Masetlha v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566(CC), para78. 
See LJ Kotze The Application of Just Administrative Action in The South African Environmental Governance Sphere: An 
Analysis of Some Contemporary Thoughts and Recent Jurisprudence. PER/PELJ 2004(7)2. Retrieved from 
http://www.nwu.ac.za/webfm_send/11778. (Last accessed on 3rd May, 2013). 
459 The concept of lawfulness of administrative action has to be interpreted in compliance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, other enabling legislations and with the rules of common law.  
460 In the popular case of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex parte Application of President of SA 
2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC) para 85. The South African Constitutional Court held that rationality or reasonableness is now the 
minimum threshold for the exercising all public powers. Therefore, administrative actions should be justifiable and 
reasonable. 
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Section 33 of the Constitution and the provisions of PAJA, any citizen who is 
aggrieved by an exercise of administrative action can apply to the court for judicial 
review. There is the right of access to the courts in section 34 of the constitution for 
whoever feels that his or her rights has been violated or is likely to be violated by 
an exercise of administrative action. 
 
In affirming the application of the provisions of PAJA to administrative actions, 
the Constitutional court held in the case of Minister of Health & another VS New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & Ors462 thus: 
“PAJA is the national legislation that was passed to give effect to the rights 
contained in section 33. It was clearly intended to be, and in substance is, a 
codification of rights. It was required to cover the field and purports to do 
so. A litigant cannot avoid the provisions of PAJA by going behind it, and 
seeking to rely on section 33(1) of the Constitution or the common law. 
That would defeat the purpose of the Constitution in requiring the rights 
contained in section 33 to be given effect by means of national legislation.” 
 
In Leon Joseph & others V. City of Johannesburg & others463 the Constitutional 
Court held that the provision of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000, require that government agencies and institutions must afford all citizens a 
procedure that is reasonable and fair before taking a decision that will materially 
and adversely affect their rights. 
 
It follows, therefore, that all administrative actions or decisions taken in a PPP 
procurement process must comply with the mandatory criteria set out and 
prescribed by law. There should be openness, responsiveness and accountability in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
461 Procedural fairness has to do with the observance of the rules of natural justice, which are aimed at achieving a minimum 
standard for fair administrative hearings and inquiries. They ensure that the administrative body/administrator applies its 
mind to the matter by adhering to certain procedural requirements, by acting fairly, and by giving the individual an 
opportunity to be heard. 
462 (2006) 2 SA 311 (CC) Para 95-96.  
463 In Leon Joseph & others V. City of Johannesburg & others CCT 43/09. 
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the decision-making process by all the governmental institutions. All bidders at 
every stage of the procurement process must be given an equal opportunity to 
compete and bid for the contract. In addition, beyond Section 33, the government, 
department and/or institution shall not take any action which is capable of 
prejudicing their competitiveness and all treasury approvals must be sought and 
obtained at the relevant stage of the procurement. 
 
Therefore, the conduct of the officials of government departments and agencies 
could be challenged in a court of law by any citizen who feels aggrieved with the 
action of such public officer. Reverting to the case of New Clicks, it is better to 
argue and emphasise that PAJA is the default law applicable for purposes of 
judicial review. Reliance on either Section 33 or common law is permissible albeit 
rarely in the event of a lacuna in PAJA.464 
 
In addition, the right of access to information is protected under the South African 
Constitution,465 the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA),466 
Standardized Public Private Partnership Provisions467 and the Public Private 
Partnership manual.468  The PAIA was enacted in response to a corresponding 
section in the Bill of Right. The Preamble to the Act gave a backdrop upon which 
the law was passed. It states:  
"The system of government in South Africa before 27 April 1994 … resulted 
in a secretive and unresponsive culture in public and private bodies which 
often led to an abuse of power and human rights violations" 
 
                                                          
464 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241. 
465See s 32, which provides for the right of access to information held by the state, and by any other person (including private 
bodies), where the information is necessary for the protection of any rights. The right also makes provision for legislation 
(PAIA) to be passed to give effect to the constitutional right. 
466 Act No 2 of 2000. 
467 See generally Clause 95 of the Standardized Provision. 
468 All these legislations contain separate provisions on the right of access to information. 
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Section 32 of the constitution provides:  
“Everyone has the right to have access to; 
(1) Information which the government has; and  
(2) Information that someone else has if they need to protect any of their 
rights.” 
  
This constitutional right is rooted on the need to promote human rights by giving 
individuals the right to access to information that are necessary for protecting their 
rights, promotion of a human rights culture and ensuring social justice. The Act 
further seeks to foster a culture of transparency, accountability, and the efficient 
governance of public and private bodies.469 Therefore under the constitution, 
information that a person may have access to is not only limited to the information 
that is within the domains of government, but rather extends to such information 
from  an individual or a private body or entity, provided that that information is 
needed in order to protect the person’s right. 
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act sets out the detail procedure and 
processes through which such information may be accessed.470  The Act provides 
that where the person or agency of the government refuses the request for 
information, “adequate reasons must be given.”471 In Brümmer v Minister for 
Social Development and Others,472 The Constitutional Court explained the 
importance of the constitutional right of access to information thus: 
 
“The importance of this right . . . in a country which is founded on values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness, cannot be gainsaid.  To give 
                                                          
469See s 9(e), which gives the following as part of the PAIA’s objects, i.e. "…generally, to promote transparency, 
accountability and effective governance of all public and private bodies…"  
470 See S. 9 of the Act. 
471 See S. 25(3)(a),  P AIA No 2 of 2000. 
472 [2009] ZACC 21; 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC); 2009 (11) BCLR 1075 (CC). 
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effect to these founding values, the public must have access to information 
held by the State.  Indeed one of the basic values and principles governing 
public administration is transparency.  And the Constitution demands that 
transparency ‘must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information’. 
 
Apart from this, access to information is fundamental to the realisation of 
the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.  For example, access to 
information is crucial to the right to freedom of expression which includes 
freedom of the press and other media and freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas.  . . . Access to information is crucial to accurate 
reporting and thus to imparting accurate information to the public.” 
 
See also the case of President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors V. M &G 
Media Limited473 where the Constitutional Court held that the constitutional 
guarantee of the right of access to information held by the state gives effect to 
openness, responsiveness and accountability as founding values of South Africa’s 
democracy. 
 
The Standardized PPP Provisions and the PPP Manual lend credence to the 
constitutional access to information. These provisions gave an elaboration on the 
application of information disclosure and treatment of confidential information in 
PPP contracts.474 The standardized provision also categorically states the obligation 
on the part of the private entities to make available any information that is required. 
However, in cases of sensitive commercial information, little information can be 
withheld due to public reasons.475 
 
                                                          
473 President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors V. M &G Media Limited CCT 03/11 [2011] ZACC 32.  
474 See Disclosure of Project and Contract Information in Public-Private Partnership Contracts. The World Bank Institute 
2013. Accessed from http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-
acquia/wbi/Disclosure%20of%20Project%20PPP.pdf on 11.17.13. 
475 See Clause 95.1, of the Standardized PPP Provisions. 
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5.5.2 Transparency, Competition and Cost Effectiveness 
Section 217(1) of the Constitution476 also requires that the procurement system 
should be ‘transparent’. Transparency has been interpreted as requiring publicised 
contracts; rule-based decision making and opportunities for verification and 
enforcement; and disclosure of the rules governing procurement in general and 
governing specific procurements.477 It was posited that the constitutional 
provisions on transparency were necessitated as a response to the culture of secrecy 
in the apartheid era, which was adopted in restricting the access of blacks to 
economic opportunities.478  
 
It must be made clear that procurement process which includes the PPP 
procurement of goods or services must be carried out in a manner that is fair, 
transparent and cost effective. These basic requirements must be complied with by 
all organs of government in the procurement processes. In so far as they impact on 
the rights and interests of private persons or bodies adversely, recourse may be had 
to the laws infringed and appropriate remedial relief may accrue.  
 
The principles of competition and cost-effectiveness which were entrenched in 
S.217(1) of the Constitution complement each other. Competition entails that a 
sufficient number of bidders are invited to bid for the available PPP contracts, 
ensuring that government does not pay uncompetitive prices. Competition in 
procurements will definitely support the anti-corruption efforts, this is because, if 
only the qualified and most economically viable bidders have access to available 
contracts, this will reduce the number and scope of corruption-induced awards and 
                                                          
476 See the 1996 Constitution, Act No 108. 
477 Sue Arrowsmith, "Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement" (1998) 47 (4) I. C. 
L. Q. 793,796. 
478 Watermeyer, "Transparency within the South African public procurement system" in Hoekman (ed.) Unpacking 
Transparency in Government Procurement (2004), 173. 
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remove the restrictions to participation created against non-corrupt bidders. Cost- 
effectiveness on the other hand can be construed to mean an obligation to obtain 
value for money for the project.  This suggests that the procuring agencies should 
seek to get the best bargain and the most advantageous contractual terms.479 
Also, Public-Private Partnerships procurement is subject to the Competition Act, 
1998.480 This Act seeks to encourage competition in the bidding process especially 
in PPP procurement in order to promote economic development, efficiency and an 
efficient functioning economy. Also, among the intendment of the Competition Act 
is to open the economy to a greater number of South Africans by encouraging 
sound competitive trade practices and eradicating restraints on the full and free 
participation in the economy. Specifically, Section 81 of the Act provides that the 
Act binds the state.  
 
Furthermore, Treasury Regulation 16.5.3 (a) provides that all procurements 
including PPP procurement must be carried out with a principle that is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective. This provision is in line with 
the constitutional provision relating to transparency, fairness and accountability 
especially in S.217 of the Constitution. In addition, under Regulation 16.5 issued 
by the National Treasury and the PPP Manual, a PPP unit is vested with the power 
of exercising quality control by certifying specific Treasury approvals at the 
different stages of PPP from inception to procurement. 
  
For example, Treasury Regulation 16.5.4 states thus;  
“.after the evaluation of bids but prior to appointing the preferred bidder, 
the institution must submit a report for approval by the relevant treasury 
                                                          
479 See Sope Williams Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures. 
480 As Amended by the Competition Amended Act, No 35 of 1999.  
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demonstrating how the criteria of affordability, value for money, and 
substantial technical and operational and financial transfer were applied in 
the evaluation of the bids demonstrating how the criteria were transferred 
in the preferred bid.” 
All these point to the fact that the law requires the relevant institutions and bodies 
concerned to substantially conform to the legal requirements of fairness, 
transparency and accountability in the procurement process. Also, the PPP Manual 
provides for the signing of an anticorruption policy and the calling for forensic 
audits if fraud or corruption is suspected.  
 
5.5.3 Rules on Confidentiality in PPP Contracts 
The general rule is that all information relating to the PPP Agreement should be 
made public.481However, that information that is considered to be commercially 
sensitive should be held confidential and protected from public access.482  Where 
parties intend to hold information confidential, such a clause must be in the PPP 
Agreement. 
 
It should be pointed out here that the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 
2000 provides that both public and the Private Parties are obliged to make available 
any information relating to the agreement at their disposal. The Act however 
allows some information, including commercially sensitive information, to be 
protected from public domain. Parties to a PPP Agreement may sometimes want to 
oblige each other to protect the confidentiality of some information which has been 
imposed by either of the parties; however, such provisions cannot override the 
                                                          
481 S. 3 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act No 2 of 2000. 
482 See generally, S.36 (1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000. 
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provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act with respect to the 
obligations of the parties. 
 
  
Parties to the PPP Agreement should therefore define from inception, what 
information are  regarded as confidential so that they do not extend confidentiality 
to those information that do not warrant protection. The test to be adopted in 
deciding whether certain information should be held confidential or not  should be 
whether the disclosure of such an information would prejudice both legal and 
commercial interests of either of the parties. 
 
Where certain information regarded as confidential is disclosed to a third party in 
any way due to no fault of either of the parties to the PPP Agreement that should 
not be held to be a breach of obligations and therefore would not attract any 
penalty. Parties should not be prevented or restricted from complying with the 
requirements regarding publicity imposed by some statutory bodies like the 
Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulators, merely because to that 
party, such information is confidential. 
 
5.6 The PPP Project Cycle 
The PPP project cycle connotes the processes, procedures, procurement methods 
and approvals which a PPP project must go through from inception to contract 
management stage. These phases are important in order to guarantee a PPP 
procurement process that is transparent and cost effective. These are 
diagrammatically illustrated in Appendix C and D respectively while the list of 
Projects at the national level signed in terms of Regulation 16 are attached  
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Basically from the above diagrams, there are four stages in the cycle. These are:  
A. Inception 
B. Feasibility Study, 
C. Procurement and  
D. Contract Management 
 
5.6.1 Inception 
In accordance with the provisions of Regulation 16.3 of the Public Finance 
Management Act, once an institution identifies a project that is suitable for PPP, 
the accounting officer shall register such project with the relevant treasury. Then 
such officer shall inform the treasury of such proposed project and then appoint an 
officer within or outside the institution who shall be in charge of the project and 
then at the request of the relevant treasury, appoint a transaction advisor. Those 
persons whose roles are vital in the preparation, monitoring and implementation of 
the project are: 
1. The Accounting Officer 
2. The Project Officer 
3. The Project Team and 
4. The Consultant/ Transaction Advisor 
 
5.6.1.1  The Accounting Officer 
The accounting officer has enormous responsibilities by ensuring that the project is 
properly executed. Throughout the life cycle of the project, he must provide the 
direction and vision and ensures that the processes and procedures adopted are 
consistent with the regulations governing it. The success and failure of such 
projects depend on his competence as to the management and general supervision. 
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He also appoints and receives reports from the project officer and provides 
strategic directions on the manner he carries out his work. 
 
5.6.1.2  The Project Officer 
A project officer is defined in Regulation 16.1 as a person identified by the 
accounting officer or an institution that is capable of managing a PPP project from 
inception to conclusion. The project officer has to be appointed immediately the 
PPP project is identified and before it is registered. He has a duty to ensure that the 
project is completed on time, conforms with the budget and in accordance with the 
standards set by the treasury. He must identify for each of the phases and the 
required expertise and management expertise. He manages the project from 
planning to procurement and to the implementation stage. He also works closely 
with the consultant/ transaction adviser and approves payment in accordance to the 
budget set by the treasury. The project adviser must be an honest person and he 
must have the commitment to achieve best in the interest of the public. He must 
make decisions that will promote and protect the interest of the public at large.  
 
5.6.1.3  The Project Team 
The project team helps in formulating policies and facilitates management and 
political support. It also helps in communicating the progress of the project to the 
public whenever it is necessary. It is also part of its duties to oversee how monies 
are being spent on the project. The project team is headed by the project officer. 
The project officer should manage and coordinate the team members in accordance 
with the best practice. 
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Due to the fact that the project has to be in phases and stages, the project officer 
being aware of this should appoint people who have the expertise and knowledge 
to supervise the project from inception to the end. 
 
5.6.1.4 Consultant/Transaction Advisor 
Where an institution does not have an officer who can prepare or draft an 
appropriate strategic plan or who can prepare the feasibility studies, then such an 
institution should appoint a consultant or transaction advisor who will provide 
defined inputs into each of the phases where such inputs are required from 
inception to the end of the procurement stage. However, where the institution is 
satisfied that it has the capacity, skills and experience within it, there will not be 
any need to appoint any consultant or advisor. 
 
5.6.2 Feasibility Studies 
This is the Second phase of the PPP Procurement cycle in South Africa. The main 
essence of the feasibility studies is to demonstrate affordability and promptly show 
how value for money can be achieved through the transfer of risks to the private 
sector. It will show a comparative advantage in terms of operational and strategic 
benefits in undertaking the PPP project. It also describes the specific functions and 
the deliverables expected and the appropriate form in which the public authority 
should adopt in the implementation of the PPP project.  
Mr Innocent Khumalo stated further that: 
“part of the essence of feasibility studies is to identify whether there are 
contradictory laws which can be picked up and at that stage, solutions can 
be proposed to it and to critically examine which government department 
has the right to grant the concession and also to know if there is a need to 
amend, to propose the amendment of some provisions and where they are 
insufficient for example, provisions can be made to supplement them. If a 
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need arises to cater for whatever risks relating to the project, that will be 
done at the feasibility study stage”.  
 
Feasibility studies comprises of the following key sections. These can be 
categorized under the followings: 
1. Sector needs assessment;  
2. Output specification; 
3. Options analysis; 
4. Construction of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC); 
5. Demonstration of affordability; and  
6. Preparation of a benchmark for value for money. 
 
The report of the study will later be submitted to the PPP Unit for assessment to 
ensure whether it conforms to the principles of affordability, value for money and 
risk transfer. Thereafter, the recommendation based on its assessment shall then be 
submitted to the Financial Secretary. Also, at the feasibility stage, the Ministry of 
Finance must approve the budget set for the project and also gives government 
guarantees where it is required. 
 
5.6.3 The Procurement Phase 
This is the Third stage in the PPP project cycle. There are five different stages 
under this procurement stage. These stages are: Prequalification; Request for 
Proposals; Best and Final Offer, where appropriate; Negotiations and Final 
Closure. The officers responsible are required to prepare bid documents including 
draft PPP agreement in accordance with the PFMA. Treasury Regulation 16 gives 
the accounting officer the responsibility of designing and managing the 
procurement process in such a way as to conform to the regulation’s requirements. 
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This implies that the module is not prescriptive, but rather lays a foundation for 
best practice as it has been developed in National Treasury-regulated PPPs. Due to 
the fact that PPP is still new in South Africa, it is expected that as new projects are 
being executed, the procurement process will further be refined to bring it in line 
with the best practices. In this phase, there are Three (3) approvals required. These 
are TA: IIA; TA: IIB and TA: III. 
 
16.5 Procurement – Treasury approvals: IIA and IIB 
16.5.1 Prior to the issuing of any procurement documentation for a PPP to 
any prospective bidders, the institution must obtain approval from the 
relevant treasury for the procurement documentation, including the draft 
PPP agreement. 
16.5.2 The treasury approval referred to in regulation 16.5.1 shall be 
regarded as Treasury Approval: IIA. 
16.5.3 The procurement procedure – 
(a) Must be in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective; and 
(b) Must include a preference for the protection or advancement of persons, 
orcategories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
incompliance with relevant legislation. 
16.5.4 After the evaluation of the bids, but prior to appointing the preferred 
bidder, the institution must submit a report for approval by the relevant 
treasury, demonstrating how the criteria of affordability, value for money 
and substantial technical, operational and financial risk transfer were 
applied in the evaluation of the bids, demonstrating how these criteria were 
satisfied in the preferred bid and including any other information as 
required by the relevant treasury. 
16.5.5 The treasury approval referred to in regulation 16.5.4 shall be 
regarded as Treasury Approval: IIB. 
 
16.6 Contracting PPP agreements – Treasury Approval: III 
16.6.1 After the procurement procedure has been concluded but before the 
accounting officer or accounting authority of an institution concludes a 
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PPP agreement, that accounting officer or accounting authority must 
obtain approval from the relevant treasury – 
(a) that the PPP agreement meets the requirements of affordability, value 
for money and substantial technical, operational and financial risk transfer 
as approved in terms of regulation 16.4.2 or as revised in terms of 
regulation 16.4.4; 
(b) for a management plan that explains the capacity of the institution, and 
its proposed mechanisms and procedures, to effectively implement, manage, 
enforce, monitor and report on the PPP; and 
(c) that a satisfactory due diligence including a legal due diligence has 
been completed in respect of the accounting officer's or accounting 
authority and the proposed private party in relation to matters of their 
respective competence and capacity to enter into the PPP agreement. 
16.6.2 The treasury approval referred to in regulation 16.6.1 shall be 
referred to as Treasury Approval: III. 
 
Before the issuance of any document to any bidder in this stage, the treasury’s 
approval termed ‘Treasury Approval: IIA’ must first be sought and obtained. The 
relevant officer must issue and advertise a request for proposal with draft PPP 
agreement, he then receives and compares the bids submitted whether they are in 
line with the terms of the advert requesting for proposals. He would thereafter 
select among the bidders the preferred bidder and then prepares a value assessment 
report. The procedure of procurement must be such that is transparent, fair, 
equitable, competitive and cost effective. Also, preference should also be given to 
persons who are disadvantaged as a result of unfair discrimination against them 
and the relevant treasury shall comply with all laws that seek to protect and 
promote the advancement of such persons. 
 
Immediately after the submission and evaluation of all bids, but prior to the 
selection of the preferred bidder, the concerned authority must submit a detailed 
report showing how the criteria of value for money, affordability and transfer of 
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risk to the private sector were applied in the bid evaluation process and stating any 
other information required by the treasury. Then once the treasury is satisfied that 
all the required steps have been taken and necessary information supplied, then the 
second approval termed Treasury Approval IIB shall then be granted.483 
 
After the procurement procedure and where the accounting authority has complied 
with all the requisite requirements as to affordability, value for money and transfer 
of risks, but before the conclusion of the PPP agreement, then the accounting 
authority shall apply for approval from the relevant treasury. It must also be shown 
that a due diligence including a legal due diligence has been carried out in respect 
of the project and also the parties involved in relation to their competencies to 
carry out the PPP project. This approval is what is termed Treasury Approval 
III.484  
 
It should be stressed that this procurement stage is very cardinal to the entire PPP 
project cycle because the success or failure of the PPP project will largely depend 
on the  extent at which the relevant accounting officer or the accounting institution 
as well as the private party complied with the appropriate laws and regulations 
governing PPP. The bidding process should be conducted in accordance with the 
laws and international best practices. 
 
5.6.4 Contract Management Phase 
This is the last stage of the PPP Cycle. This stage spans through the procurement, 
development, delivery and exit stages. Therefore, contract management is 
applicable to commencement, contract signing, and service delivery and through to 
                                                          
483 This is in compliance with Regulation 16.5.4. 
484See Regulation 16.6.2.  
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the exit of the private sector partner. It touches on virtually all the stages in the PPP 
cycle. During this stage, accounting officer will be responsible for PPP contract 
Management Measure outputs, monitor and regulate performance, liaise effectively 
with the government and other necessary parties and settle disputes (if any). 
 
5.7 The Concession Award Process 
This is one of the stages in the PPP Cycle discussed above (Procurement Phase). It 
centers on the award process which is very germane and needs further elaboration. 
Module 5 of the PPP Manual issued by the National Treasury expatiates on how to 
go through the stages in PPP procurement and getting the required approvals and 
documentations at the necessary stages. National Treasury Regulation 16.5 (1), 
(2) and (3) are more detailed and explicit on the stages and approvals to be 
obtained. It is expedient to state that the institution concerned must comply with all 
the requirements of this and other legislations governing the award process. The 
regulation provides 
16.5.1 Prior to the issuing of any procurement documentation for a PPP to 
any prospective bidders, the institution must obtain approval from the 
relevant treasury for the procurement documentation, including the draft 
PPP agreement. 
16.5.2 The treasury approval referred to in regulation 16.5.1 shall be 
regarded as Treasury Approval: IIA. 
16.5.3 The procurement procedure – 
(a) Must be in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, 
Competitive and cost-effective; and 
(b) Must include a preference for the protection or advancement of persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
incompliance with relevant legislation. 
16.5.4 After the evaluation of the bids, but prior to appointing the preferred 
bidder, 
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The institution must submit a report for approval by the relevant treasury, 
demonstrating how the criteria of affordability, value for money and 
substantial technical, operational and financial risk transfer were applied 
in the evaluation of the bids, demonstrating how these criteria were 
satisfied in the preferred bid and including any other information as 
required by the relevant treasury. 
16.5.5 The treasury approval referred to in regulation 16.5.4 shall be 
regarded as 
Treasury Approval: IIB. 
 
It is important to state here that the procurement phases of the PPP go through 
distinct stages which are follows; 
1. Pre-qualification 
2. Request for Proposals 
3. Best and Final Offer  
4. Negotiations and 
5. Financial Close 
 
5.7.1 Pre-qualification 
In order to reduce the total number of private parties in the PPP procurement 
process, the National Treasury through the Manual provides for what is called Pre-
qualification exercise. This is the first part of the PPP procurement process. It is a 
very important part of the PPP procurement process and it must be carried out in 
accordance with the applicable procurement legislations, regulations and best 
practice. 
The objectives of this stage among others are: 
1. To select a limited number of bidders who will be qualified financially, 
technically and who have sufficient skills and commitments to execute the 
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project. There should also be the will to meet the objectives of the Black 
Economic Empowerment policy. 
2. This stage will also afford the bidders the opportunity of knowing the rules 
and regulations applicable in to the procurement process. 
3. All vital information about the project circle will be disseminated at this 
stage. 
4. It will also give the participants the opportunity of knowing what skills and 
qualities are expected from the private party in the procurement process. 
5. It will afford the PPP Unit and other government departments to gather 
verifiable information from the private party which can be evaluated and 
which may enhance a more efficient and effective PPP process. 
 
It is only the pre-qualified bidders that would be allowed to enter the Request for 
Proposal (RFP) stage. Other critical issues to be considered at this stage include the 
requirements of the parties who are eligible to participate in the bidding process; 
the bid bond; the number of prequalified bidders which is mostly kept to a 
minimum of three and maximum of four persons; the Black Economic 
Empowerment policies and whether there is any conflict of interest. 
 
The following approvals must be obtained at this stage; 
a. The accounting officer or authority, who is the officer responsible for the 
implementation of the institution’s procurement policy under the PFMA 
must give an approval to the project. 
b. The mandatory Treasury Approval (TA:IIA) must be obtained from the 
National Treasury at this stage.  
c. Such other approvals that may be required by specific institutions.  
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5.7.2 Request for Proposals (RFP) 
The next stage is for the institution to call for proposals from the private sector. 
This is done through publication of same in the institution’s website and the media. 
The Request for Proposal (RFP) must provide information about the background to 
the project, the expected outcome and the time limit within which the project must 
be completed. It will set out the way and manner the procurement will be carried 
out and what should be done at what stage. It will also set out the laws, rules and 
regulations governing procurement, with the minimum requirement of compliance 
with the regulations. The processes must be described in details, including the 
processes and procedure for securing approvals and consents from the National 
Treasury. 
 
It also sets out the standard specifications for the project, the commitments 
required from the bidders, the payment mechanism and penalty for non-
compliance, the bid evaluation criteria and lastly the legal requirements for the PPP 
processes. 
 
5.7.3 Best and Final Offer 
After the submission of bids, the bids have to be evaluated resulting in the selection 
of a preferred and reserved bidder.  The evaluation process must be known to all 
the bidders and must comply with the relevant legislations and regulations 
governing it. The evaluation teams and committees will be appointed and all 
declarations and codes must be signed. The provisions of the Promotion of 
administrative Justice Act (PAJA) and the BEE Code must be specifically adhered 
to. 
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At this stage, the accounting officer or authority must submit to the treasury, the 
report of the value-for-money with an application for the approval of TA: IIB. It is 
only when this approval has been granted that the preferred and reserve bidders 
will be announced and thereafter, negotiations will commence with the preferred 
bidder. The preferred and the reserve bidders would then be required to accept the 
appointment and extend their bid bonds as a commitment to the process. The 
institution may replace the preferred bidder with the reserve bidder where he 
withdraws or negotiation fails. 
 
5.7.4 Negotiation 
After the preferred bidder and the reserved bidder have been chosen, the next stage 
is the negotiation stage. This is an important part of the procurement process. It is a 
process and not an event. Negotiation is important it bridges gaps that may be 
created in a contract; it helps in eliminating confusion, and assists in formal 
clarification of the terms and conditions of the agreement. It also helps in 
structuring a sound and durable agreement which will protects the interests of the 
parties thereto. 
 
 Where the negotiation is successful, it culminates into the award of contract 
thereby ending the procurement process. Both the institution and the private sector 
party go to the negotiation table with different motives. The institution and the 
private party have different perspectives on the negotiations stage. The institution 
will want to reduce the cost and maximize the value of the services to be provided 
through the partnership, while the private sector will be soliciting for a reduction in 
the risk and an increment in the margins.  The negotiation should culminate in a 
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clear PPP agreement which will encompass all other ancillary agreements which 
are vital to the successful delivery of the PPP project. 
 
5.7.4.1  Basic Principles of Successful Negotiations 
The Manual has also laid down the basic principles which should guide a party to a 
successful PPP negotiation. Although, these principles are not exhaustive, but strict 
observance to them will help to achieving a successful negotiation. These are; 
a. The negotiating party should focus on interests and not on positions. 
b. He must as must much as possible separate the people from the problem. 
c. He must do his homework and map out what he really wants from the 
negotiation. In fact, he should have prepared designed a detailed 
negotiation plan. This will allow him to make a pre-define positions and a 
fall back in case he does not have his way through. 
d. He should be fair in his dealings in order to build confidence. 
e. He should listen actively to the submissions of other parties. 
f. He should respect the other party’s priorities and in some cases be prepared 
to compromise his position. 
g. He should not be in a hurry or be under pressure to take a decision at any 
given time. 
h. He should never have the notion that monopoly of decision is only for the 
preferred bidder. 
i. He should never be emotional and over reactive to whatever the other party 
says. 
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5.7.5 Contract Close 
The final selection of a private party signals the end of the complex procurement 
process and the beginning of new phase which requires distinct levels of 
institutional capability. The actual PPP agreement will have to be drawn at this 
stage.  The project officer must ensure that adequate time and resources are 
devoted to the preparation of the agreement. It is always better that the preferred 
bidder is closely involved in the development of the PPP agreement because his 
involvement will help in building good working relationship between the parties. 
 
In addition, a legal document covering the legal opinion, legal due diligence, 
capacity and competence of the parties to enter into a PPP agreement must be 
signed by the project advisor. This is essential in ascertaining that both parties have 
complied with the requirements of a valid PPP agreement. Some of the contents of 
the legal opinion are; 
1. That the project falls within the PPP project under the Act; 
2. That all the required approvals from the treasury have been obtained;  
3. That the process of procurement complies fully with the relevant 
regulations and regulations; 
4. That all future guarantees and financial commitments have been authorized; 
5. That the relevant institution, by law, has the capacity to enter into such PPP 
agreement; and  
6. That the authorized signatory has the competence to enter into such PPP 
agreement on behalf of that institution. 
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5.7.5.1  Getting the TA: III Approval 
Also during this stage, the Project Officer will apply for the approval of TA: III. 
This application presupposes a continuation of value for money report and also sets 
out the total negotiated cost for the project and the contingent liabilities which the 
institution has incurred. It also sets out in details, the institution’s plans to manage 
the PPP agreement and establishes the legal due diligence conducted on the 
competence of the parties to enter the PPP agreement. 
 
5.8 Duration of Concession Agreement 
The PPP Agreement must specify the duration of the concession agreement. There 
is a difference between the gestation period and the service period. The gestation 
period is the period between the signing of the contract to the day the project is 
completed. While service period is the period within which the project is put into 
operation. 
 
The Standardized PPP provision No 2 of 2004 laid down what to be considered in 
the choice of duration for the concession agreement as follows:  
1.  The requirements of the contracting authority in relation to the Services; 
2.  The possibility of alternative uses of the Project Assets; 
3. Affordability of the Services to be provided in the light of the institution’s 
anticipated future budgetary allocations. Also, the economic usefulness of the 
Project is also to be considered. The general principle is that a PPP Agreement with 
a longer duration may be more affordable as this may reduce the amount of the 
Unitary Payments over the Project Term; 
4. The necessity for any major replacement or refurbishment in respect of the 
Project Assets over the Project Term; and 
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5. The period for the debt repayment (where the debt repayment term is longer, this 
may allow for a longer duration of the concession agreement). 
 
However, where the project asset has an alternative use in a way that it is possible 
for the private party to recover its investment by putting same on an alternative 
usage or selling them, these may influence a shorter date for the duration of the 
concession agreement. If this is the case, the Unitary Payments should be lower 
and the project term should be shorter than in the former case where the project 
term will be longer because of absence of an alternative usage for the asset. 
According to Mr Lindokhule on the duration of PPP project in South Africa, he 
stated thus; 
“There is no specific rule that regulates the duration of concession 
agreement in South Africa. However, from the statistics of some of the 
projects already awarded and completed, the maximum contract duration is 
30 years. The Chapman’s Peak Drive Toll Road which is a project under 
the Western Cape Department of Transport was concessioned for 30 years. 
Also, the Eco-tourism Manyeleti 3 sites awarded by the Limpopo 
Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism was also 
concessioned for a period of 30 years. The famous Guatrain Rapid Rail 
Link under the Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works under 
the (DBFOT) was concessioned for a period of 20 years and the Head 
office accommodation built by Rainprop Consortium has a 25 year 
concession period.” 
 
It is necessary to state that the most important thing is to determine a reasonable 
period for achieving a specified return on investment. The concession period 
should be one that will allow the private sector to recoup the moneys he has spent 
on the project and also to make his profit on the investment.   
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5.9 Participation by Foreign Nationals 
An alien who wishes to participate in a PPP project in South Africa must first 
register a company under the laws of South Africa. All prospective foreign 
applicants will have to follow the under listed procedures: 
1. No permits are required for a foreigner who wishes to engage in business 
except business permit. All foreigners who wish to engage in business or 
join in a partnership in South Africa must have at least R2.5 million which 
he must be ready to invest in business. This fund which must belong to the 
applicant and originates from the applicant’s bank overseas will then be 
transferred to South Africa.485The business or partnership which the 
foreigner intends to start must be one that will create jobs for South African 
nationals. Between Six months and one year of commencement of 
operation, the applicant must submit to the Department of Labour, a proof 
that the business is employing South Africans.  
 
2. Having obtained a business permit, the company must then be registered 
within 21 days of the start of business with the Registrar of Companies in 
accordance with S.13 of the Companies Act 2008.486 
 
3. Where a company that is willing to participate in business in South Africa 
has already been registered in the overseas country, Such companies are 
required under the Companies Act of 1973 are regarded as “external 
companies” and are required to register with the Registrar of Companies in 
Pretoria. An external company is not required to appoint a local Board of 
Directors, however, it must appoint a person who is resident in South 
                                                          
485 Starting a Business in South Africa. Accessed from http://sami.co.za/images/starting_business.pdf. Accessed on 
15.05.13. 
486 Act No 71 of 2008. 
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Africa and who will be authorised to receive all processes and notices 
which are being served on the company. Such companies must also appoint 
a qualified auditor and must also have a registered office within the 
Republic of South Africa. 
 
5.10 Termination of PPP Contracts 
Termination of PPP agreements in South Africa is generally governed by the 
provisions of the Standardized Note issued by the National Treasury in 2004. This 
note recognizes three broad ways of terminating a PPP agreement. The first one is 
by default of either of the parties, the second is where the private party is involved 
in a corrupt or fraudulent act in the procurement process and the third is where 
there is Force Majeure. These three situations will be discussed in seriatim:  
 
5.10.1 Termination Due to Default by Either of the Parties 
Every standard PPP Agreement must deal comprehensively with the possibility of 
early breach by the private party. This will allow the institution to terminate for 
inadequate provision of services as agreed to in the concession agreement and also 
with this clause in the agreement, the private party can also terminate where the 
institution has failed to do what is expected of it under the contract. The 
termination clause in a PPP agreement must specify the act or acts of the Private 
Party which may give the institution the right to terminate and vice-versa. These 
acts, as far as practicable should be objective, clear and there should be room for 
reasonable tolerances bearing in mind the unpalatable and undesirable 
consequences of termination. 
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5.10.2 Termination Due to Corrupt Acts 
The standardized PPP Notes487 provides that where a corrupt act or fraud is 
perpetrated against the public authority in the PPP procurement process and the 
performance of the PPP contract, such institution may terminate the PPP agreement 
on the ground of corrupt practices. The corrupt acts referred to also include gifts, 
and all other acts of grafts that are common in public procurement. 
 
 Therefore, every PPP Agreement must provide for termination as part of the 
consequences of corrupt dealings. The institution must have a right to terminate the 
agreement in such circumstances. Where the corrupt act is committed by the 
private party, its directors, shareholders, agents or any of its employees acting with 
the authority or knowledge of any of the directors of such a company, then such 
institution will have a severe remedy which is outright termination of the PPP 
agreement. In addition to this, the institution may also sue for compensation and 
also seek to recover the losses that it has suffered as a result of the private party’s 
corrupt practices. 
 
In the same vein, where the corrupt practices is perpetrated by a director or any of 
the agents of the subcontractor acting under the knowledge and authority of a 
director of the subcontractor, then the authority may subject to a notice in writing, 
terminate the agreement and treat it as a corrupt act of the private party, unless the 
private cause the subcontractor to be replaced within the period of the notice given. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
487 See S.60(5) of the Standardized PPP issued as No 2 of 2004. 
  
250 
 
5.10.3 Force Majeure 
Force Majeure is an unexpected event that occurs due to no fault of either of the 
parties to a contract. Where an unexpected event occurs in such a way that both 
parties could not agree on a mutual solution to address the unexpected event, either 
of the parties has the right to terminate the concession agreement. Where the 
private party is the one who terminated for force majeure, the position is that he 
should still be compensated on termination for Force Majeure. The compensation 
which is payable on termination as a result of Force Majeure should reflect that 
neither of the parties is at fault. 
 
5.10.4 Effects of Termination 
Where a party has elected to exercise his right to terminate, the PPP Agreement 
becomes terminated in accordance with the provisions of the agreement and the 
parties will no longer be required to perform any other obligations under the PPP 
Agreement. The agreement may, however, contain some provisions which will still 
be effective even after its termination (there may be provision for indemnity even 
after the termination). In addition, all the rights, duties and obligations that have 
been performed by the parties before the termination of the contract can still be 
enforced after the termination. 
 
There are also certain rights and obligations that will arise only once the 
concession agreement is terminated and such must unequivocally be provided for 
as surviving the termination of the agreement. These include the procedure of 
transferring the project back to the public authority and the private sector’s 
obligation to clear the construction site after termination. It is important that these 
provisions are set out in the agreement because where adequate provisions are not 
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made; this may result into unnecessary delay or interruptions in the provision of 
services. 
 
5.10.5 Compensation for Termination 
It must be categorically stated in the agreement that the private party is not entitled 
to any compensation on the expiry of the project term.488 The Private Party will 
only be entitled to seek compensation where the institution has terminated the 
agreement before the expiry date. The value of the amount payable as 
compensation will depend on the reasons for the termination. Where the 
termination is as a result of the breach of the agreement by the public authority, the 
compensation accruable to the private party will be much more than the 
compensation payable to the private party as a result of force Majeure. In all cases, 
compensation payable by the private party as a result of default on his default 
should be lesser than the compensation payment on termination for any other 
reason. 
 
In addition, the compensation accruable to the private party should also cover all 
amounts that are due to the third parties in the course of the contract like the 
subcontractors. This amount has to be thoroughly calculated in order not to extend 
beyond the first-tier subcontractor.  
 
 
 
                                                          
488 See S.63 of the Standardized PPP Provision No 2 of 2004. 
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5.11 Dispute resolution in PPPs 
The Arbitration Act,489 Module 6 of the National Treasury PPP Manual and the 
Standardized provision490 prescribe a detailed procedure for resolving dispute in 
PPP. It is therefore important for the parties to include this in the PPP Agreement. 
It is the requirements of these provisions that all disputes should first be referred to 
the respective liaison/project officers in order to proffer solutions to it. If these 
officers are unable to resolve the issue within time, then the dispute should then be 
referred to both the accounting officer of the institution and the Chief Executive of 
the private party. 
 
If the dispute could still not be settled at this stage, then it has to be referred to an 
independent mediator appointed by the two parties to the dispute.491 Where 
however, the dispute could still not be settled by the independent mediator, then it 
is at this stage that it has to be referred to the courts for settlement. It is therefore 
incumbent on both the project officer who acts for the institution and his 
counterpart who acts for the private party to ensure that management team 
understands the procedure for resolving disputes. 
 
The project officer has the duty to facilitate cooperation and resolve disputes that 
may arise as early as possible. He should try to involve higher authority in 
resolving the disputes where need be and he should create the best atmosphere to 
facilitate quick and effective dispute resolution. 
 
In order to ascertain the cause of the problems and finding a lasting solution to it, 
the project officer should: 
                                                          
489 Act No 42 of 1965. 
490 See Part 86 of the Standardised Provision. 
491 See also S.11 (1) of the Arbitration Act of 1945 as amended by Act No 49 of 1996. 
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1. Always record the problems as they occur; 
2. Notify the private party of the problems in accordance with the mode set 
out in the PPP Agreement; and  
3. Ensure that the approaches to be followed in resolving the problems are 
clear and documented. 
 
The regulation requires that before a PPP dispute is taken to court, alternative 
means of settling disputes like informal conciliation must first be attempted 
because these modes will fast-track the resolution of the dispute by expert 
adjudicators. Also, resolving the dispute through an alternative means will also 
settle the dispute amicably. This is because the mode and procedure adopted is by a 
consensus of the two parties rather than by imposition of the law by the court. It is 
only where the informal attempts fail that the matter should then be referred to the 
court for adjudication. The PPP Agreement must therefore provide for informal 
resolution of certain urgent issues through conciliation because any delay in 
settling those issues will prejudice the interest of either of the parties. 
 
It should be mentioned that Mediation, which is the resolution of dispute by a 
neutral third party is not specifically favoured by the rules in the PPP 
Standardization. The reason is because, in mediation, the neutral party has no 
power to render a decision which would be binding. Therefore, internal referral 
like informal conciliation is preferred than mediation. 
 
Where the issues in dispute between the private party and the institution also 
extend to the private party and the subcontractor or another third party, then it will 
be better to join all parties in the proceeding. There are also instances where a party 
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who has a direct and substantial interest in the proceedings will be joined by 
operation of law as a necessary party. This is because; whatever decision is made at 
the end of the proceedings will have a direct effect on him. 
 
The institution should refrain from being drawn into the disputes that arise between 
the private party and his subcontractors. The PPP Agreement should also provide 
that the private party should not stop the ongoing work or leave the sites while any 
dispute is still being resolved. 
 
5.12 Challenges Facing PPP in South Africa 
The South African PPP programme, though ranked as one of the best in the world 
with policy, legal and institutional framework, still has its own challenges. These 
challenges are few compared to other countries like Nigeria and Ghana that were 
examined earlier in this research work. Few of the challenges identified here are 
inadequate personnel to attend to projects, delay in the preparation and execution 
of the project which hinders deal flow, conflicting laws and policies that govern the 
PPP projects and public mistrust on the part of private sector’s involvement in the 
management and control of public assets. 
 
5.12.1 Resistance from the Trade Unions 
There has been serious resistance by trade unions in South Africa on the proposed 
e-tolling of some roads in Gauteng province (this comprise of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria). There have been series of protests and demonstrations that government 
had no right to levy tolls on the users. The trade union, under the umbrella of 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (OUTA) had approached the High court of 
Pretoria for a judicial review of the decision of the South Africa National Road 
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Agency Limited (SANRA). The High Court ruled in favour of the trade unions and 
directed that full review of the e-tolling scheme should be carried out before the e-
tolling could be introduced. 
 
On appeal to the Constitutional court, it was argued by the appellants SANRA and 
the National Treasury that the decision of the trial court had caused a great delay in 
the implementation of its programme and that this has also prevented it from 
repaying a huge debt which he had incurred in building the roads. The 
Constitutional Court, in a unanimous decision upturned the decision of the trial 
high court and affirmed the argument of the appellants.492The constitutional court 
held that the interim order granted had an immediate and irreparable effect on the 
government and business and thus appealable. The court stated further that the 
interim order must be set aside because the trial High Court did not take into 
consideration the constitutional imperatives of the principles of separation of 
powers. The court held thus: 
"The High Court should have held that the prejudice that would confront 
the motorists in Gauteng if the interim interdict were not granted did not 
exceed the prejudice that the National Executive, National Treasury and 
SANRAL would have to endure were the temporary restraining order 
granted." 
 
While reacting to the judgment of the constitutional court, the Finance Minister 
Pravin Gordhan commended the judiciary and stated that Government respects the 
fundamental right of the citizens who felt aggrieved by the decision of any member 
of the public to approach the court for a judicial review. He went further to state 
thus; 
                                                          
492 The ruling of the Constitutional Court was delivered on 20th September, 2012. 
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"Government remains convinced about the appropriateness of the Gauteng 
Freeway Improvement Project, with the user-pay principle, as part of our 
country's investment in road infrastructure and our collective drive to grow 
the economy."  
 
5.12.2 Inadequate Personnel 
Public Private Partnerships require a host of competent and skilled staff to 
successfully handle the complex PPP transaction. The required areas of 
competencies include human resources, project management; financial analysis, 
legislative and regulatory knowledge, legal, Black Economic Empowerment and 
insurance. South Africa’s PPP is expanding. However, there are significant 
shortages in virtually all the disciplines listed above. As at January 2013, the 
National Treasury PPP Unit has only Seventeen (17) professional staff to handle 
hundreds of complex proposals that are being brought to it every time.493 Out of 
this 17 skilled staff, in the PPP Unit, Project Evaluation has only two professionals; 
Business Development has two skilled staff while Financial Analysis section has 
three professionals. Also, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation has two 
competent staff, Municipal Desk Section has three professional while Information 
Technology Division has only one professional. This shortage of skilled and 
competent personnel is also a challenge to the Municipal PPP Unit. 
 
It is also the view of the National Treasury that PPP projects takes longer time to 
implement, and that these projects require time and expertise that the treasury and 
other implementing agencies do not have internally. Both the National Treasury 
and the Municipal PPP units would therefore also like to have access to more 
expertise and more assistance in order to increase PPP deal flow. 
                                                          
493 Being part of the interview granted by Mr Hlatshwayo during the researcher’s visit to the PPP Unit of the National 
Treasury in February, 2013. 
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5.12.3 Delay in Preparation and Execution of Projects 
Since 1999 when the PFMA was enacted till February 2013 (14 years), only 
Twenty Four (24) PPP projects have been executed at the National level.494 Several 
projects have been signed both under the PFMA and the MFMA that are still in the 
pipelines. This delay may partly be as a result of the shortage of manpower and 
also a detailed and very cumbersome procurement procedure which must be 
followed in awarding PPP contract in South Africa. 
 
5.12.4 Conflicting laws and Policies 
There are apparent overlapping responsibilities on the policy directions of PPPs 
especially in the municipalities. This confusion sometimes arose as to which 
agency performs certain functions among the Municipal PPP Unit, Department of 
Local Government and other national agencies or departments.495 At the municipal 
level, there are also conflicting provisions in the legal framework between the 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and the Municipal Systems Act 
(MSA).496 One of the most apparent conflicting provisions is in the area of 
conducting a feasibility studies for a PPP project. Both Acts require that feasibility 
studies should be conducted; however, their provisions are not identical. 
 
While under the MSA, an average time-frame for the conduct of feasibility studies 
is Two (2) years,497 however, under the MFMA, a period of 6 Months has been 
fixed for the feasibility studies. Since a municipality is bound by the provisions of 
                                                          
494 That was as at February 2013. 
495Key Challenges to Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa, an Initiative of the Presidency of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Business Trust. Retrieved from  http://www.castalia-advisors.com/files/12345.pdf. Accessed on 14th May, 
2013.  
496The Municipal Systems Act (MSA) is one of the Acts enacted by the parliament with the aim of empowering the Local 
Governments to achieve its constitutional objectives. It has among other objectives to promote social and economic 
development, to ensure the provision of services to the community in a sustainable manner and encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. 
497 See S.78 of the MSA. 
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the two Acts, adequate care has to be taken in order not to contravene the 
provisions. 
 
5.12.5 Lack of Awareness on the benefits of PPPs 
There is the notion that the private sector’s involvement is only to make profit and 
not really to provide the needed infrastructures for the nation. Also, that the private 
sector will not optimally utilize the infrastructure assets for the public interest, but 
rather for their personal aggrandizement. Some politicians do not subscribe to the 
idea of vesting the state resources into the hands of private sector, because this will 
mean ceding authorities, responsibilities and control of infrastructure assets, and 
this will connote vesting them with political powers.  To them, unless a state is in 
control of its own resources, that state cannot exercise the right of political self-
determination. Therefore, there is the lack of trust on the governmental objectives 
in harnessing the private sector resources to develop the nation’s infrastructure. 
 
5.13 Lessons Learned from the South African Framework 
The following key lessons are learnt from the South African experience, and what 
is true of South Africa is actually true and can be adopted by most of the 
governments. 
1. South Africa has adopted a highly regulated and formal approach to public 
procurement and Public-Private Partnerships by entrenching Constitutional 
provisions as well as binding legislation and regulations to achieve the 
procurement objectives. The Administrative Law in South Africa has developed 
at an unprecedented manner making the country to be one of the best in the 
world in terms of administrative laws and regulations especially with provisions 
on the administrative justice action. 
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2. South Africa has also incorporated various anti-corruption measures into its 
procurement regulations generally, and the effects of such mechanisms on the 
machinery of government will be great.498 An example of this is the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. 
3. The basic principles of transparency, accountability, fairness, cost-effectiveness 
and publicity have constitutional backings and other supporting legislations. 
These are very important principles that guide all procurements. 
4. The provisions relating to dispute resolution in the South Africa’s PPP are very 
comprehensive and effective. This is important in order to attract private sector 
to develop public infrastructure. 
5. The establishment of a dedicated PPP Unit within the national treasury helps in 
understanding and appreciating the budgetary implications of PPPs. This is 
because PPP procurement is linked to the finances of government departments. 
Where the power to regulate the PPP is vested in a department which does not 
really understand these financial intricacies, this may lead to financial 
imbalances. 
6. The Establishment of the PPP units at the Municipal and Provincial levels 
ensure that PPP projects are implemented at the Municipal and provincial levels. 
This will increase the PPP deal flow and drastically increase the pace of 
development at these levels.  
7. A clearly defined evaluation and procurement processes enables the bid 
evaluation and the procurement to be transparent to a larger extent.  
8. The delivery of a PPP project that is well structured and which is in line with the 
principles of affordability, Value for money and sufficient risk transfer is the 
ultimate objective of the South African PPP programme. 
                                                          
498 Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement:  A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification 
Measures. Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December, 2011. 
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9. Government must first explore the possibility of carrying out a project under the 
public procurement before contracting it under PPP. It is not all projects that fits 
into PPPs. It is only an alternative means of building infrastructure where public 
procurement will not be suitable. 
10. The PPP Unit which coordinates and renders technical assistance to government 
departments should be more equipped with skilled staff. This will help in 
increasing the pace at which South Africa rolls out more PPP project.  
 
5.14 Conclusion 
The law and policy developed for Public Private Partnerships in South Africa make 
it amongst the leading countries in the field of PPPs in the world. The constitution, 
legislations and other policy framework put in place to govern PPP are 
comprehensive, detailed and encompass the detailed provisions for procurement 
and monitoring of PPP Projects. These have helped to boost the public service 
record in the delivery of PPP projects in recent years, and the project pipeline has 
continued to increase both in number and value-for-money principles that they 
contain.  
 
Being a country whose PPP programme is still developing, there are still a few 
challenges which hinder the progress of PPPs and which the country must 
overcome within a short period of time. Skills shortages in the PPP unit and 
government departments which have resulted in delays in the implementation of 
concession agreements; conflicting legal and policy framework and lack of 
awareness on the importance of the PPP scheme are some of these challenges. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
 
 6.0   INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was 
established by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2205 (XXI) 
of 17th December, 1966, as part of its commitments to facilitate the development of 
International trade and Investment.499 UNCITRAL was given the mandate to 
further promote the codification, harmonisation and modernisation of international 
laws and conventions by preparing and promoting the adoption of a model 
legislative and non-legislative framework in different key areas concerning trade, 
investment and development.500 UNCITRAL has set up different working 
committees to perform the substantive preparatory work on different aspects of law 
and which have been identified in plenary sessions. The working groups on 
Procurement and Infrastructure Development are part of them.501 
 
In recognition of the importance of private sector in infrastructure development 
through Public-Private Partnerships, the United Nations UNCITRAL group is 
having series of deliberations with the aim of producing a standard model law and 
recommendations to the United Nation in order to further attract private investors 
in the development of public infrastructure. Series of International Colloquium 
were held in Vienna by the UNCITRAL working group with the aim of 
                                                          
499 For more information about the origin, composition and mandate of UNCITRAL, see “Basic facts about the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law” .Accessed from http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-
57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf, on 07.06.13. 
500 UNCITRAL has produced several conventions and model laws. Few example of these are the texts and statutes on the 
Procurement  and Infrastructure Development, International Commercial Arbitratiion and Conciliation, Electronic 
Commerce among others. 
501 See especially the reports of the UNCITRAL Working Group on Procurement from 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procurement.html. Accessed on 13.11.13. 
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harmonising and codifying a model legislative guide on Public-Private 
Partnerships.502 
 
On the importance of private sector participation in development through the PPPs, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe reported in 2008 as follows: 
“Over the past fifteen years, governments have been struggling to achieve 
economic development and competitiveness through improving their basic 
infrastructure. Increasingly, governments are turning to the private sector 
for the financing, design, construction and operation of infrastructure 
projects. Once rare and limited, these Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
have emerged as an important tool for improving economic competitiveness 
and infrastructure services. They are increasingly being considered as a 
mechanism to fill an infrastructure deficit in many UNECE countries.”503  
 
Also, at the UNCITRAL Colloquium on Public-Private Partnerships held in Vienna 
in May 2013,504 concerns of lack of legal certainty and regulatory stability for PPP 
transactions were raised as follows: 
“Concerns have been raised about the impact of a lack of uniform rules on 
the use of PPPs as a tool for infrastructure development and the provision 
of public services. The lack of legal certainty may increase transaction 
costs as standard terms may need to be negotiated on a project-by-project 
basis, which is has been reported, can further discourage the use of PPPs 
and lead to widely varying projects terms, with negative impacts on results 
and capacity. In some other countries, it was noted, PPPs are designed ‘on 
the spot’, without any domestic guidance, and sometimes taking inspiration 
from any suitable provisions in public procurement law. In others, the topic 
has been effectively set aside thanks to the absence of an adequate legal 
framework. Here, the experts suggested that public efficiency would be 
                                                          
502 Among these were the UN Conference on Sustainable Development which was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20th – 
22nd June, 2012. Also, there was the UNCITRAL International Colloquium on PPPs held in Vienna, Austrial between 2nd -
3rd May, 2013. 
503 See UNECE Guidebook on Promoting Good Governance in PPPs, Avant Propos, available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/publications/ppp.pdf. Accessed on 09.06.13. 
504 See the Report of the Colloquium organised by UNCITRAL in Vienna, Austria between 2nd-3rd May, 2013 available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/public-private-partnerships-2013.html. Accessed on 10.06.13. 
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enhanced through standardizing administrative procedures, while leaving 
enough flexibility to adapt the project agreements to the specific needs of 
each project.”    
 
In recent times, evidence has shown that the need to adopt PPP as a developmental 
strategy has increased and has gone beyond the nations of the European 
Community alone.505 Other countries like China, the United States of America, 
South Korea, United Kingdom, Brazil, South Africa and India among several 
others have adopted this synergy. Another report from the UNCITRAL Secretariat 
stated that the total value of PPP transactions in India alone may exceed US$1 
trillion within the next five years while PPPs are also increasingly being used in 
other countries of Central and Southern America, China and other countries in the 
Asia and the Pacific region.506   
 
While it is recognised that some countries have general specific laws regulating 
PPPs in their domain like Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, India, Portugal, 
Poland, Italy and some others, some other countries like China, Ghana and few 
others are in the process of coming up with specific legislations on PPPs. Other 
regular users of PPPs including the United States, Australia and United Kingdom 
have no relevant provision which has general application to PPP projects and 
services. They have however developed legislations for different sectors of 
PPPs.507  United Nations Secretariat noted that there are varying figures as to the 
                                                          
 
505Report to the Third Session of the Team of Specialists on Public-Private Partnerships 18-19 April , 2011 regarding Model 
PPP Laws. Retrieved from 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/ppt_presentations/2011/TOS_PPP3/2.I.10_Richard_Armitage.pdf. Accessed on 
10.06.13. 
506 See, for example, http://www.eria.org/projects/PPP.html, http://www.adb.org/publications/public-private-partn 
infrastructure-projects-case-studies-republic-
korea;http://ppp.gov.ph/?page_id=107;http://www.adb.org/offices/pacific/strategy  http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-
description-title,1303.html?id=co-t1139;www.iadb.org/biz/ppt/0604grahamb.ppt#4. 
 
507 See for example, the Mitcham-Frankston Project Act of 2004(Victoria) which is a specific legislation for project related to 
the EastLink toll road PPP in Australia. 
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percentage of PPP projects being undertaken without a PPP law. However, it has 
been stated that the percentage of such projects is not less than 90%.508 
 
There is no doubt that having a uniform legislative framework for PPPs would be a 
great tool not only for developing countries, but also for the developed nations who 
still need to build or modernise their ageing infrastructures. According to Simmons 
and Simmons,509 it was reported that there is a great possibility for investors to shy 
away from nations that do not have adequate legal framework for PPPs. 
 
6.1 Public-Private Partnerships in Other Jurisdictions  
Apart from the selected African countries examined in the preceding chapters in 
this thesis, it is pertinent to also briefly look at PPPs from other selected 
jurisdictions. These are: 
 
A. Australia 
Australia is one of the countries using PPPs as a means of developing its 
infrastructures. Currently, the country has about 5% of the global PPP market. The 
participation of the private sector in developing public infrastructure has gradually 
increased over time. This is because the government has since adopted 
privatisation at both the commonwealth and the state levels. The government is 
also desirous of using alternative method of private participation including PPPs 
and PFI. The structure and size of Australia presents both opportunities and 
challenges considering the huge amount of resources needed to develop new and 
maintain old infrastructures. 
                                                          
508 See the Report of the Colloquium organised by UNCITRAL in Vienna, Austria between 2nd-3rd May, 2013 available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/public-private-partnerships-2013.html. Accessed on 10.06.13. 
509See the Report submitted by Simmons and Simmons to the Third Session of the Team of Specialists on Public Private 
Partnerships 18-19 April, 2011 regarding Model PPP Laws. Retrieved from 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/ppt_presentations/2011/TOS_PPP3/2.I.10_Richard_Armitage.pdf. Accessed on 
10.06.13.  
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Currently, Australia does not have a well-developed PPP market similar to that of 
UK and there have been signs of the government to a well coherent PPP Policy. 
Although the country has executed some projects under the PFI model, however, 
there no coherent legal framework to regulate the projects. Each of the projects has 
its regulations and policies guiding same. 
 
B. Ireland 
The first PPP project in Ireland were signed in the year 2000 after which the 
project stagnated. In 2005, the Finance minister announced that the government 
had accepted the new proposals for a new initiative to adopt PPPs with the aim of 
accelerating project delivery. The government entered into a PPP transaction with 
Eurolink Consortium for the construction of the N4/N6 Kilcock Kinnegad project 
with a concession period of 30 years. The project transfers 30 years traffic risk to 
the private sector.  Since 2005, the government has entered into some PPP projects. 
The Irish roads programme has really benefited a lot from this initiative.  
 
C. China 
Since the 1994 tax reform in China, financial pressure has pushed the local 
governments to seek private investment to help in providing 
infrastructure.510Initially from the mid-1990s, the country witnessed the making of 
a legal and policy framework for Public-Private Partnerships from year 2000 till 
the present time. PPPs projects in China have witnessed huge investment input 
especially from the international operators.   
 
                                                          
510 See Cheng CHENG & Zhengxu Wang, ‘Public-Private Partnerships in China: Making Progress in a Weak Governance. 
Published by the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. Available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-56-chengchen-ppp.pdf. Accessed on 14.08.2014. 
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However, the country is facing some challenges to the smooth implementation of 
PPPs, the most prominent of which is the fragmented legal and regulatory 
framework. The monopolistic tendency of the state in the provision of 
infrastructure has also limited the private sector participation to an extent. In recent 
time, a more coherent legal and regulatory framework is anticipated which will 
help in the smooth implementation of PPPs. 
 
The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) 
which has been the leading arbitral institution in Asia will play an important role in 
settling PPPs and other disputes.511 Real growth in international arbitration in the 
region has also gravitated to Singapore and Hong Kong.512 The China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) together with other 
arbitration institutions in the region are being increasingly used in cases involving 
commercial disputes instead of litigation, which is often viewed as time 
consuming, expensive and inefficient. This institution will therefore play a greater 
role in strengthening the PPP programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
511 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) is one of the major permanent 
arbitration institutions in the world. It was formerly known as the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, CIETAC was set 
up in April 1956 under the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in accordance with the Decision 
Concerning the Establishment of A Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission Within the China Council For the Promotion of 
International Trade adopted on May 6, 1954 at the 215th session of the Government Administration Council.  
512  The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) are 
the principal arbitration venues in the Asia Pacific with a lot of disputes successfully resolved yearly. 
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6.2 Reasons for Modernisation and Harmonisation of PPPs at the 
International Level 
 
There have been series of concerns raised that while PPPs represent a new area of 
financial, legal and government institutions, it has however not been treated as 
such.513 There is clear lack of understanding of the project structure and procedures 
by the stakeholders; in fact, many projects have been abandoned and several others 
cancelled as a result of disputes which have arisen among the parties concerned.514  
 
There have also been great concerns about the effects of a lack of a uniform rules 
governing PPPs as a tool for infrastructure development and the provision of public 
services. Where there is no legal certainty and standard terms for PPP programme, 
transaction cost of projects will increase because negotiation will be on project-by-
project basis. This may further discourage the greater use of PPPs, as a solution to 
filling infrastructure gaps. 
 
The report of the 2013 Colloquium on Public-Private Partnerships noted that in 
some countries, PPPs are designed “on the spot” without recourse to either any 
local or international provision on  public procurement law that serves as a 
guidance for such projects.515 The report further noted that public efficiency will be 
enhanced where there is standardization of the administrative procedures which 
can be adopted by countries without any barriers. However, leaving enough 
flexibility to adapt the agreement to the country specification is therefore 
recognised. 
 
                                                          
513 See Nicholas D, Devising Transparent and Efficient Concession Award Procedures, Uniform Law Review/ Revue De 
Derot Uniforme, NS- Vol XVII, 2012. 
514 See for example, the Lagos Ibadan Express way concession contract which was terminated by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria in 2012.  
515 See the 2013 Colloquium on PPP which was held in Vienna, Austria. 
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Currently, there are series of non-uniform legislative guides made by different 
international bodies to regulate PPPs at the international level. There are also a 
number of existing publications available from international bodies which are 
useful sources of guidance to lawyers responsible for drafting national legislation 
to create a legal framework to support the development and implementation of a 
PPP programme.516 However, none of these legal frameworks can be considered as 
constituting a Model Law for PPPs. The need to have a common set of rules to 
govern PPP transactions has been on the increase.  
 
Therefore, this research also seeks to examine the key international legal 
instruments relating to Public-Private Partnerships in infrastructure development. 
The work concludes that there is the need to revise the UNCITRAL PFIPs Guide 
and Model Provision in line with the current socio-economic realities. The work 
therefore suggested core principles which should be incorporated in a Model PPP 
Legislative Guide. 
 
6.3 Current International Legislative Frameworks for Public-Private 
Partnerships 
 
There are currently some legislative guide or advice on Public-Private Partnerships 
at the international level. The most prominent which are examined in this work are: 
(a) UNCITRAL Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) 
Instruments; 
(b) The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO’s) 
Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through Build, Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) 1996; 
(c) The OECD “BASIC Elements of Law on Concession Agreements” 2000; 
                                                          
516 See the Simmons report, op cit. 
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(d) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD’s) “Core 
Principles on Modern Concession Law” 2006; and 
(e) European Commission’s Directives on the Award of Concessions. 
 
All these will be discussed, analysed and evaluated one after the other. 
 
6.3.1 UNCITRAL Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs) 
Instruments 
 
These instruments comprise of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on PFIP 2000 
and Model Legislative provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects 
(PFIPs) 2003. These instruments contain both legislative recommendations and 
model provisions on privately financed infrastructure projects. The legislative 
recommendations and the model provisions contained therein are intended to assist 
and guide the law making bodies of member nations in the adoption of a model 
framework for PFIPs in their respective countries.517 These recommendations are 
followed by notes that offer detailed explanations of the legal, regulatory, financial, 
policy and other issues that are discussed. 
 
The summary of the recommendations in the instruments are set out hereunder: 
1. That the constitutional, legislative and institutional framework to be 
adopted for privately financed infrastructure project should be one that 
will ensure transparency, fairness and long term sustainability of the 
project. The parliament of each member nation should ensure that all 
                                                          
517 Seungwoo Son, Legal Analysis on Public-Private Partnerships regarding Model PPP Rules. Retrieved from 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/public-private-partnerships-
2013/20120704_Report_on_PPP_legal_IssuesSon_Seungwoover.11.pdf. Accessed on 13.11.13. 
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restrictions or hindrances on the participation of the private sector to the 
development and operation of infrastructure are eliminated.518  
2. That the public authorities of the host countries should be identified by 
the law. This is important especially to know which organ of the 
government has the power to grant concession to the private sector for 
the development and operation of infrastructure projects. 
3. That privately financed infrastructure projects may include concessions 
which are awarded for the construction and operation of new projects or 
upgrading and maintenance of an existing infrastructure projects. 
4. That the enabling legal framework should identify the types and 
categories of infrastructure in respect of which concession may be 
granted. 
5. That the enabling legal framework should also specify whether the 
Federal or central government has an exclusive power to grant 
concession in respect of a project or whether concession in respects of 
the same project can be granted concurrently with the states/ regional or 
Local governments. These powers are mostly found in the legislative 
lists of the constitution of the member states.519  
6. That there should be an institution or coordinating body established to 
coordinate the activities of both the public and the private sector in 
respect of the project. This body should exercise its powers according to 
the statute establishing it.  
7. That the power to regulate infrastructure services under this initiative 
should not be entrusted to body or institution that either directly or 
indirectly provide infrastructure services. 
                                                          
518 See recommendation No.1 on the constitutional, legislative and institutional framework. 
519 For example, these are contained the the schedules to the Nigerian, Ghanaian and South African Constitution. 
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8. That regulatory competence should be entrusted to an independent body 
that is autonomous in order to ensure that its decision is taken without 
any interference or pressure from public service providers or private 
infrastructure operators.  
9. That the rules and regulations governing the procedures for the award of 
concessions should be made public. Regulatory decisions should be 
backed by reasons for arriving at such decisions and as much as 
possible, those decisions should be accessible to interested stakeholders 
through publications or other means. 
10. The legal framework should establish a very transparent procedure for 
settlement of disputes or where there is a call for review of regulatory 
decisions by an independent and impartial body, which may include 
court review, and should set forth the grounds on which such a review 
may be based.   
11. That where appropriate, there should be established a special procedure 
for the settlement of disputes among the parties concerning alleged 
violations of laws and regulations governing the relevant sector. 
12. That no limitation whether statutory or otherwise should be imposed 
upon the contracting parties’ ability to agree on how to allocate the risks 
in such a way that will suit the needs of the particular project. 
13. Lastly, the enabling law should state how to access financial support 
from the relevant authority, and to what extent can such authority make 
a guarantee to a third party with a view to giving support to the private 
sector in the implementation of the project. 
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It should be mentioned that the provisions in the UNCITRAL instruments focus 
only on physical infrastructure projects and exclude all other projects which may 
involve the extraction and development of natural resources. There are emerging 
issues like using PPPs to develop agricultural land for mining and to create food 
security for the nation.520 Also service concession which is emerging in recent 
times as a form of PPPs is also not covered in the Instruments. 
 
In addition, significant issues relating to commerce are not addressed in the body 
of the UNCITRAL Instruments, but rather they are contained in the notes. This is 
important due to increasing industrialisation and urbanisation which is compelling 
governments to resort to the private sector to seek for alternative means of 
infrastructure financing. The financial turmoil which erupted in the mid-2007 in 
the U.S. has now become the worst global financial crisis ever recorded. This 
therefore necessitates that financial institutions/lenders should reposition 
themselves and take into consideration such measures to avoid in order. Therefore,    
 
It is not in doubt that the level of global awareness of the existence of the 
UNCITRAL Guide and Model is low, and there has been scarce reliance on their 
provisions as sources of guidance in the drafting of PPP legislations by countries 
that have adopted PPPs.521 The UNCITRAL instruments came into being more 
than a decade ago when PPPs have not really developed significantly. There was 
the global financial crisis which has now significantly affected the way and manner 
                                                          
520 See, further, Fairer Mining Concessions in Africa: How Can this be Achieved?, available at  
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEB%20VOL%203%20Issue%203%20avril%202012 
%20BIS_AEB%20VOL%203%20Issue%203%20avril%202012%20BIS.pdf, and Nicholas, supra and the sources cited 
therein. 
521 See Simmons& Simmons Report. 
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in which international projects are financed with a consequent result on the PPP 
transactions. 522 
 
According to a report by Simmons and Simmons,523 the report admitted that 
though, the UNCITRAL Guide at best can serve as useful basis for assessing the 
readiness of a government’s policy, financial, legal and regulatory framework to 
support PPPs, it was contended that both the UNCITRAL Guide and the Model 
Law do neither constitute nor purport to be a model law and, as far as the 
committee was able to gather, there is nothing in the law which can be viewed in 
the true sense as a model law relating to PPP. 
 
6.3.2 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO’s) 
Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through Build, Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) 1996 
 
This organisation issued a guideline for infrastructure development through Build, 
Operate and Transfer Projects (BOTs) in 1996. The guidelines provide a basic 
orientation needed to undertake a BOT project. It considers both financial and legal 
issues while carrying out BOT projects as well as the essential practical 
information on the structures that a good BOT project should take. 
 
However, some of the features in UNIDO’s BOT are very similar to what is 
obtainable in Public Procurement. For example, under the UNIDO’s guidelines, the 
operator gets his revenue through a fee charged from the government rather than 
tariffs charged from direct users. This feature may qualify the BOTs as public 
                                                          
522 For example, there was the global economic meltdown which started in 2007 through 2009. 
523 This was the report submitted by Simmons & Simmons to the Third Session of the Team of Specialists on Public Private 
Partnerships 18-19 April 2011 on the Model PPP Laws. A/67/17, Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, 45th session, para 115, available at ww.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/sessions/45th.html. Accessed on 
01.07.13. 
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procurement in some respects.  There is no doubt that one of the key principles of 
concession contracts is that it is the users and not the government that will pay 
directly for the use of the facilities. 
 
Under the European Union Procurement Directives 2004/18/EC,524 such 
concessions are not considered as part of public procurement. Article 2 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement   defines ‘acquisition” to include 
BOTs, but arguably not concessions. 
 
Therefore, under the UNIDO’s Guideline, the line between Public Procurement 
and Public Private Partnerships is not clear. Therefore, there is the need to identify 
the features of PPPs separate from that of Public Procurement. This will ensure 
clarity in the PPP projects. 
 
6.3.3 The OECD BASIC Elements of Law on Concession Agreements 2000 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) convened a group of experts with a view to assisting it in 
formulating basic elements for private infrastructure financing in the transition 
economies525 based on the international best practices in order to ensure that 
project financing by the private sector becomes a more viable option for the much 
needed infrastructure financing in the region. 
 
It is against this backdrop that it was realised that a huge amount of capital is 
required to modernise the ageing infrastructures especially those of the transition 
                                                          
524 Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects 
http://www.unido.org/resources/publications/imported-publications/guidelines-for-infrastructure-development-through-
build-operate-transfer-bot-projects.html. Accessed on 10.06.13. 
525 A transition economy is one that is changing from centrally planned economy to free market economy.  
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economies of Central/Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union and to 
reconstruct the Balkans after a decade of war and neglect. It was further realised 
that this amount can neither be sourced from developmental assistance nor from 
the government budget alone. The enormity of the investment required for 
economic reconstruction and development would require governments to mobilise 
and harness all potential resources, both public and private through the public-
private partnerships initiative in transition economies. 
 
In carrying out the search for this model framework, the OECD had the followings 
as its objectives: 
1. To provide information to Eurasian legislators on the guiding legal principles 
and best international practices with respect to concession agreements;  
2. To contribute to the harmonisation of the relevant legislation in the Eurasian 
region; and  
3. To elaborate on these principles and practices with a view to providing 
assistance to Eurasian Governments in the negotiation of actual concession 
agreements. 
 
This document produced 18 key provisions to complement existing laws on 
concessions with the aim of facilitating privately financed infrastructure projects in 
the Black sea/ South East Europe. 526 The document is couched in a form of legal 
provisions that can be found in law statutes. The law does not purport to qualify as 
a model law that can guide all concession agreements.527 The basic elements have 
contributed to the existing jurisprudence on concession in the following ways: 
                                                          
526 See, further, the Simmons and Simmons Report, which notes that the UNCITRAL Guide and Model provided a basis 
“point of departure”  for the Basic Elements which are made available at 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,3425,en_33816563_33816964_33959803_1_1_1_1,00.html. Accessed on 17.05.13. 
527 See PPP in Infrastructure Resource Centre. Retreived from http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/library/oecd-basic-elements-law-concession-agreements. Accessed 0n 14.11.13.  
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(a) It serves as a source on which interested countries can draft their respective 
laws on concession agreements; 
(b) It offers a reference point for negotiating concession agreements; 
(c) It offers suggestions to problems that may likely arise in the negotiation of 
concession agreements; 
(d) It establishes a basis for the coordination of advice to all transition economies 
in respect of concession agreements; 
(e) It also helps in the harmonisation of legislations relating to concession 
agreements with international standards and best practices; and 
(f) It helps in facilitating and promoting a common approach to addressing issues 
relating to concession agreements. 
 
It should be noted that the basic elements address key issues on privately financed 
projects and concessions; however, the scope of the legal text and guidance only 
focuses on the transition economies.528  Transition economies are those countries 
that are changing from centrally planned economy into a free market economy. 
While the UNCITRAL Instruments on PFI focus only on infrastructure projects, 
OECD elements focus not only on infrastructure, but also on natural resources.529 
 
6.3.4 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD’s) ‘Core 
Principles on Modern Concession Law’ 2006 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD has issued a set of 
“Core Principles” with the main aim of identifying and promoting sound 
principles in the area of concession and Public-Private Partnerships within the 
                                                          
528 See the discussion paper of the UNCITRAL Colloquium on PPPs held In Vienna between 2-3 May, 2013.  Accessed from 
http://www.cnudmi.org/pdf/english/colloquia/public-private-partnerships-2013/Discussion_Paper_260313.pdf 
529 Seungwoo Son, at Page 7. 
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European Union. This document also sets out principles to protect both the 
investors and the public authority.530 
 
Among the core objectives of this document are to promote fairness, predictability, 
stability, and flexibility and to protect both the private investors and the public 
sector from unfair treatment and abuses. These Core Principles are based on 
transparency in the procedures in order to ensure fairness to all parties. These sets 
of documents were initially published on EBRD’s website in the year 2005 
soliciting for public comments before it was finally adopted in 2006.  
The EBRD’s document was drafted after a wide consultation and sourced from 
other international and regional texts. The following international texts on PPPs 
and concessions were used and considered.  
1. The UNIDO Guidelines on BOT Projects issued in the year 1996; 
2. OECD Basic Elements of a Law on Concession Agreements, 2000; 
3. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects, 2000; 
4. UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects, 2003; 
5. European Commission Interpretive Communication on Concessions Under 
Community Law (2000/C 121/02);  
6. European Commission Guidelines for Successful Public-Private 
Partnerships,  
            2003; and 
7. European Commission Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions, 2004. 
                                                          
530See Core Principles for a Modern Concession Law. Retrieved from  
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/legal/concessions/core_principles.shtml. Accessed on 19.06.13. 
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There are ten (10) core principles adopted by the EBRD for Modern Concession 
Law (MCL) within the Union. The principles are summarised hereunder with their 
sources: 
 
(a) There should be clarity in the Modern Concession Law (MCL) for the 
private sector 
 
There is no doubt that clear legal framework and good government policies are 
very important in attracting private sector to participate in infrastructure 
development. The existence of an attractive legal and business environment will 
certainly signal the commitment of the government to development. This strategy 
should generally be developed and integrated in the legislative document to be 
approved for concessions by the national governments. 
 
This principle was taken and developed from UNIDO’s Guideline for 
Infrastructure Development through BOTs. These two documents (both UNIDO 
and EBRD) stress the importance of adopting a sound legal and regulatory 
framework in order to show the commitment of the state in the promotion of sound 
business environment by enhancing and protecting the interest of potential 
investors.531 
 
(b) A Model Concession Law should create a sound legislative foundation 
for concessions 
 
 For the private sector to effectively participate in the development of infrastructure 
there should be an enabling legal framework. An enabling legislative foundation is 
important to clearly establish the roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholders. 
                                                          
531 See Principle 1 of the IBRD document for a modern concession law. 
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The concession legal framework should be one that will foster a clear, predictable, 
and stable legal environment for concession projects. 
 
This principle was sourced from the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide which in its 
first recommendation, emphasises the importance of having a solid legislation 
because it will not only set out in clear terms the investment regime necessary for 
concessions, but it will also signal the commitment and readiness of the state to 
enter and be bound by the concession agreement. 
 
(c) A Model Concession Law should provide clarity of rules  
Every concession law should have clear rules which will define the extent and 
scope of its application.  Where there is legal clarity and precision in the rules, such 
will help in ensuring predictability of the concession regime, stability and validity 
of the concession agreement as well as ensuring the prevention of ungrounded 
arbitrary actions by the contracting authorities. The rules in the MCL should give a 
detailed definition of concession, contracting authorities and the extent of their 
powers, the list of sectors and infrastructure that can be concessioned, as well as 
the criteria for selection of concessionaires. This principle is based on the 2nd-5th 
recommendations of the UNCITRAL. 
 
This recommendation as contained in the Legislative Guide further stresses the 
need to have detailed rules that defines and identifies the organ of government 
responsible to grant concession, the categories of infrastructure that are eligible 
under the scheme, the responsibilities of the contracting parties and the powers of 
the institution that is responsible to oversee and coordinate the projects. 
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(d)  Model Concession Law should provide a stable and predictable concession 
legal framework 
 
Privately financed projects are mostly for a long time. In the course of      
implementation, some factors may change which may adversely affect the smooth 
implementation of the project, and one of this is the legislation. Incessant changes 
in the relevant legislation may adversely affect the agreement and which may in 
turn affect the sustainability of the project.  
 
In order to ensure the stability and predictability of the project, government should 
avoid incessant changes to the concession laws and should also include a proviso in 
the contractual agreement, stipulating the surviving applicability of the regime in 
force at the time the agreement was signed. This recommendation was taken from 
both recommendation 58 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the OECD 
Basic Elements Law on Concession which contain stability clause with the aim of 
protecting the concessioner from the possible changes of concession law by the 
government. 
 
(e) A Model Concession Law should promote fairness, transparency and 
accessibility to all the concession rules and procedure 
 
One of the basic principles guiding a concession is the fairness, transparency and 
accessibility of the rules and procedures governing the selection of concessionaires. 
An ideal MCL should guarantee a fair, transparent and competitive bidding and 
selection processes giving equal treatment to all potential investors. It should also 
afford the bidders the opportunity to sue in case any of the contract terms has been 
violated.  
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Recommendations 9 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide specifically provides 
that the rules and regulations guiding concessions should be fair, transparent and 
accessible to whoever wants to have access to them. Regulation 10 states the need 
for a MCL to provide for the establishment of an independent body to review the 
administrative decisions made in the process of granting concessions. 
 
(f) A Model Concession Law should be consistent with the country’s legal 
system and other national legislations  
 
In order to avoid unnecessary collusion and inconsistencies, a Model Concession 
Law should not be inconsistent with the national legislation of the country. Where 
any inconsistency occurs, appropriate legislations should be made to ensure it is 
amended and brought in line with the country’s legislation. 
 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide reiterates the need for the concession laws to 
be in consonance with the constitutional provisions and other enabling statutes of 
the respective country. Typical examples will be the constitutional provisions 
stating the extent of a government agency to grant concessions. Any proviso in the 
concession law that stipulates a contrary position will be declared inconsistent by 
the court.532 
 
(g) Model Concession Law should allow for negotiability of concession 
agreements 
 
Freedom and flexibility are important factors to consider in negotiating 
concessions. This is because the parties will be able to factor in a variety of 
circumstances in allocating risks between them and it also ensures elaboration of 
more creative and financially efficient approaches to risk allocation. 
                                                          
532 Such laws must as a matter of law not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution. See for example, the provision 
of S.1 of the Nigerian Constitution (As amended). 
  
282 
 
Recommendation 12 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide advises the legislative 
drafters against including provisions that will limit or curtail the capacity of either 
or both parties to negotiate with respect to a particular area of the concession 
provision. Therefore, parties’ rights to negotiate should not be limited or restricted 
to a particular area of the agreement. 
 
 (h)   The Model Concession Law should allow for enforceability of the 
decisions of courts or arbitral tribunals 
 
In order to effectively protect the interests of parties to a PPP agreement, decisions 
of courts or arbitral awards should be enforceable for proper resolution of disputes 
among the parties concerned. This principle is especially very important in order to 
create a more attractive, predictable and secured investment climate for the 
investors. This principle, which is largely sourced from Recommendation 69 of the 
UNCITRAL Model law emphasises the importance of agreeing on a dispute 
resolution mechanism that is the best and most suitable for such kind of project. 
 
(i) Recommendation on the need for the government to support financially or 
give a guarantee for sourcing of funds 
 
There are instances where though, the private sector has the technical competence 
to execute the project; however, it may require some funds which would need to be 
sourced from either internally or externally. Government can therefore assist these 
potential investors by giving guarantees for the successful execution of the 
projects. This will make the project to be more attractive to the investors. 
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(j) A good Mode Law should accommodate Security Interests 
As a rule, only approximately 30% of a concession project is financed by the 
concessioner. The remaining percentage (say 70%) is usually sourced from 
financing institutions such as banks and other lenders. Therefore, there is a need for 
a security arrangement whereby the concessioner gives the lender, security over its 
rights under the concession agreement. 
 
However, in order for this security to be effective, the government should also give 
an assurance to the lenders that for the purposes of the security’s enforcement, the 
proper procedures would allow the concession to be carried out and the lenders to 
“step-in” to the concession agreement. Thus, this mechanism guarantees the 
continuation and sustainability of the concession project and effectiveness of the 
investment. 
 
It should be mentioned that although, the EBRD “core principles were developed 
from the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and Model Law amongst others, it has 
however been observed that the EBRD still needs a greater clarity in the legislative 
framework on concessions.533 This should be in form of enactment of new laws or 
amendment of the existing laws. It was also noted that there is the need for 
increased transparency in the selection process.  This will involve adequate 
publicity for the invitation to bid and also in the selection process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
533 See Anita Ramasastry, A favourable concessions regime: A lender’s perspective and perceptions from transition 
countries. Retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/concessions/labadi.pdf. Accessed on 04.11.13. 
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6.3.5 European Commission’s Directives on the Award of Concessions 
In recognition of the great economic opportunities offered by concessions, the 
European Commission evinced its intention to adopt a legislative initiative on 
Public Private Partnership projects.534 This was informed by the fact that in the 
community, the award of works concession contracts is guided by a limited number 
of secondary legislations,535 while in the case of service concessions, the general 
principles governing the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
is the applicable law.536 
 
However, the lack of legal certainty has occasioned serious distortions in the 
functioning of the internal market and is hindering the access of European 
businesses. Not only that, it also results in lack of efficiency in the way and manner 
businesses were carried out. In the explanatory memorandum of the Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of concession 
contracts,537 the reasons for the Community’s intention to adopt a single legislative 
framework were stated thus: 
 
“In the context of severe budgetary constraints and economic difficulties in 
many EU Member States, efficient allocation of public funds is of particular 
concern. An adequate legal framework for the award of concession 
contracts would favour public and private investment in infrastructure and 
strategic services at best value for money. The potential of a legislative 
initiative on concession contracts to create a supportive EU framework for 
PPPs was singled out in the Commission's 2009 communication on 
Mobilising private and public investment for recovery and long term 
structural change: developing public private partnerships.” 
 
                                                          
534 See communication The Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence of 13 April 2011. 
535 These are separate legislations that are applicable in the respective member states. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Communication 2011/0437 (COD). 
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The main aim of this initiative therefore is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
the award of concession contracts which can result into great benefits to both the 
public authorities and the private economic operators in the development of 
infrastructures. A clear legal framework will also allow all economic operators 
within the EU effective access to the market. 
 
The information gathered from different consultations with stakeholders on the 
need for a legislative framework for concession contracts was adopted by the 
Impact Assessment Board on 21st March 2011. The board on its part made further 
recommendations on certain vital issues that the legislative framework should 
address.538 In the executive summary of the final Impact Assessment Report, the 
board put it succinctly thus: 
“The report confirmed the need for new legislation. It found that economic 
operators are faced with an unlevel playing field, which often leads to 
missed business opportunities. This situation gives rise to costs and is 
detrimental to competitors located in other Member States, contracting 
authorities and contracting entities and consumers. Moreover, both the 
definition of concessions and the precise content of the obligations of 
transparency and non-discrimination arising from the Treaty remain 
unclear. The resulting lack of legal certainty increases the risk that illegally 
awarded contracts will be cancelled or terminated early and it ultimately 
discourages the authorities from using concessions where this type of 
contract could be a good solution.” 
 
In December 2011, the Commission finally adopted its proposal on the award of 
concession contracts.539 This proposal is part of the efforts of the Commission with 
the aim of consolidating and creating a modern legislative framework for the award 
                                                          
538 These include the differences in the treatment between concessions and public contracts and the reasons for the 
consequences of the distortions found in the different laws on concessions. 
539As announced in the Single Market Act (IP/11/469). 
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of concession contracts within the EC. It is also made in consonance with the 
provisions of the Public Procurement Directives applicable within the EU.540 
 
6.3.5.1 The Main Elements of the New Directives 
(a) The new rule gives a more precise and clearer definition of Concession.  
(b) The scope of the application covers the award of works and services contract 
both in the classic and utilities sector. 
(c) It makes provision for compulsory publication of such contract in the official 
Journal of the European Union provided their value is equal to or more than 
€5,000,000; 
(d) It provides for concrete solutions to take care of unexpected changes in 
concession contracts as a result of unforeseen circumstances 
 (e) It establishes certain obligations in respect of the criteria for selection and 
award of contract to the bidders. These obligations are applicable to both the public 
authorities and the private firm;541 
(f) The directive provides for no strict award procedures, but it however provides 
that such procedure as may be adopted should ensure that there is transparency and 
equal treatment of all parties especially with respect to negotiation.  
(g) Provides for the application of the remedies directives542 to all concessions. 
This is aimed at guaranteeing judicial protection for all European Union companies 
that are taking part in the bidding process. 
 
                                                          
540 See COM(2010) 608 final, point 1.4, proposal nº 17. 
541 These rules aim at ensuring that such criteria are published in advance, are objective and not  discriminatory. In general, 
they are less rigid than similar provisions currently applicable to public contracts. 
542 Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC. 
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6.3.5.2  Legal Elements in the Directive 
The proposal derives its source from the relevant provisions in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).543 Specifically, Article 114 (1) of the 
treaty provides: 
“Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions 
shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The 
European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.” 
  
It is the intendment of the drafters that this Directive will guarantee legal certainty, 
fairness and transparency in the award of concession contracts; as a result, this will 
ultimately contribute to improved investment opportunities and ultimately ensure 
better quality of works and services. 
 
(a) Provisions Relating to Legal Certainty 
The Directive aims to enhance legal certainty as it provides clear rules governing 
the award of concessions which the parties seeking to contract must comply with. 
In addition, the Directive also aims to give economic operators basic guarantees 
with respect to the award of concession contracts. The proposal further 
incorporates such provisions as to ensure substantial compliance with the 
principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination, so as to give 
                                                          
543 See Articles 53(1), 62 and 114 of the TFEU. 
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prospective tenders the opportunity to effectively compete with others.544 This will 
allow for an overall economic advantage for both the contracting authorities and 
the prospective private firm. These criteria will further ensure the prevention of 
arbitrary decisions by the contracting parties and further provides that the criteria 
must be published in advance in order to give the prospective tenders the 
opportunity to know the detailed provisions.545 The directive will apply to 
concession contracts awarded after it came into force.546 
 
(b) Procedural Guarantees 
The Directive does not contain fixed and rigid procedures that must be followed 
unlike the Public Procurement Directives.547 This will give room for the nations 
within the community to adopt a more flexible procedure, reflecting national 
legislations and allowing the award process to be structured in accordance with the 
legal system of the respective states.  However, the directive provides a number of 
succinct procedural safeguards which must be adhered to in awarding concessions. 
These procedural safeguards are aimed at ensuring a fair and transparent 
process.548 
 
The directive provides further that the criteria for selecting the winner should relate 
exclusively to the economic, financial and technical capacity of operators, should 
be made public and this should allow an economic operator to relying on the 
capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of its links with those 
                                                          
544 See Article 24 of the Proposed Directive. 
545 See Artice 18 of the Proposed Directive. 
546 As at the time of this research, the Draft Proposal is not yet in force. 
547 See the Public Procurement Directives 2012. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/reform_proposals_en.htm. Accessed on 15.11.13. 
548 See Article 25 of the Directive. 
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entities, if the latter proves to the contracting authority or entity that it will have at 
its disposal the necessary resources.549 
 
It has been stated that new rules on concessions will improve legal security for 
public authorities and economic operators across Europe in the provision of 
infrastructure projects such as ports, roads, dams and even in the provision of 
services to the citizens.550 The Directive gives the contracting authorities the 
autonomy to decide on the best way to provide public services. This will give 
certain degree of flexibility to the states as to the choice of procedures to be 
followed in awarding concessions. However, whatever procedure is adopted, it 
should be one that ensures transparency and non-discriminatory criteria. 
 
6.4 Is there any Comprehensive Legislative Framework for PPPs at the 
International Level? 
 
There is no doubt that there is plethora of texts and documents from the United 
Nations,551 multilateral agencies552 and even multilateral development banks553 on 
Public-Private Partnership projects. However, concerns have been expressed that 
there are multiple PPP approaches, practices and procedures being developed by 
various international bodies with the aim of regulating PPP transactions.554Public 
efficiency in PPP transactions can only be enhanced where there are standard legal 
and administrative procedures with certain level of flexibility to the specific needs 
of each project. 
 
                                                          
549 See Article 24 of the Directive. 
550 See the Europa Memo titled ‘Commissioner Michel Barnier welcomes agreement on new rules for the award of 
concession contracts European Commission - MEMO/13/623   26/06/2013. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-623_en.htm. Accessed on 12.11.13. 
551 See the UNCITRAL Instruments. 
552 See the OECD Basic Principles, UNIDO Guidelines for PPP Projects and the European Commission’s Directives on the 
Award of Concessions. 
553 See the EBRD Basic Principles. 
554 See the report submitted by Simmons & Simmons. 
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The rationale for adopting a single legislative framework for PPPs formed part of 
the deliberations at the UNCITRAL Colloquium on PPPs held in Vienna in May 
2013 where it was stated thus: 
“A text addressing the legislative framework for PPPs would be an 
important tool not only for developing but also for developed countries, in 
which how to regulate PPPs remains a topic of considerable debate, 
despite many existing PPP projects. Additionally, some countries have very 
limited experiences in PPP, and the need for information and clarification 
on the subject is stated to be high” 
It is therefore beyond argument that there is the need for a comprehensive, 
consistent and up-to-date legislative framework to regulate Public Private 
Partnership Projects. Without this, investors may not have confidence in the 
business environment in which they contract. 
 
6.5 Recommendations 
1. Any model law (whether at the national, regional or international level) that 
seeks to develop a framework for Public Private Partnerships must contain certain 
“Core Principles” that will guide the implementation of PPP Projects. These core 
principles are very cardinal for a successful PPP programme. A good model law 
should: 
 
(a) Identify the relevant agencies that have the powers to grant PPP contracts 
and the extent to which such powers can be exercised 
 
This is one of the most important issues that a PPP Legislative Guide should 
address. Normally in a country, it is the government ministries, departments and 
other agencies that are vested with the powers to grant concessions. The law should 
specifically identify which of these ministries, agencies and departments is vested 
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with such powers in respect of a specific project. This will help to reduce 
duplication of same projects by different agencies or departments of government. 
  
(b) Identify the agencies responsible for the implementation of PPP projects at 
the Central/State/ Local or Municipal levels 
 
A good legislative guide should identify the agencies responsible for the 
monitoring and implementation of PPP projects. These agencies should be 
identified at all levels of government Federal/State/Municipal or Local 
Government as the case may be.  
 
(c) Identify and amend all potentially conflicting legislative provisions in the 
national laws 
 
All potentially conflicting national laws that could hinder the proper execution and 
implementation of PPP projects should be identified and amended. Due to the 
complex nature of PPP transaction, different laws may be applicable like laws 
regulating tax, insolvency, arbitration, land acquisition among others. Therefore, 
potentially conflicting areas of these laws must be identified and amended 
accordingly.   
 
(d) Allow contracting authorities to reasonably negotiate the terms of the PPP 
contract if necessary within the limits or guidelines specified by the law 
  
A model legislative guide should contain provisions allowing parties to a PPP 
transaction to negotiate the terms of the contract within the bounds allowed by the 
law and without fear or favour. 
 
(e) Establish a fair, equitable and transparent procedure for tendering and 
selection of bidders 
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This is one of the core basic principles that a model legislative guide should 
contain. It should establish a standard procurement procedure that ensures 
transparency, fairness and equal treatment of all the bidders. It should also contain 
provisions to the effect that government agencies or department shall not take any 
action which is capable of prejudicing the interest of any of the parties. 
 
(f) Provide detailed and enforceable remedies for any party who wishes to 
seek redress either in a court of law or through Alternative Dispute Resolution 
mechanisms 
 
Such legislative Guide should provide for a comprehensive procedure for seeking 
redress through arbitration or a court of law. Because of the fact that PPP disputes 
are commercial disputes, there should be provision for internal mechanism for 
settlement of disputes, and it is only when this fails that a party can go to 
arbitration or finally to a court of law. 
 
(g) Contain Provisions for financial incentives or government guarantees for 
the Private sector where necessary 
 
The Model Legislative Guide should contain provisions for government assistance 
to the private sector. This may be in form of financial assistance or guarantee that 
the project will be executed successfully. These incentives will certainly spur the 
private firms to enter into concessions and it will also make the market to be more 
attractive. 
 
(h) Provide for the validity of security interests granted by the Contractor 
over its assets or cash-flow and to grant step-in rights to its lenders 
 
Due to the fact that most concessioners source a larger percentage of project money 
from the banks and other financial institutions, there will be the need for an 
arrangement relating to the security of the money. The guide may include a 
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provision relating to an assurance by the government that the proper procedure will 
be followed in order to execute the project and also that for the purpose of the 
security’s enforcement, the lenders should be assured of the right to step in to the 
concession agreement. Thus, this mechanism guarantees the continuation and 
sustainability of the concession project and effectiveness of the investment. 
 
2. Apart from the above principles, it is also pertinent to consider that the 
scope of projects that can come under PPPs should be expanded to include natural 
resources projects like mining and also the provision of service contracts. The 
model law should cover both soft555 and hard infrastructure556 and also natural 
resources557 and services. 
 
3. Elements of emerging legislations at the national level could also be 
incorporated into the model law. Some countries have developed national 
legislations for PPPs and this can be of help when updating the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Evidence indicates that countries like Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
France and South Africa among others have developed their respective PPP 
legislations.  
 
4. UNCITRAL Model Law should incorporate significant issues relating to 
commerce, especially considering the fact that demand for investment in 
infrastructure has now greatly exceeded the financial resources available to the 
public.  
 
                                                          
555 Example of soft infrastructure is the internet services. 
556 Bridges, Dams and roads among others are examples of hard infrastructure.  
557 These connotes reserves or other deposits of whatever nature such as gold, silver, oil and gas, hydrocarbons and other 
resources that may be found. See further the provision of Article 2(f0 of the OECD Basic Principles. 
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5. The language to be adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law should be 
succinct and comprehensive so as to serve as a guide for national legislatures in 
adopting a model law for their respective countries. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can play a very 
significant role in the development of a nation through the development of social 
and economic infrastructure like roads, dams, airports, bridges, hospitals and 
educational institutions among others.  There is also no doubt that PPP enhances 
efficiency in public services and can assist a nation in harnessing private capital to 
build infrastructure that will support economic growth. In fact, private finance is 
now a big business and it has drastically changed the landscape of public 
procurement. For PPPs to successfully drive economic growth and prosperity, 
certain conditions precedent must exist. These include sound policies, laws, 
implementation strategies good institutional set-up. The writer is mindful of the 
focus of this chapter is on an international model law. 
 
At the international level, there is the need to have a coherent approach to all 
methods of infrastructure development and provision of services through the 
establishment of a clear, consistent and comprehensive model legislation whose 
application will transcend a nation’s border. The main reason for this is that since 
PPPs involve the transfer of national assets to the private sector, then all 
transactions should be subject to the same rules regarding governance, 
transparency, competition, objectivity in decision making and dispute resolution 
procedure and so on. 
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From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the UNCITRAL Instruments regulating 
PFIP do not constitute a model law. It should therefore be revised to incorporate 
the legislative provisions in the OECD Basic Elements, EBRD Core Principles and 
other emerging issues that need to be addressed in PPPs. All these taken together 
can serve as a checklist for the stake holders and other prospective investors to 
measure whether a nation’s legal system has adequate provisions for PPPs or not.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter, the writer will revert to the objectives of this research 
mentioned at the beginning of this thesis. Chapter 1 of this thesis put forward four 
objectives for this research namely: 
 
1. To examine and evaluate the legal and regulatory framework for Public 
Private Partnerships in infrastructure development in Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa and other core international legislative frameworks for purposes of reforms 
and creating a sound investment environment for private investors;   
2. To analyse the roles and responsibilities of the regulatory agencies under 
the relevant regulations, laws and conventions;  
3. To identify the issues and challenges facing the implementation of PPP in 
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa after their adoption; and 
4. To propose reforms and recommendations in order to close the gaps in the 
existing legislative framework for PPPs in these countries as well as the 
international agencies. 
 
The specific issues addressed in Chapters III-VI of this thesis are meant to achieve 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd objectives as stated above. Having examined the existing legal 
and regulatory framework for Public Private Partnerships in Infrastructure 
Development in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, as well as core regional and 
international legal frameworks on same, this chapter seeks to bring together the 
answer the earlier questions posed in the previous chapters in order to achieve the 
above objectives. 
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7.2 Review of Chapters II-VI  
Chapter II centers on the meaning, definition and the conceptual framework for the 
study. Discussion here centers mainly on the definition of concepts, differences 
between Public Private Partnerships and other procurement models such as public 
procurement and privatization. The chapter further discusses the different types of 
Public Private Partnerships as well as the necessary and vital agreements which are 
important in a PPP transaction. 
 
Chapters III, IV and V examine the regulatory regime of Public-Private 
Partnerships in Ghana Nigeria and South Africa respectively, with specific focus 
on the legal and regulatory framework put in place. The chapter further examines 
the functions and powers of the regulatory agencies and the contracting authorities 
in the grant of PPP contracts because it is important to determine the agency that 
has the power to grant and ensure the successful implementation of the projects. 
The chapters also discussed the basic principles that are important and which may 
serve as a tool-kit in measuring the investment environment for PPP programme in 
a particular country. These are transparency, accountability, fairness in the bidding 
process, publicity and confidentiality among others. The chapters thereafter 
examined the challenges facing the PPP programme in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
 
 
Chapter VI on the other hand examined the PPP legislative frameworks made by 
the UNCITRAL and some other international agencies so as to serve as guides for 
nations to adopt as PPP at the national level. Specifically, the UNCITRAL 
Instruments on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (PFIPs), United Nations 
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Development Organisation (UNIDO), the OECD and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) legal instruments were examined in 
order to determine whether each of them can serve as a model law that can 
successfully serve as guide for nations willing to adopt PPPs.  
 
7.3 Findings 
This research work carried out an extensive review of the relevant laws and 
regulations governing PPPs in the three selected countries. As at the time of 
writing this research, Ghana has not enacted a PPP law yet, it only uses a mere 
policy issued by the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning. The brief 
findings are as follows:  
 
7.3.1 Adequacy of the Existing Legal Framework 
Among the three national laws examined, South Africa has the most 
comprehensive legal framework compared to what is obtainable in Ghana and 
Nigeria in relation to PPP regulatory framework.  
 
7.3.1.1 Findings on Transparency, Accountability and Fairness of PPP 
Procurement 
The study showed that unlike Ghana and Nigeria, South Africa has series of 
legislations and regulations to ensure that a fair and transparent procedure is 
followed in PPP procurement process. The constitution itself contains provisions to 
this effect. Section 217 of the constitution provides that such procedure must be 
transparent and fair. Several other legislations like the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, 2000, Promotion of Access to Information Act, the Competition Act, 
Preferential Procurement Act, the PPP Manual and the modules make extensive 
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provisions in order to ensure that PPP procurement process is transparent. The 
Promotion of administrative justice Act in Particular provides that official acts of 
government agencies must be lawful, reasonable and in accordance with a 
procedure that is fair.  
 
Competition laws which encourage sound competitive trade practices and 
eradicates restraints on the full and free participation in the economy have not been 
enacted in Nigeria and Ghana. Although, competitive bidding is mentioned in both 
the ICRC Act of Nigeria and the Ghana PPP National Policy, the procedures for 
achieving a fair competition are not clearly stated. This law is vital to a sound PPP 
procurement because it ensures that the most competent bidder emerges through a 
fair competitive procedure.  
 
From the findings on the adequacy of the law on this point, South Africa has the 
most comprehensive laws that can ensure transparency, accountability and farness 
in procurement process followed by Nigeria and Ghana in that order. 
 
7.3.1.2  On the Right of foreign Nationals to Participate in PPP process 
This study has shown that all the national laws of the countries examined allow 
foreign operators to participate in the provision of infrastructure through the PPP 
initiative. This right to participate has certain conditions that vary from one 
jurisdiction to the other.  In Ghana, the law allows any foreign investor who 
intends to participate in infrastructure development in the country to team up with a 
Ghanaian entrepreneur or a firm for a joint venture in order to form a partnership or 
company. The Government of Ghana has no overall economic or industrial strategy 
that discriminates against foreign-owned businesses. In some cases a foreign 
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investment may enjoy additional incentives if the project is deemed critical to the 
country's development. However, under the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 
Act, 1994 (Act 478), a foreign investor must have an equity capital of not less 
thanUS$10,000 and must be in partnership with a Ghanaian before he can form a 
company or participate in any Joint Venture in Ghana. 
 
In Nigeria, a foreign expatriate may operate alone or in joint venture with a 
Nigerian by means of a company which must first of all be registered in Nigeria. 
Such an alien is free to participate in the procurement processes in Nigeria 
provided it has complied with the relevant legislations in Nigeria. However, S.55 
of the Companies and Allied Matters Act provides that a company may apply to 
the President for exemption from registration in Nigeria where such company is 
invited to Nigeria by or with the approval of the Federal Government to execute 
any specified individual project. This provision is intended to attract foreign 
companies that have the competence and capabilities of executing gigantic projects 
but who may wish to avoid the procedure of registration in Nigeria. 
 
Findings revealed that any foreigner who wishes to participate in business in South 
Africa requires no other permit except business permit. Such a company must have 
at least R2.5 million which he must be ready to invest in the country. Such business 
or partnership which the foreigner intends to start must be one that will create jobs 
for South African nationals. 
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7.3.1.3 Adequacy of the Law on Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Findings revealed that it is only the South African framework that makes extensive 
provisions for dispute resolution in PPP procurement process. The ICRC applicable 
in Nigeria only mentions that parties shall refer to arbitration in case of dispute, 
however, the procedure and other necessary provisions are not provided in the law. 
The National Policy applicable to PPPs in Ghana is silent on dispute resolution 
mechanism for PPP contracts. In both Nigeria and Ghana, the respective 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act applicable in each country govern PPP disputes in 
those countries.  
 
In South Africa however, Module 6 of the National Treasury PPP Manual and Part 
86 of the Standardized provision applicable to PPPs prescribe a detailed procedure 
for resolving dispute in PPP procurement. Findings further showed that it is the 
intendment of these provisions that disputes must first be settled internally by the 
Project Officer and Accounting Officers respectively. The regulation requires that 
before a PPP dispute is taken to court, alternative means of settling disputes like 
informal conciliation must first be attempted because these modes will fast-track 
the resolution of the dispute by expert adjudicators. The study further showed that 
the PPP regulations do not favour Mediation, which is the resolution of dispute by 
a neutral third party. The reason is because, in mediation, the neutral party has no 
power to render a decision which would be binding. Therefore, internal referral 
like informal conciliation is preferred than mediation. 
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From the findings on this point, South African legal framework has comprehensive 
provisions for resolution of PPP disputes through an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism that is effective. There is no doubt that investors will be more confident 
if the dispute resolution mechanism is effective and result-oriented. 
 
This research work also examined the international legislative framework. This is 
the discussion in Chapter VI. It was pointed out that the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on PFIPs and other legislative framework examined are not comprehensive enough 
to constitute a model law that can guide all countries that wish to adopt PPP as a 
solution to their infrastructure deficit. UNCITRAL Model Law at best can only 
serve as a guide for countries that wish to adopt a national law to regulate their PPP 
Programme. What a comprehensive model law should contain is provided in this 
chapter under recommendations. It is further suggested that the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and other international legislative framework should be revised so as to make 
it comprehensive. 
 
7.4 The Roles and Responsibilities of the Regulatory Agencies in the 
Successful Implementation of Public-Private Partnerships Programme 
The second objective is to examine the roles and responsibilities of the concerned 
agencies in order to ensure a successful PPP programme. In doing this, the study 
identified and examined the regulatory authorities in the selected jurisdictions. 
Findings on this are as follows: 
 
7.4.1 On the Power of the Agencies that can grant Concessions 
The findings from the three countries examined reveal that the power to grant PPP 
contracts is vested in the Ministries, Department and agencies (MDAs) of 
government concerned. Therefore, the extent of the powers of the respective 
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agencies is contained in either the constitution or the enabling laws establishing 
such institution. The rationale for having such provision in the constitution is to 
clearly spell out which level of government or agency has the powers to grant 
concession. In Nigeria and South Africa that have different layers of government, 
the powers are contained either the exclusive or residual legislative list in the 
constitution. These lists provide for the areas where the federal or state or 
municipal governments have legislative competence. Ghana operates a unitary 
system of government; therefore, the possibility of conflicts on which organ has the 
powers is almost non-existent. 
 
7.4.2 Functions and Effectiveness of the Regulatory Agencies in the 
Implementation of PPP Programme 
Findings on the above showed that South Africa has the most effective regulatory 
agency for the implementation of PPPs. The PPP Unit of the National Treasury has 
rolled out more PPP projects that the other two countries. Findings further revealed 
that in Ghana and South Africa, the main regulatory agencies which are the Public 
Investment Division and the PPP Unit are situated within the Ministry of Finance 
and the National Treasury respectively. Research shows that the reason why these 
agencies are within the ministry of finance and the national treasury is mainly to 
ensure sound financial management of funds by the MDAs. As a result of the fact 
that PPP is linked to the capital of the MDAs, the National treasury and the 
MOFEP will be able to properly monitor and ensure full compliance with the 
power of approval of funds and if there is any guarantee to be given. 
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As a result of this, it was found that it is better for the regulatory agency to be 
established within the ministry of finance or National treasury.  Due to off-budget 
nature of PPPs, the establishment of the agency within the finance ministry will 
help to appreciate the budgetary implications of PPPs. 
 
However, in Nigeria, the Infrastructure Concession Commission is under the direct 
control of the presidency which is a political institution. Some of the PPP projects 
that have failed in Nigeria are not unconnected with the fact that the commission 
lacks proper implementation strategy. Part of the reasons for this is because 
majority of members of the board of the commission are politicians who know 
little or nothing about PPP programme. The Lagos / Ibadan Highway project which 
was concessioned to Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited failed because vital issues which 
the commission ought to have addressed during the feasibility studies were not 
addressed. The Commission has very little effective powers under the Act 
establishing it and it may likely end up being largely a monitoring and policy-
making entity without the capacity to enforce compliance, particularly on the side 
of the government.  
 
The study therefore found that the PPP regulatory agency in South Africa is more 
effective and this accounts for an increase in the deal flow of PPP transactions in 
the country. 
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7.5 Challenges Facing PPPs 
The challenges facing PPPs are discussed in each of the chapters dedicated to each 
of the selected countries studied. These are: 
 
7.5.1 Lack of Comprehensive Legal Framework 
The study found that lack of clarity and comprehensive legal framework poses a 
major challenge to the PPP deal flow in Ghana. The country still relies on the 
National Policy which was made by the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. The Proposed PPP law which is still pending to be passed will likely 
address this challenge once it is enacted into law. This lack of comprehensive legal 
framework is not a challenge to the South African PPP Programme. A lot of Acts, 
Regulations and Manuals and Modules have been made with the aim of 
complementing one another on PPP issues.  This is one of the success stories for 
South Africa’s PPP programme.  
 
In the absence of a sound and comprehensive legislative initiative, the rules on the 
definition and award of PPP contracts and other vital issues will emerge from 
decisions of courts, leaving legal uncertainty to persist and its attendant price and 
protracted litigation. 
 
7.5.2 Challenge of Raising Long Term Credit Facilities 
The study found that this is a major impediment to the implementation of PPP 
programme in Nigeria. PPP projects are mostly for long term. Most Nigerian banks 
only grant a short term or medium term finance. The Multi-Million Dollar 
Lagos/Ibadan Concession Project failed because the concessioner could not raise 
the credit facilities locally.  When the concessioner got some infrastructure 
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financiers outside the country, the Federal Government of Nigeria then refused to 
give a guarantee which was a condition agreed upon between the concessioner and 
the financiers. If this challenge is not adequately addressed, it would be difficult for 
the private sector to execute gigantic projects which require huge funding in 
Nigeria. 
 
This is not a major challenge to the implementation in Ghana and South Africa. In 
fact, South Africa has executed series of gigantic projects involving huge finances 
with the support of local banks and other financiers. Rand Merchant Bank and 
Group Five have been in the fore-front of those that finance PPP projects in South 
Africa. The Dedicated PPP Unit also recommends guarantees for any developer 
that needs to source for funds externally. 
 
7.5.3 Dearth of Experts 
The study found that the three countries still need more experts to accelerate the 
rate at which PPP projects are being rolled out and monitored. Because of the 
complex nature of PPP transactions, expertise should be developed to cover 
various areas such as contract management, legal, policy and financial aspects of 
the PPPs. This is the only way by which there can be an appreciable increase in the 
deal flow of PPP projects. This will greatly help to monitor and increase the deal 
flow of PPP projects. 
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7.5.4 Lack of Political Commitment 
On this point, it was found that the governments of Ghana and South Africa have 
shown high degree of commitments to make PPPs work. In fact, to further 
demonstrate its commitment to PPPs, the government of Ghana has appointed a 
minister of state in the presidency, whose role is mainly to see to the proper 
implementation of PPP Programme in the country. The minister will be responsible 
for policy issues while the PPP Advisory Unit of the Public Investment Division 
will still be the main regulatory body. 
 
In Nigeria, lack of government commitment has also been a major challenge. After 
the Bi-Courtney Aviation Services spent about 25 Billion Naira on a BOT project 
at the Murtala Muhammed Airport in Lagos, in October 2012, the Federal Airport 
Authority of Nigeria suddenly came out to introduce a new dimension disclosing 
that the Build, Operate and Transfer arrangement it had with the company over the 
airport was only for a period of 12 years and not 36 years. 
 
Not only that, in the concession of Lagos/ Ibadan Expressway concession project 
that was granted to Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited, the Federal Government of 
Nigeria blatantly refused to give a guarantee to the international financiers who 
already expressed their readiness to finance the very important road project in 
Nigeria. After the concessioner could not raise all the funds, but within the time 
given to the developer for the project, the Federal Government abruptly terminated 
the road contract without any consultation with the developer. 
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All these point to the fact that the Federal Government of Nigeria only pays a lip 
service to making PPPs work in the country. It was further found that government 
has the culture of impunity when it comes to fulfilling its obligations under the 
contract especially where a private sector is concerned. This is as a result of the 
fact that the government always feels it is in an unequal position in dealing with the 
private sector.  This lack of commitment on the part of the government will scare 
away private investors who want to invest in infrastructure project in the country. 
 
7.5.5 Corruption 
Findings revealed that this is another major impediment to PPP process. This is 
most pronounced in Nigeria than Ghana and South Africa. Although, Ghana and 
South Africa are not totally insulated from corruption, however, the degree of 
corruption in contract procurement in Nigeria is alarming. The legal loopholes and 
lack of political will in government facilitate both domestic and cross-border 
corruption in Nigeria. The 2013 Transparency International Index, which ranked 
Nigeria as 144 out of the 177 countries examined stated that abuse of powers, 
bribery and secret dealings have continued to ravage public procurement in 
Nigeria. 
 
7.5.6 Slow and Weak Justice Administration System 
Although, PPP dispute being commercial in nature are normally referred to 
arbitration and if it fails, it can then be referred to the regular courts. Findings on 
this revealed that slow pace of justice delivery is not healthy for a PPP programme. 
Most of the private developers borrowed money from banks and other financial 
institutions to finance the project. Therefore, they do not want their monies to be 
tied down while the protracted litigation goes on indefinitely in court. Aside PPP 
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commercial disputes, a litigant may want to challenge the administrative action of 
the regulatory agencies or even a breach of the provisions relating to transparency, 
fair competition and access to information. All these will have to go to the regular 
courts of law and not to arbitration. 
 
Findings revealed that South Africa’s judicial system is very strong, speedy and 
effective. The Constitutional Court is fearless and very independent, likewise other 
courts of record.  This has been demonstrated in several cases earlier cited in the 
discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. This has really increased the confidence that 
the private sector has in the entire procurement system. 
 
The judicial system in Nigeria is slow and tainted with corruption. Cases can linger 
on in court for 20-30 years or even more before they are finally concluded. This 
certainly does not support the nation’s drive to attract investors to develop 
infrastructure in the country and certainly reduces the confidence that the investors 
have in the judicial system.  
 
7.5.7 Conflicting Laws and Policies 
This research revealed that for PPPs to work smoothly, all conflicting laws and 
policies have to be amended to allow a proper implementation of the PPP 
programme. In South Africa, there are apparent overlapping responsibilities on the 
policy directions of PPPs especially in the municipalities. This confusion 
sometimes arose as to which agency performs certain functions among the 
Municipal PPP Unit, Department of Local Government and other national agencies 
or departments. There are also conflicting legislative provisions in the legal 
framework especially between the Municipal Finance Management Act MFMA 
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and the Municipal Systems Act MSA. One of the most apparent conflicting 
provisions which this study depicted relates to the time requirement for conducting 
feasibility studies. Although, both laws stipulate that feasibility studies should be 
conducted at the municipal level, their provisions are however not identical. 
 
In the same vein, the study revealed that in Nigeria, conflicting legal and regulatory 
framework poses a great challenge. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, there 
is apparent conflicting provision between the Federal Airport Act and the Federal 
Capital Development Authority Act as to which agency has the powers to grant 
concession in respect of the airport situated at the Federal Capital Territory. 
Conflicting claims by both agencies have led to abandonment of the Nnamdi 
Azikiwe Airport concession project. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Governments all over the world are greatly encouraged to grasp the opportunities 
provided by the private sector which are: the availability of large capital to meet 
the growing needs of infrastructure projects; competence and efficient management 
of resources; skills and access to advanced technology; as well as transparency and 
accountability to drive a nation to achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development. The paradigm shift is now from ‘government-providing’ to 
‘government enabling’ approach in the provision of infrastructure. 
 
Today, there is a worldwide revolution for infrastructure provision through the 
Public-Private Partnership initiative. This paradigm shift to PPPs from other 
procurement methods can help African nations and other developing nations to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and sustainable development. 
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This will also help these nations to take their rightful place in the global 
economies. As a result of globalization which has removed barriers to a nation’s 
border, it will be increasingly difficult for any nation to remain competitive if its 
infrastructure development continues to perform at a sub-optimal level. However, 
there is still a lack of realization of these very fundamental conditions on the part 
of many developing countries. 
 
A comprehensive legal framework is one of the hallmarks of a successful PPP 
programme. This is because it will provide a high level of legal certainty and 
regulatory stability which are very cardinal in creating an enabling environment for 
PPPs to thrive. This will go a long way in helping nations to achieve sustainability 
in Public-Private Partnership programme. The legal regime may either be codified 
in a special law or it may be scattered over many legal instruments. However, the 
former is most preferable. Where there are special laws, then the law will be more 
certain and easy to access. However, where the legal instruments are scattered such 
as company law, property law, intellectual property law, public procurement law, 
foreign investment law, tax law and many others, then all such applicable laws, 
operational rules, statutes, guidelines and other specified institutional and 
administrative arrangements will together constitute the legal regime for public-
private partnerships.  
  
Successive governments in Africa and other developing countries have shown 
concerns for the state of infrastructure in their countries in various ways, especially 
through government’s direct involvement in infrastructure provision, albeit, with a 
limited degree of success. Public Private Partnership arrangements have great 
potentials to provide new infrastructures and upgrade the ageing ones. However, 
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the current legal and regulatory framework in Nigeria and Ghana respectively does 
not accurately reflect what is required to provide sound investment environment for 
the PPP programme. 
 
South Africa has undoubtedly developed one of the best legal and regulatory 
regimes for efficient PPP regime with stringent measures against inefficiencies and 
leakages. The number of projects being carried out under the PPP programme is 
increasing by the day. Comprehensive legal framework, strong and effective 
dispute resolution mechanism, strong political commitment, early establishment of 
PPP Unit in the National Treasury, the black economic empowerment impacts, 
strong financial market and competitive public sector as well as extensive 
communication are part of the success factors for PPP Programme in South Africa. 
Although, South Africa PPP regime has its own challenges, nevertheless, it is still 
the preferred model among the countries studied because of its comprehensive 
legal and regulatory regime. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships are thus attractive enough for the government to adopt 
because they may not require any immediate cash spending from the government; 
they can enhance the provision of critical infrastructure and service delivery; they 
allow for the transfer of risks associated to the project to the private sector and they 
provide relief from the burden of costs of design, construction and maintenance of 
the projects. Properly coordinated and well managed partnerships between the 
private sector and the governments will help developing nations to achieve socio-
economic development. It is in fact a modest and achievable development initiative 
provided that everything is put in place to make it happen! 
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7.7 Recommendations 
As shown from the findings in sections 7.3 to 7.5 above, the following 
recommendations are put forward: 
 
7.7.1 To Ghana 
1. A comprehensive legal and regulatory framework is very essential in 
sustaining PPP programme. The National Policy on PPP which is the main 
document regulating PPPs in Ghana is not comprehensive enough to ensure a 
successful PPP programme. There should be certainty in the law on PPPs in order 
to clarify and define the obligations of the contracting parties and the regulatory 
agencies. In the absence of a sound and comprehensive legislative initiative, the 
rules on the definition and award of PPP contracts and other vital issues will 
emerge from decisions of courts, leaving legal uncertainty to persist and its 
attendant price and protracted litigation. 
 
2.  The law and policy regulating PPPs in Ghana as presently constituted do 
not support the drive to fully ensure transparency and accountability in the bidding 
process. Transparency and accountability enthrone integrity in the PPP 
procurement process. This would ensure that all bidders are treated fairly and 
equally and would afford them the same opportunities. Laws that promote 
transparency and accountability should be enacted to complement the provisions of 
the National Policy on PPP. Examples of these are the Competition law, Freedom 
of Information Law, Preferential Procurement Law among others. Once the 
investors have confidence that the bidding process is transparent, Ghana PPP 
programme will attract the best and most economically viable bids. 
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3. Information is also another very viable tool to monitor procurement 
processes. The freedom of information law should be enacted to afford Ghanaians 
access to information about the activities of the government, agencies and the 
officials with respect to the allocation of public resources. This is a potent power to 
fight corruption. It is trite that corrupt practices flourish in darkness and secrecy, so 
any attempt that is aimed at opening governments and their agencies to public 
scrutiny is very likely to advance anti-corruption efforts. Information law will also 
promote transparency and reduce corruption. There is no doubt that a bad 
government needs secrecy to survive. Keeping governmental actions in secrecy 
will ensure continuous wastes, ineffectiveness, inefficiencies and gross abuse of 
power to survive. There is a certain impunity that enables non-performing 
governments; public and even private institutions to continue to hold sway over the 
people because the people are basically kept in darkness and ignorance. The 
Freedom of Information Act is a powerful weapon against this culture of impunity. 
 
4.  An effective dispute resolution mechanism should be put in place in order 
to resolve any potential dispute between the parties. Private parties (including the 
concessionaire, financiers and contractors) will be more encouraged to participate 
in PPP projects when they have confidence that any dispute arising between the 
contracting authority or other governmental agencies and the concessionaire; or 
between the private parties themselves can be resolved fairly and efficiently 
without wasting time.  Because of the commercial nature of PPPs, where huge 
amount of money is committed to the projects, litigation will be undesirable. Each 
PPP contract should therefore provide for an acceptable mode of settling disputes 
which must, of course, not be antithetical or obnoxious to the allowed dispute 
resolution system under the legal framework of the concerned country. 
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5. There is the need to train more experts in order to be able to develop 
capacities in the relevant agencies of government in Ghana. Expertise should be 
developed to cover contract management, legal, policy and financial aspects of the 
PPPs. This is the only way by which there can be an appreciable increase in the 
deal flow of PPP projects in Ghana. 
 
7.7.2 To Nigeria 
1. The government should be more committed to making PPPs programme 
work in Nigeria. It is one thing to have regulations for PPPs, and it is another thing 
for the governments and their agencies to be committed to making PPPs work. 
Politicians and bureaucrats must be absolutely committed to ensure that PPPs 
succeed, if not, the government’s initiative to boost infrastructure through the PPPs 
will fail. In addition to this, the government should also provide political 
guarantees to investors where such is needed. The Federal Government has not 
shown enough commitments to support the initiative and that is why not much 
success has been recorded since the inception of the scheme. 
 
2.  Governmental policies should be consistent and in tandem with the PPP 
agreement. Inconsistencies of government policies in Nigeria are also likely to 
scare investors away and may even frustrate the private sector out of partnerships 
with the government.  
 
3. Corruption has become a national malaise and a major problem that hinders 
development in Nigeria. As much as possible, corruption in PPP Procurement 
process should be reduced to the minimal level. Ideally, there should be zero 
tolerance for any form of corruption. This can be achieved if the government itself 
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is committed to this cause. The laws on corruption should also be strengthened. 
Although, there are laws against corrupt practices in the country, they are not being 
implemented properly by the respective institutions established for that purpose. In 
South Africa, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Practices Act was 
specifically enacted so as to provide for stringent measures to combat corruption 
by establishing a register of persons and companies convicted of corruption in the 
country in order to prevent them from benefiting from public sector procurement. 
Very useful lessons could be learned from the United Kingdom and Singapore 
where corruption was the culture in the two nations. However today, corruption has 
been reduced to the barest minimal level. 
 
4. The Infrastructure concession commission which is the main PPP 
regulatory agency should be strengthened for successful implementation of the PPP 
programme. The Commission has very little effective powers under the Act 
establishing it and may likely end up being largely a monitoring and policy-making 
entity without the capacity to enforce compliance, particularly on the side of the 
government. Adequacy and certainty of PPP laws are therefore, vital for effective 
public-private cooperation. 
 
5. The Infrastructure Concession Commission should also be more insulated 
from politics in the concession award process. The fact that the commission is 
under the direct control of the presidency portends that its policies and decisions 
will be influenced by politicians rather than experts in the area of procurement. The 
commission should rather be brought under the wing or control of a ministry that 
looks across line ministries: typically a ministry of finance, economy or planning. 
The advantage of this is that such dedicated unit will fully appreciate the budgetary 
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implications of PPP projects due to the off-budget nature of PPPs. In addition, the 
dedicated unit may create a center of knowledge and expertise that can provide 
individual departments with technical assistance and also will be able to keep a 
watchful eye on departments and agencies through its regulatory approval 
mechanism. 
 
6. In Nigeria, there is the need to train more experts in order to be able to develop 
capacities in the relevant agencies of government. Apart from the federal/national 
level, states and local governments should also develop expertise in the area of 
PPPs. Expertise should be developed to cover contract management, legal, policy 
and financial aspects of the PPPs. This is the only way by which there can be an 
appreciable increase in the deal flow of PPP projects at the various levels of 
government. 
 
7. The law should be strengthened to further promote transparency and fair 
competition among the bidders. Transparency and accountability enthrone integrity 
in the PPP procurement process. Like South Africa, Nigeria should also enact law 
on fair competition. Laws that promote transparency and accountability should be 
enacted to complement the provisions of the main PPP legislation. Examples of 
these are the Competition Law and Preferential Procurement Law among others. 
Once the investors have confidence that the bidding process is fair and transparent, 
PPPs will attract the best and most economically viable bids. 
 
8. Laws and mechanisms for resolving PPP and other procurement disputes 
should be made comprehensive and clear. The ICRC Act only provides that in 
cases of disputes, parties shall refer the dispute to arbitration and no more. The 
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procedure and the rules of engagement were not provided. A clear and detailed 
dispute resolution mechanism will no doubt increase and enhance the confidence in 
the procurement system. 
 
9. Inconsistent laws should also be harmonised and amended. There are still 
conflicting provisions in some statues e.g. there exists a conflict between the 
Federal Airport Authority Act and the Federal Capital Development Authority Act. 
This and other potential conflicting provisions should be resolved and harmonised. 
 
7.7.3 To South Africa 
1. South African government should address the shortage of skilled staff in the 
PPP Unit. The numbers of staff are smaller in number compared to the number of 
PPP projects that are in the pipeline. Adequacy of skilled staff will help in 
increasing the deal flow.  
 
2. The few conflicting provisions should be amended and harmonised. For 
example, the apparent conflicting provisions between the period for conducting 
feasibility studies in the Municipal Finance Management Act MFMA and the 
Municipal Systems Act MSA should be harmonised.   
 
3. Laws are not carved on stones. What is sufficient today may not be so in the 
nearest future. There must always be room for continuous improvements and this 
must be made as part of the culture of an advanced legal system. 
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7.7.4. To UNCITRAL and other International and Regional Legislative 
Agencie 
1. The UNCITRAL Instruments on PPPs need to be revised with a view to 
bringing it in line with the current trends. This is the only way in which the legal 
instruments will be relevant as a guide for countries that intend to adopt PPPs as an 
alternative to other procurement methods. There is the need to have a coherent 
approach to all methods of infrastructure development and provision of services 
through the establishment of a clear, consistent and comprehensive model 
legislation whose application will transcend a nation’s border. Therefore, for the 
purpose of convenience, it will be better if all PPP transactions are subject to the 
same or substantially similar rules in all nations that are signatory to the 
UNCITRAL law. 
 
2. The scope of projects that can come under PPPs in both UNCITRAL and 
UNIDO’s instruments should be expanded to include agriculture, natural resources 
projects like mining and also the provision of service contracts. The model law 
should cover both soft and hard infrastructure and also natural resources and 
services. 
 
3. Elements of emerging legislations at the national level could also be 
incorporated into the model law. Some countries have developed national 
legislations for PPPs and this can be of help when updating the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Evidence indicates that countries like Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
France and South Africa among others have developed their PPP legislations.  
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4. UNCITRAL Model Law should incorporate significant issues relating to 
commerce, especially considering the fact that demand for investment in 
infrastructure has now greatly exceeded the financial resources available to the 
public.  
 
5. The language to be adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law should be 
succinct and comprehensive, so as to serve as a guide for national legislatures in 
developing countries in adopting a model law for their respective countries. 
 
6.  Finally, any model law (whether at the national, regional or international 
level) that seeks to provide a framework for Public Private Partnerships must 
contain certain “Core Principles” that will guide the development and 
implementation of PPP Projects. These basic principles are very important in order 
to achieve success in the PPP programme. It is therefore suggested that a good PPP 
model law should: 
 
(a) Identify the relevant agencies that have the powers to grant PPP contracts 
and the extent to which such powers can be exercised. This is one of the 
most important issues that a PPP law should address. Normally in a 
country, it is the government ministries, departments and other agencies 
that are vested with the powers to grant concessions. The law should 
specifically identify which of these ministries, agencies and departments 
that is vested with such powers in respect of a specific project. These 
powers are mostly spelt out in the constitution and other enabling statutes 
of the respective country. This will help to reduce duplication of same 
projects by different agencies or departments of government.  
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(b) Establish and identify the entities that are responsible for the 
implementation of PPP projects at the Central/State/ Local or Municipal 
levels. This mainly deals with the regulatory agencies. These agencies are 
responsible for the implementation of PPP laws and policies. They are also 
in charge of monitoring and compliance with the relevant rules and 
regulations. 
 
(c) All potentially conflicting legislative provisions in the national law should 
be identified and amended. This is very important so as to reduce the 
possibility of conflicts. Due to the complex nature of PPP transaction, 
different laws may be applicable like laws regulating tax, environmental 
law, insolvency, Arbitration, land acquisition among others. Therefore, 
potentially conflicting areas of these laws must be identified and amended 
accordingly.  This will ensure a smooth application and implementation of 
the Programme. 
 
(d) A model PPP law should give room to allow contracting authorities to 
reasonably negotiate the terms of the PPP contract if necessary within the 
limits or guidelines specified by the law. Sometimes, this may be necessary 
in order to bring the project in conformity with the prevailing socio-
economic realities. This should be done in line with the law and established 
customs and without fear of favour. 
 
(e)  Establish a fair, equitable and transparent procedure for tendering and 
selection of bidders.  This is one of the core basic principles that a model 
legislative guide should contain. It should establish a standard procurement 
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procedure that ensures transparency, fairness and equal treatment of all the 
bidders. It should also contain provisions to the effect that government 
agencies or department shall not take any action which is capable of 
prejudicing the interest of any of the parties. 
 
(f) Provide detailed and enforceable remedies for any party who wishes to seek 
redress either in a court of law or through arbitration. The law should 
provide for a comprehensive procedure for seeking redress through 
arbitration or a court of law. Private parties (including the concessionaire, 
financiers and contractors) will be more encouraged to participate in PPP 
projects when they have confidence that any dispute arising between the 
contracting authority or other governmental agencies and the 
concessionaire; or between the private parties themselves can be resolved 
fairly and efficiently without wasting time. Because of the commercial 
nature of PPPs, where huge amount of money is committed to the projects, 
litigation will be undesirable. Each PPP contract should therefore provide 
for an acceptable mode of settling disputes which must, of course, not be 
antithetical or obnoxious to the allowed dispute resolution system under the 
legal framework of the concerned country. Because of the fact that PPP 
disputes are commercial disputes, there should be provision for internal 
mechanism for settlement of disputes, and it is only when this fails that a 
party can go to arbitration and finally to a court of law. Risk management 
should be made as part of the corporate culture. Where risks are properly 
managed, disputes may be avoided or minimised for cost saving purposes. 
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(g) Contain Provisions for financial incentives or government guarantees for 
the Private sector where necessary. The Model Law should contain 
provisions for government assistance to the private sector. This may be in 
form of tax breaks or guarantees that the project will be executed 
successfully. These incentives will certainly spur the private firms to enter 
into concessions and it will also make the market to be more attractive. 
 
(h) Provide for the validity of security interests granted by the Contractor over 
its assets or cash-flow and to grant step-in rights to its lenders. Due to the 
fact that most concessioners source a larger percentage of project money 
from the banks and other financial institutions, there will be a need for an 
arrangement relating to the security of the money. The law or guide may 
include a provision relating to an assurance by the government that the 
proper procedure will be followed in order to execute the project and also 
that for the purpose of the security’s enforcement, the lenders should be 
assured of the right to step in to the concession agreement. Thus, this 
mechanism guarantees the continuation and sustainability of the concession 
project and the investment. 
 
(i) Incorporate provisions that aim at addressing ways to improve 
sustainability issues in PPP procurement. Environmental and 
developmental provisions in PPP procurement law will help in developing 
green public procurement and it will further encourage more 
environmentally friendly designs. 
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The above stated recommendations are very vital to a successful PPP programme 
in the three countries examined and in any developing nation. In fact, if these 
recommendations are taken into consideration in drafting or developing a PPP 
programme, there is no doubt that the number of successful projects executed 
under PPPs will continue to increase both in terms of quality and quantity. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Interviewees and Core Issues Covered 
 
 Professor Paul Obo Idornigie has worked with the Bureau of Public Enterprises 
where he has participated in different privatisation projects. He is currently a 
lecturer at the Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in Abuja. He was 
interviewed on the legal framework for PPPs in Nigeria. He also explained a lot 
of challenges facing PPPs in Nigeria. He was interviewed at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies in Abuja, Nigeria on 06.06.12. 
 Professor M.M. Akanbi was formerly the Dean of Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Ilorin. He is an expert in commercial arbitration. He was mainly 
interviewed on Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means of settling PPP 
disputes being commercial disputes. He also explained the right of foreiners to 
participate in businesses in Nigeria. 10.06.12. 
 Mr. Oshobi is a lawyer and he is involved in the development of PPP projects 
generally in Nigeria. He is a staff of Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited and he spoke 
generally on the challenges the company was facing especially the with the 
concession of Murtala Muhammed Airport and the Lagos Ibadan Expressway 
which were granted to Bi-Courtney Nigeria Limited. The interview took place at 
the head office at Afribank Street, Lagos Nigeria on 30.19.12. 
 A staff of the Infrastructure Concession Commission gave interview on 
condition of anonymity. She was interviewed mainly on the regulatory issues 
and challenges the commission is facing in regulating PPPs in Nigeria. The 
interview took place at the Commissions head office in Abuja on 02.07.12. 
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 In Ghana, Mr Ekow Coleman of the PPP Advisory Unit of the Public Investment 
Division in Accra was interviewed. He spoke on the importance of private sector 
involvement in infrastructure development in Ghana. He also spoke on the 
procedure for granting concession contracts under the PPP national Policy in 
Ghana. The interview took place at the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning on Wednesday 9.01.13 
 Professor Bondzi-Simpson is the Dean of Law, University of Cape-Coast, 
Ghana. He was interviewed on the legal framework for PPPs in Ghana. He 
further spoke on the challenges facing PPPs in Ghana which he identified 
mainly on the lack of comprehensive legal framework. He was interviewed at 
the Law Faculty, University of Cape-Coast on in January 2013. He was 
interviewed on 11.01.13 
 Mr Lindokwule Hlatshwayo is the head of Tourism Development at the PPP 
Unit of the National Treasury in Pretoria, South Africa. He was interviewed 
generally on the regulatory issues and challenges facing PPPs in South Africa. 
He was interviewed at the PPP Unit of the National Treasury on 25.02.13. 
 Mr. Innocent Khumalo, is an Associate Partner, of Ledwaba Mazwai & Co, 
Pretoria, South Africa. Ledwaba Mazwai is a leading Law firm that is involved 
in PPPs since the commencement of the programme in South Africa. Mr 
Khumalo gave an analysis of the legal framework of PPPs in South Africa.  He 
also spoke on the historical background of PPPs and the challenges facing PPPs 
in South Africa. He was interviewed on 28.02.13. 
 Dr. Yemi Soyeju is the Coordinator, Centre for Law and International 
Development at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He was interviewed on 
the challenges facing PPPs in both Nigeria and South Africa. He also spoke on 
the challenges of PPPs in Nigeria and how this can be addressed. He was 
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interviewed on 5th and 6th March, 2013 at the University of Pretoria, South 
Africa. 
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APPENDIX B 
Questionnaire 
These questionnaire is applicable in the three countries visited for the interview. 
 Kindly tell me your name and your designation? 
 For how long have you been working in this organisation? 
 Can you tell me about Public-Private Partnerships in this country? 
 Can you give a brief historical background of PPPs in this country? 
 Are there legal and regulatory framework governing PPPs in this country? 
 When was the first legislation on PPPs made in this country? 
 What are the applicable legal  and regulatory framework on PPPs that you 
know in this country? 
 Can you just shed more light on the relevant provisions of the legislations 
relating to PPPs? 
  What are the projects executed on PPPs so far and how many of them are 
successful? 
 Is this country a federating state or unitary state? 
 Are there regulatory agencies in place to regulate and monitor PPPs? 
 Are they in place at both at the federal and state levels? 
 Is there any mechanism for dispute resolution for PPP disputes? 
 What is the procedure for dispute resolution recognised by the law? 
 Which of them is the most effective in settling PPP and other commercial 
disputes? 
 What is the position of the law on non-indegenenous contractors, can they 
participate in PPP programme? 
 What laws and regulations cover foreign participants? 
 So far, what are the challenges that you think PPP programme has 
encountered in this country and how do you think they can be addressed? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
The PPP Project Cycle 
Source: The National Treasury 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
The Municipal PPP Project Cycle 
Source: The National Treasury. 
  
  
352 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
  
  
353 
 
 
  
  
354 
 
 
  
  
355 
 
 
